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I. The French Revolution and Napoleon, i 789-181 5 

II. The Reaction, 181 5-1848 

III, The Triumph of Nationalism, i 848-1 871 

IV. Armed Peace and War, 1870- 1920 
V. Socialism and Politics, 1870- 1920 







Europe in 1789 10 

Napoleon's Empire in 18 10 28 

Europe in 181 5 39 

The Unification of Italy .110 

German Confederation, 181 5-1866 118 

The Near East, 1878-1912 . 148 

Distribution of Races in Austria-Hungary . . .153 
Europe in 1919 167 




NAPOLEON, 1789-1815 

Europe in 1789 — The Revolutionary Period — Napoleon Bonaparte — 
The War of Liberation and the Settlement of 1815 — The Age of Transi- 
tion — (a) Social and Economic Changes— (6) European Literature and the 
Romantic Movement. 

Europe in 1789 

'\ I. Tke Old Regime 

REPORT has it that Louis XV once said, "Apr^s 
moi le deluge." In making this historic observa- 
tion, however, he displayed no very startling powers 
of prevision, and his reading of the signs of the times might 
have been endorsed by any contemporary of average intel- 
ligence and education. Towards the end of the eighteenth 
century it must have been quite obvious that Europe had 
outgrown her institutions and that changes of a radical 
nature were perforce approaching, although the extreme 
imminence of the cyclone was perhaps a subject of general 
miscalculation. She was palpably oppressed by the sur- 
vival of an obsolete civilization ; her organization was still 
that of the Middle Ages, her society was still impregnated 
with the ancient principles of Feudalism and Catholicism, 
and she had not yet discarded practices and conventions 
which had lost their utility. Her institutions, which collec- 
tively ar^ termed the Old Regime, were out of date, since 


they failed to meet the conditions and needs of the age. 
Consequently, the interest of the century lies in the growth 
of criticism and opposition. An attack was made on the 
practical machinery and on the underlying ideas of exist- 
ing institutions, which, gaining in strength through the cen- 
tury, culminated in the political and social upheavals of 
the French Revolution. In practice, the rising generation 
demanded the introduction of newer and more efficient 
methods into administration ; in theory, a war was waged 
upon two of the fundamental ideas of the Old Regime, the 
principles of autocracy and privilege. 

The greater number of European States were, in the 
eighteenth century, absolute monarchies. Their princes, 
bound by custom rather than by law, and regarding their 
dominions as so much private property, looked upon good 
government as a duty owed to God rather than to their 
people. They were not infrequently accustomed to consult 
their subjects on political matters in some kind of popular 
assembly, of which the French States-General is a good 
example, but they were seldom bound to follow the advicek 
thus given, so that, in effect popular opinion and criticism,! ^ 
could only find expression in rebellion and the use of| 

England was exceptional in possessing a constitutional 
government ; her King could not make laws without the 
consent of Parliament^a body of men empowered to discuss 
and_legislate. The lovvef^ouse "of Parliament was com- 
posed of the representatives of the people, while the upper 
house represented the hereditary and privileged nobility. 
England was not a democracy and the masses of the people 
still had no power to vote for members of the House of 
Commons; but, in the measure of popularity secured to her 
legislature, she was more democratic than any other large 
European State. The executive and administrative power 
was lodged in the King and his ministers ; but these were 
responsible to Parliament for their acts, so that the execu- 
tive was, in fact, subordinate to the legislature. 

England had peculiar advantages in other directions. 


She had an equal law for all men, which did not differen- 
tiate between noble and peasant, soldier and civilian, 
government official and private citizen. No Englishman 
could be arrested and kept in prison without public trial. 
The English Press was free, and any man could publish 
what he pleased without having to obtain the licence of a 
censor. For these, and for other liberties which the British 
Constitution secured to the individual, was England ad- 
mired on the Continent, despite the fact that she stood in 
need of radical reforms, possessed little religious toleration, 
an unfairly distributed taxation, and an imperfectly repre- 
sentative legislature. In the minds of those who criticized 
the Old Regime, the demand for personal liberty became 
involved in the demand for constitutional government. 

Another salient characteristic of the Old Regime was 
class privilege. The old feudal nobility, which had once 
done good service to the monarchy, retained all its former 
privileges but had lost its political utility. The nobles were 
no longer employed in the administration, for the monarchs, 
growing jealous of them and distrustful of their power, 
preferred to govern through middle class officials. A series 
of bureaucracies, dependent on the princes, grew up, and 
the landed nobility became idle and useless. 

This was nowhere more apparent than in France, where 
the nobles retained all the rights which had been theirs 
when they were entrusted with the task of defending the 
State, without justifying their existence by the performance 
of any political or social duty. They monopolized the 
landownership and lived on the labour of others ; they 
were exempt from taxation and from many forms of public 
service ; they were given all the higher posts in the army 
and the Church. The peasants were practically their 
slaves, though in this respect the peasants of France were 
not so badly off as those of Austria and Germany. In some 
parts of Germany they might not marry or leave their lord's 
estate without permission, they had to pay heavy tolls and 
dues and devote much free labour to his land. It was just 
because the French peasant was rather better off that he 


had the spirit to resent the privileges of an aristocracy 
which did no work. 

In the same way the Catholic Church, which had in times 
past contributed so much to the civilization of Europe, 
retained in the eighteenth century a position which it no 
longer ostensibly justified. Its great wealth ministered to 
the selfishness of the aristocratic class rather than to the 
maintenance of Christianity, for the lower clergy and the 
parish priests, who were drawn from the peasant class, lived 
in bitter penury, while the higher ecclesiastical posts were 
monopolized by the younger sons of the nobility, who fre- 
quently lived the most unclerical and licentious lives, often 
professing open unbelief. The Church was hated also by 
all critics of the Old R6gime for its intolerant opposition to 
all intellectual progress and reform. It monopolized educa- 
tion, censored literature, and offered unfailing hostility to 
innovation. Most of the greatest books of the century 
were banned, and few leading thinkers escaped ecclesiastical 
censure. In some countries the Inquisition was retained. 
Current political speculation became, in consequence, in- 
fused with hostility towards religion, especially towards 
Catholic Christianity. Most of the leaders of European 
thought were agnostic, and, in Catholic countries, many 
were definitely anti-Christian. 

2. The Critics of the Old Regime 

Under these conditions a party of opposition grew up 
and, by the middle of the century, clamours for reform 
were heard. Men-begaft-tQ_speak of democracy and of 
the sovereignty of the people. These~were^Tio new~ideas, 
but they had heretofore been preached only by the intel- 
lectual few and had small attraction for the average man. 
European practice had taken the opposite direction. A 
series of terrific wars had caused the peoples of the Con- 
tinent to cast themselves upon the mercies of any capable 
rulers, to submit to any tyranny, provided that they were 
protected from their neighbours. For three centuries Europe 


had sustained that class of emergency which forms the 
excuse for despotism. Criticism slept until the compara- 
tive calm of the eighteenth century, and when it at length 
awoke, it was, at first, largely destructive. 

The leader of the attack, the most able exponent of 
the universal unease, was, undoubtedly, the French writer 
Voltaire, 1694- 1 778. Under his not very distinguished 
family title of Arouet, mention is made of Voltaire, early 
in the century, in the voluminous memoires of the hide- 
bound and conservative St. Simon, a typical noble of the 
Old Regime. The serene contempt with which the aristo- 
crat refers to the man of letters, as a negligible person of 
mean origin who is somehow managing to attract attention, 
is interesting, when it is remembered that, twenty years 
later, Voltaire was to become a leading figure, not only in 
French, but in European literature. He was one of the 
Olympians of the age, and his influence went far to form 
the minds of his successors. He launched an attack, power- 
ful if estimated on the score of literary excellence alone, 
upon the outstanding evils of the day. To his mind, the 
bane of society, the canker which must be exterminated, 
was the influence of " persecuting and privileged orthodoxy," 
the fanaticism which sent him into exile and which confis- 
cated his books. He was greatly roused by the fate of 
Calas and other unfortunate Protestants who were persecuted 
for their religion, and against Catholicism the sharpest barbs 
of his derision were directed. Politically also he was a 
critic and a thinker, and a prominent figure among those 
who admired the British Constitution. Against religion, 
authority, and tradition, he turned the powerful weapon of 
his ridicule, and, though he preached no revolt, though he 
outlined no constructive programme, he exposed the hollow 
mockeries of those sacred things which had hitherto inspired 
awe. An absolute monarchy must perforce be founded 
upon sanctions other than military power; rU re^^ ?l->gr.lq- 
t isms are supported by religion jnd the jAithority of cherished 
t raditions. _ W here faith in these is destroyed a revolution 
will soon follow. 


Europe was for forsaking her ancient gods, but new ones 
were lacking as yet. These Voltaire had no power to supply. 
His works were framed to appeal to a limited circle, and 
they could only rouse enthusiasm among the privileged and 
educated classes. They were not calculated to stir on to 
performance the more active sections of the community. 
If criticism were to be transmuted into revolt, a solvent 
stronger than ridicule must be discovered. 

This need was met by Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), 
the son of a Geneva watchmaken Kbusseau^s literary 
activity, like that of Voltaire, was exercised in various 
directions. As " a describer of the passions of the heart 
and the beauties of human nature" he was, to a certain 
degree, the precursor of that Romantic Movement which 
revolutionized European literature at the end of the century. 
Politically, however, the importance of his g reat w ork U he 
Social Con tract " outweighs all other. Here he painted an 
idealized society, a perfect denMCracyj. in .which men had 
casrofrtheiFBonds"~and acknowledged no law but that of 
the " General Will ". No startling or original truths are set 
forth; but the book possesses a quality of forcefulness, a 
specious appearance of lucid argument, which appealed to 
a very large section of contemporary European opinion. 
Therein lay its strength and its danger. The doctrine of 
the sovereignty of the people, useful in former days only to 
obscure jurists, became the fashion, when it had been thus 
- >^ elaborated by a popular and imaginative writer. AusiS^jof 
-'^^ boundless, optimism set in, and the disciples of Rousseau 
declared their complete. faith in the perfectibility of human 
institutions. This view was based on a belief in the 
essential nobility of man in his primitive and savage con- ; 
dition ; the " state of nature " was generally accepted as the 
Golden Age, The faults and vices of human -n almt; were 
attributed to the corruption of imperfect institutions, the 
institutions, against ^ which _ Voltake had in veigh ed. But 
Voltaire had never suggested that human nature, under 
any institutions -whatsoever, would be other than faulty. 
The impetus to reform came from the more hopeful^political 


philosophy of Rousseau. It seemed that a very few 
measures, the destruction of a small number of mediaeval 
suA^ivals, would ensure the return of hum anity to the^ 
Golden Age. The maxim, moreover, that all^ men are bom 
free and equal tended to undermine a social. .ordef'based^ 
upon privilege and class distinction, and transmuted into 
"natural rights" those personal liberties, already secured 
to the individual under the British Constituti on, which the 
followers of Voltaire had admired. 

The influence of Rousseau was reinforced by the Declara- 
tion o £ Ind^pen(feTTCe~iIT "America. Here a great republic 
was admIlfedIy~~ft5TIn3e3 ^ilpon the principles of the 
"sovereignty of the people" and the "rights of man." 
The most optimistic of European Reformers had despaired 
of imitating the British Constitution, so baffling were its 
intricacies in the eyes of the political student. But the 
American Constitution was simple; it required no very 
protracted study, and, in a single document which could be 
mastered in an hour, it enumerated all the principal institu- 
tions of the State and laid bare to the reader a whole 
political system. It was a constitution which could be 
copied, and the rising generation began to think that their 
goal must be a written constitution, setting forth the prin- 
ciples of Rousseau and checking monarchical power. 

3. Practical Reform and the Enlightened Despots 

The growth of opposition to the theory of autocracy was, 
however, only part of the reforming movement of the 
eighteenth century. There was, in addition, a universal ad- 
vance in material progress, and a sweeping away of obsolete 
and antiquated methods. Kings and princes, though they 
might exclude their subjects from political power^ were 
frequently indefatigable in their efforts to promote the 
general welfare. Frederick II of Prussia was their great 
exemplar ; for his extraordinary success in encounters with 
other States was generally explained by his industry in in- 
ternal reform ; and his conquered opponents were determined 


to copy him. Progress and enlightenment became the 
fashion. Joseph II of Austria, Catherine of Russia, 
Charles III of Spain and his minister Aranda, the Portu- 
guese minister Pombal, Gustavus III of Sweden, Leopold 
of Tuscany, Ferdinand of Naples and his minister Tanucci, 
the Duke of Parma and his minister Du Tillot, Bernstorff 
the Danish minister, the King of Sardinia, the Elector of 
Bavaria, and a legion of German princelings, all appeared 
to be tireless in their efforts to do good. They founded 
banks, established national credit, reorganized taxation and 
finances, encourage d mini ng and-induS-try. inapxQYed a,gri- 
culture, swept away the old tolls and dues which were in- 
juring transport, codified the laws, abolished torture, and 
undertook educational reform. In some cases, of which 
Baden and Denmark are examples, they abolished serfdom 
and taxed the nobles. They studied political economy from 
a scientific point of view, and encouraged scientific research 
in their new universities. The movement frequently aroused 
the hostility of the Church, which invariably resisted in- 
novations in education ; consequently there was, in many 
countries, a contest between Church and State, of which 
the universal suppression of the Jesuit order, one of the 
mainstays of Catholic education, is symptomatic. 

Not all these reforms were accomplished in any one State, 
but, generally speaking, improvement of some sort was at- 
tempted almost everywhere, and even the Pope was reported 
to have drained some marshes. In France alone was this 
movement of " Enlightened Despotism " -a conspicuous 
failure. Turgot, the most progressive minister of Louis 
XVI, was dismissed before he could mature his policy of 
improvement. The Queen disliked him and resented his 
attempts to restrain the extravagance of the court. Had he 
succeeded, it is difficult to say how far the Revolution of 
1789 would have gone: a wise king reconciles his people 
to despotism, it is the incompetent tyrant who demonstrates 
the evils of autocracy. The failure of Louis XVI to keep 
pace with the rest of Europe and to accomplish those re- 
forms which had been undertaken by nearly every other 


monarch was one of the most prominent features in history 
immediately before the explosion of 1789. 

The French Revolution was thus in two r espects the cul- 
mination of eigh teenth-cen tury move ments ; it was a crisis 
in a general movement towards practical reform, and it was 
a manifestation of the impact of current political^jthgory 
upon obsolete institutions. Some of the men who sat in 
the first "National Assembly" cared very little for the 
doctrines of Rousseau, and desired merely to secure for 
France the reforms undertaken by all the other States of 
Euiope. Others were fighting for political liberty, believing 
that other good would follow. Both parties were inspired 
by an extreme optimism and an inordinate faith in the 
power of human reason to solve all social perplexities, 
and both were decidedly anti-Catholic in character. The 
influence of both is seen in the constitution of 1791, a pro- 
duction which is, in its essence, the outcome of eighteenth- 
century thought. In its unifying, reforming, codifying, and 
educative aspect, it is reminiscent of the work of contem- 
porary benevolent despots ; but the influence of current 
political theory is manifested in the abolition of class 
privilege, the prodigal bestowal of political liberties, and the 
declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Principles of 
Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. 

4. The Political Map of Europe 

Before a closer examination of the movement begun in 
1789 can be attempted, it is necessary to summarize the 
political features of Europe, as they were at the beginning 
of the Revolution. Such a sketch will show how many and 
varied were the ambitions and jealousies of the Old Regime, 
and will explain why events in France attracted, at first, so 
little attention. Europe was more interested in the final 
partition of Poland, and in the difficulties of the Emperor 
Joseph II, than in the politics of the National Assembly. 
The Holy Roman Empire was the most singular mediaeval 
survival in 1789. It was a monument to the ancient idea 



that all the States in Christendom should owe homage to 
one Emperor, as all the Churches were united under one 
Pope. In the eighteenth century the Empire was merely a 

confederation of the States of Central Europe, exclusive of 
Switzerland. Germany consisted of a great many large and 
small States and free towns, each ruled by a sovereign 


prince, lay or ecclesiastical. All were members of the 
Empire, under the direction of a Diet, and of an Emperor, 
elected for life. The Archduke of Austria was generally 
elected Emperor, though the office was not hereditary in the 
Hapsburg family. There was a growing tendency among 
the rulers of the larger States of the Empire, such as 
Bavaria and Saxony, to absorb the smaller and thus to 
consolidate their dominions. Of these, the most rapacious 
had been Prussia, the rival of Austria. This kingdom had, 
under the able rule of the house of HohenzoUern, risen from 
insignificance to a position of prominence and power. She 
had lately, however, under King Frederick William, adopted 
the part of protectress of the small States against the ag- 
gressions of Austria. 

The Hapsburg dominions consisted of the Archduchy of 
Austria, the kingdom of Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, and 
a medley of Slav and Croatian provinces stretching from the 
Carpathians to the Adriatic, the fruit of piecemeal conquests 
from the Turks. Some of these provinces were part of the 
Empire, and some were outside it ; their only bond of union 
lay in the person of the Archduke of Austria, their common 
ruler, who also possessed the Milanese in Italy, and the 
province of Belgium in the north. The Archduke had a 
difficult position, amid the conflicting races and religions of 
his inheritance. In 1789 the Emperor Joseph was attempt- 
ing to introduce some kind of order and uniformity into his 
unwieldy patrimony. Everywhere, however, he met with 
opposition and obstruction, especially in Belgium, where 
local prejudices were very strong. 

To the east of Austria lay Russia, a vast, unknown, and 
savage country, which had till recently lain outside the 
sphere of European politics. Under the Empress Catherine, 
however, an aggressive policy had been pursued. In the 
south the Russians were gradually approaching Constanti- 
nople, while in the north they coveted the Swedish Province 
of Finland, and intended to dominate the Baltic. In central 
Europe their ambition was to absorb Poland, an ancient 
kingdom lying between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, which 


had fallen into helpless anarchy and decay. Russian greed 
in this direction was a trifle restrained by the attitude of 
Prussia and Austria, who demanded compensation for 
Russian annexations. Hence a series of Partitions took place 
in 1772, 1793, ^rid 1795, which ended in the complete ex- 
tinction of the Polish kingdom. Russia and Austria had 
further causes for dispute in the Balkan Peninsula, where 
the crumbling power of Turkey affected them vitally. 
Each hoped for Balkan expansion when the subject Christian 
races, the Greeks, the Roumanians, and the Serbs, should 
finally throw off the Turkish yoke. 

Among the Scandinavian powers of the North, the 
kingdom of Denmark and Norway was the most important. 
Holland, a little Republic under the Prince of Orange as 
hereditary Stadtholder, had a certain amount of prestige, 
owing to her commercial and maritime development and 
her colonial connexions. She was, together with Portugal, 
the permanent ally of England, an arrangement conducive 
to their common maritime interests. 

France, under the house of Bourbon, had lost much of 
her ancient importance, owing to the incompetence of the 
Crown. Under the well-meaning but stupid Louis XVI, 
she had lost most of her weight in European politics and 
was fast approaching national bankruptcy. She acquired, 
however, some reflected glory from her alliance with Austria 
and Spain. Louis XVI had an Austrian Queen, the sister 
of Joseph II; and France had made, in 176 1, a family 
compact of alliance with Spain, which also possessed a line 
of Bourbon kings. Spain was, however, a poor and back- 
ward country, petrified by the intolerance of a bigoted 
Church, and offering little encouragement to her reforming 
King, Charles IV. 

Italy, divided into many small States, was torn by the 
rival ambitions of Austria and France. To the French 
group belonged the Bourbon King of Naples and Sicily, 
the Duke of Parma, and the King of Sardinia, whose 
dominions included Piedmont, Savoy, and Nice. The Grand 
Duke of Tuscany, on the other hand, was the brother and 


the eventual successor of the Emperor, and the Duchess of 
Modena was their sister-in-law. There were besides three 
independent Republics — Venetia, destined to become the 
prey of Austria, Genoa, coveted by Sardinia, and Lucca. 
The Papal States, in central Italy, owed their homage to 
the Pope as sovereign prince. 

The conflicting interests here outlined persisted through- 
out the revolutionary wars, so that by 1815 we shall find 
that the small Italian Republics have disappeared, that 
Poland is completely partitioned, that Russia has annexed 
Finland, and that nearly all the smaller States of Germany 
have become the prey of the larger. These movements re- 
ceived impetus from the outbreak of war against revolu- 
tionary France, and they constantly reappear amid all the 
new motives and ideas which come into play. They 
supply material for the matchless diplomacy of Napoleon, 
and are manifested in the settlement of 181 5. To contem- 
porary eyes the wars of the Revolutionary Period might well 
have appeared as a continuance of the struggles of the Old 
Regime, as offering no break in the story of European 
ambition, and as a phase of international politics in which 
the fortunes of revolutionary France played but a second- 
ary part 

The Revolutionary Period 

I. The States General and its Work 

The meeting of the States General, which marked the 
opening of the revolutionary drama, attracted little attention 
in contemporary Europe, and was not regarded as a very 
startling or unusual step. According to ancient custom, 
the King of France could, in times of danger or difficulty, 
consult representatives elected by the three orders or estates 
of his realm, the clergy, the nobles, and the people. France 
was divided into electoral units, each of which elected a 
deputation of four members, of whom one was chosen by 
the clergy, one by the nobles, and two by the rest of the 
population. The Assembly thus elected did not resemble 


the English Houses of Parliament in function, for it could 
only offer advice and tender petitions, and it had no power 
to legislate. It was summoned and dissolved at the King's 
will. For many years no States General had met, but in 
1789 the King, on the advice of his minister, Lomenie de 
Brienne, determined to invite the co-operation of his people 
in the reorganization of the finances of the country. 

His subjects, however, did not regard this step as a mere . 
financial measure. A large section of the community was 
exasperated by the continual mismanagement of a Govern- . 
ment which was, apparently, incapable of reform. The pro- 
gressive party ascribed this to the fact that the middle 
classes, the merchants and the townspeople, had no voice 
in the administration. The nobles and the clergy exer- 
cised political power indirectly in other spheres, but the 
great majority of the people could only express their views 
through their elected deputies in the States General, which 
had not been consulted since 1 6 1 4. They were now deter- 
mined to take an active part in the reconstruction of 
the country and elected, as their deputies, the most dis- 
tinguished and public-spirited men in the nation. Though 
these represented the middle class rather than the peasants, 
they had, generally speaking, the sympathy of the poorer 
people, who hoped, in a vague and inarticulate way, that 
prices might be reduced and the general misery relieved. 

When the States General met on 5 May, 1789, the 
deputies elected by the nobility and the clergy withdrew 
into separate halls, on the understanding that each Order 
was to sit separately. To this the deputies elected by the 
Third Estate refused to agree. They took, from the begin- 
ning, a firm stand. They denied that they represented a 
mere section of the people, but announced themselves to be 
a " National Assembly " representing the nation as a whole, 
and they invited the other deputies to join them. In an 
excited meeting on the Tennis Court of Versailles they 
swore that they would not separate till they had given a 
constitution to France. 

The National Assembly had the support of a section of 


the clergy and of a small band of enlightened nobles, of 
whom the Marquis de Lafayette, an ardent supporter of 
constitutional reform, who had fought in the American War 
of Independence, is typical. The Assembly, though steeped 
in the political creed of Rousseau, and anxious to put into 
immediate practice the principles of Liberty, Equality, and 
Fraternity, was, at first, perfectly loyal to the King, desiring 
only to co-operate with him in the abolition of abuses. But 
Louis, though finding it advisable to submit to their policy, 
was influenced by the views of the reactionary party, and of 
Marie Antoinette, his Austrian wife. He could not bring 
himself to trust his people, and his wavering policy alarmed 
the populace of Paris. It was feared that he might attempt 
to disperse the National Assembly by force. Serious riot- 
ing took place and, on 14 July, a Parisian mob took the 
Bastille, the great fortress of Paris, where the political 
prisoners were kept. This event was acclaimed throughout 
Europe by all lovers of liberty, as the signal of the downfall 
of absolute monarchy in France. Nor were the people slow 
to seize the power thus tasted. In the provinces the peasants 
rose and sacked the castles of the nobles, believing that 
the days of feudal oppression were ended. The Paris mob, 
exasperated by repeated rumours of the King's intended 
flight to Austria, marched to his palace at Versailles, and 
forced the royal family to return with them to the capital. 
Thus, by 5 October, Louis XVI was virtually a prisoner in 

The National Assembly, or the Constituent x^ssembly as 
it was now called, had meanwhile drawn up a constitution for 
France. All kinds of class privilege had been abolished, 
religious toleration had been proclaimed, the old Provinces 
were replaced by eighty uniform departments, juries were 
instituted in criminal cases, a codified law was projected, 
and all public careers had been opened to men of talent, irre- 
spective of birth. These reforms were to be a lasting tribute 
to the men of 1789; they were destined to remain when 
much of the work of later revolutionaries was swept away, 
and even in the reaction after 181 5 they were maintained, 


to the permanent benefit of the nation. The new constitu- 
tion, which was completed in 1791, gave poh'tical power to 
the middle classes rather than to the masses, since it ex- 
cluded from the vote all " passive citizens " or those who 
did not contribute a certain sum to the direct taxation of 
the country. The democratic element was more distinctly 
manifested in the prevalence of elective offices, for all public 
functionaries, even judges and clergy, were to be elected. 
This provision demanded a very high level of public spirit 
and political education from the ordinary citizen, since the 
election of so vast a number of public men required sacrifices 
of time and trouble. The people of France did not prove 
themselves equal to this privilege, and elections soon fell 
into the hands of cliques and factions, especially in Paris, 
where a large number of political clubs had sprung up. 
The new executive was to be very weak, for the Assembly 
had a deep distrust of executive power. The laws, made 
by a single legislative chamber composed of the representa- 
tives of active citizens, were to be carried out by the King and 
his ministers. These were to be the servants of the State ; 
they could be criticized by the Legislative Assembly, but 
they might not sit in it Only one man realized the dangers 
latent in this provision. This was Mirabeau (1749-91) 
who had been elected as deputy for the Third Estate for 
Aix and Marseilles, although he belonged by birth to the 
nobility. This great statesman, by virtue of his outstand- 
ing ability, had soon become the leader of the National 
Assembly. During a long residence in England he had 
made a thorough study of the British Constitution, and he 
was anxious that France should follow the English model, 
whereby ministers are drawn from the Parliamentary 
majority. Thus, he thought, could she obtain a strong 
government, supported, and not impeded, by the popular 
will. But the Assembly did not realize that good laws are 
so much waste paper without a strong power to enforce them. 
They did not see, as he saw, that France was drifting 
into anarchy while they discussed the details of an ideal con- 
stitution. They did not dread, as he dreaded, the menace of 


foreign war. He placed all his hopes on the monarchy, 
and on the fund of loyalty latent in the nation. He strove 
to effect an alliance between the Court and the Assembly, 
using all his influence to persuade the King to trust his 
people. He recommended Louis to quit Paris for some pro- 
vincial town like Rouen, whence an appeal could be issued 
to the loyal forces of the nation. Paris, he said, wanted 
money, while the Provinces demanded laws. But his efforts 
were vain. His moderation was misunderstood, and he was 
distrusted by the Court and the Assembly alike. He 
died in 1791, having been unable to secure the safety of 
his country or to avert those evils which he foresaw for 

The final breach between the King and the Assembly 
was hastened by the flight of the royal family to the frontier, 
where the Queen's brother, the new Emperor Leopold, was 
massing troops. They left behind them a declaration dis- 
avowing all the work done by the Assembly. At Varennes, 
however, they were overtaken and compelled to return. It 
was no longer possible to preserve the fiction that the King 
and the Assembly were in agreement, and the issue now 
lay between the two parties in the Assembly, those who 
wished to preserve the monarchy, if possible, and those who 
demanded a Republic 

2. The Outbreak of War 

The flight to Varennes proved to Europe that the King 
was an unwilling prisoner, and Leopold began to think that 
he must intervene on behalf of his relatives. He hoped, 
however, that threats would suffice, and, in conjunction with 
the King of Prussia, he published an aggressive declaration, 
which effectually exasperated the people of France without 
giving any real help to Louis and his Queen. 

At this critical moment the Assembly dissolved itself, 
and a new Legislature, elected according to the provisions 
of the Constitution, took its place. Unfortunately an article 
in the Constitution prevented any member of the Constituent 


Assembly from re-election to the new Legislature ; a self- 
denying clause inserted by the men originally elected by 
the Third Estate, in order to prove that their constitution- 
making was not merely an attempt to perpetuate their own 
power. The effect, however, was disastrous, for it meant 
that the new Assembly was composed of untried and in- 
experienced men. The Constituent Assembly represented 
the fine and disinterested element in France, and no second 
body of men as good could be found. The new legislators 
were the second best, the ambitious, the fanatics, and the 
platform politicians. The two leading parties in the 
Legislative Assembly were the Jacobins and the Girondins. 
The Jacobins, inspired by Danton, Robespierre, and Marat, 
feared the outbreak of war as likely to increase the power 
of the King. The Girondins, led by the republican journalist 
Brissot, desired a war which would force the King into open 
opposition. They favoured the promulgation of laws against 
the clergy who would not take aji oath of allegiance to the 
new constitution, and against the nobles who had fled from 
France and were enlisting foreign support. These laws 
would, they knew, be an outrage both to the King's religious 
scruples and to his family feeling, since his own brothers 
were among these hnigris, or fugitive nobles. 

The Emperor meanwhile showed signs that he would 
pass from threats to action. He was not only concerned 
for the safety of his sister, but he was alarmed at the 
aggressive policy of the Assembly, which had abolished the 
feudal rights of princes of the Empire who held estates in 
the French province of Alsace. These rights the Emperor 
was bound to defend. Germany, moreover, was endangered 
by the unrest of the peasants who felt the contagion of the 
French example. The cause of peace was still further 
imperilled in 1792 by the death of the cautious Leopold 
and the succession of his son, Francis II, a young and in- 
experienced man. Dumouriez, the French minister, believed 
that war was inevitable, and pursued an aggressive policy, 
in accordance with popular demand. In April, 1792, 
France declared war on Austria, not realizing that Prussia 


would most certainly co-operate with the Emperor; and 
the struggle between the Old Regime and the Revolution 
took on a new and more sinister aspect. 

The first campaign spread panic in France. The dis- 
organized French army could not withstand the Prussian 
advance on Paris, and the King and Queen were suspected 
of treachery. On 19 August an insurrection took place in 
which the King was suspended from office and imprisoned 
with his family. The climax of panic and danger was 
reached in September, when the terrified mob, driven mad 
by their fear of traitors, massacred many people in the 
prisons. On 20 September, however, came the news that 
the Prussian army had been driven back at Valmy, and the 
most pressing danger was over. 

A National Convention, elected by universal suffrage, 
proclaimed France a Republic and embarked on vigorous 
war measures. Troops were recruited and trained and the 
standard of military efficiency raised. In consequence the 
French were able to occupy Savoy and Nice, to overrun the 
Austrian Netherlands and to score rapid successes in the 
Rhine Provinces. These conquests were not unacceptable 
to the conquered peoples ; Belgium, Savoy, and the Rhine 
Provinces were filled with revolutionary enthusiasm and 
regarded France as a Liberator, rejoicing when the National 
Convention announced their annexation. The war was no 
longer defensive, and waged to free French soil from the 
foreign invader, but had become aggressive. The first object 
of the revolutionary armies was to extend French territories 
to their natural frontiers, the Rhine, the Alps, and the 
Pyrenees, the second was to spread revolutionary doctrines 
throughout Europe. The people, intoxicated by their 
success, believed themselves destined to carry their new 
principles to all lands and to wage war on all monarchical 

Europe, shocked by this universal defiance, was still 
further horrified by the execution of Louis XVI in 1793 ; 
and France gradually became involved in war with the 
whole of Europe, with the exception of a few small States, 


such as Venice and Swedea Spain, Portugal, Tuscany, 
Naples, and the Empire joined the coalition against her. 
England, neutral as long as the issue merely concerned the 
internal affairs of France, was involved in war owing to the 
question of the Netherlands. England has never liked to 
see any strong power in the Low countries, and France had 
annexed Belgium and attacked Holland. France suffered 
reverses during the campaigns of 1793, ^^^ was only pre- 
served by the fact that the allied commanders quarrelled 
and would not co-operate. Few of the allies were prepared 
to make sacrifices, and Austria and Prussia were distracted 
by their extreme interest in the second and third partitions 
of Poland, 1793-95. They succeeded, however, in driving 
the French out of Belgium, while Spain attacked in the 
rear. The insecurity of France was augmented by the 
rising of La Vendue, which began as a protest against con- 
scription, but which turned into a royalist movement, under 
clerical direction. Civil war was fomented by the Girondins, 
who had lost their power in the Convention. 

3. T/ie Terror 

This combination of dangers convinced the National 
Convention of the need for a strong Government A 
Committee of Public Safety was formed which exercised 
supreme arbitrary authority through the country, and 
achieved efficiency by concentrating power into a few 
hands. It was, in effect, a restoration of the old supremacy 
of the Executive so much dreaded in 1789, for the Con- 
vention soon submitted entirely to the Committee and 
registered its edicts without comment. 

This period is commonly called the Reign of Terror. 
Under the guidance of Robespierre the Committee organized 
a system by which the people were terrorized into sub- 
mission by Revolutionary Tribunals. According to the law 
of suspects, any man denounced as an enemy to the Republic 
could be arrested. The death sentences in Paris rose from 
three a week in April, 1793, to 196 in July, 1794. Marie 


Antoinette was executed in October, 1793, and many 
nobles shared her fate. Similar tribunals in the provinces 
sent their quota of victims to the guillotine, and many 
thousands of innocent people perished. Anyone who 
criticised the rule of the Committee was struck down, in- 
cluding such revolutionary leaders as H6bert, who de- 
nounced it as unconstitutional, and Danton, who protested 
against such wholesale slaughter. 

Such a system was the outcome of panic, engendered by 
military defeat, civil war, and internal treachery. Though 
many of the nobles were innocent, yet it must be re- 
membered that others were in league with the enemies of 
France and actually fighting against her. The whole of 
the clergy were in opposition, which accounts for the fierce 
attacks made by the terrorists upon religion. Churches 
were closed, all forms of worship were forbidden, and the 
priests went in danger of their lives. 

The horror of such a Government was accepted by the 
people on account of the success with which it suppressed 
civil war and repelled the invading armies. All that was 
best in France was at the Front, where efficient men were 
rising from the ranks and the untried soldiers of 1793 were 
gaining experience. The whole strength of France lay in 
her army. No sooner was the worst danger over than a 
popular reaction against the terror took place (signalized by 
the fall and execution of Robespierre), and the succeeding 
Government, called the Thermidorians, was composed of 
more moderate men. The Committee of Public Safety was 
retained, but the number of executions decreased and several 
of the most violent terrorists were guillotined. 

4. The Treaties of Basle and the Directory 

The spectacle of a Nation in Arms was not without its 
effect at the Front, and the success of the French persisted. 
The conquest of Holland, which was formed into the 
Batavian Republic, on the French Model, deprived England 
of the only base to which she could send an army, and 


reduced her to a sea blockade and an attack on the French 
colonies. The allies were tiring of a war which proved 
difficult beyond expectation ; Prussia especially, who had 
least at stake, was willing to make a separate peace. 

On 5 April, 1795, the Treaty of Basle was signed, mak- 
ing peace between France and Prussia, in which the 
Northern States of Germany were protected from P'rench 
invasion by a fixed line of demarcation. Other countries 
followed the lead of Prussia and the first coalition was 
broken up. Peace was the more possible because, with the 
fall of the terrorists, the programme of a revolutionary 
mission had been abandoned, and the Thermidorians were 
sincerely anxious for a satisfactory settlement 

On the conclusion of the Treaties of Basle, a new Con- 
stitution was drawn up for France. It showed that the 
politicians had learnt, by their previous mistakes, that the 
administration of Government cannot be carried on by a 
legislative Assembly. An attempt was made to secure the 
efficiency of the Committee of Public Safety without its 
tyranny. Government was carried on by five Directors, 
chosen by the legislature, a new one each year. They 
appointed ministers, controlled administration, foreign 
policy, the army and navy, and were, in fact, the supreme 
Executive authority. Legislation and taxation appertained 
to two assemblies, the Council of Ancients, and the Council 
of Five Hundred, elected by a wide, but not a universal, 
suffrage. Most of the reforms of 1791 were retained, but 
many elected officials were now appointed by the Directors. 
The first aim of the new Government was to make peace, 
for the whole country desired it. England, Austria, 
Sardinia, Portugal, and the Empire were, however, still 
irreconcilable, and must be conquered before peace could 

Against Austria and Sardinia the main offensive of 1796 
was flung. Napoleon Bonaparte, a young Corsican 
General, divided the Sardinian from the Austrian troops in 
a brilliant campaign, forcing the former to abandon the 
combat and defeating the latter at the battles of Castiglione, 


Areola, and Rivoli. Austria was forced to agree to the 
Peace of Campo Formio, 17 October, 1797, yielding the 
Milanese to France, and all the territory on the left bank 
of the Rhine including Belgium. As compensation she 
annexed Venice, and was in addition secretly promised 
Bavaria, which she had long coveted, if she would evacuate 
all the fortresses of the Empire which she garrisoned in the 
Rhine district. In doing this she sacrificed German interests 
and abandoned her position of protectress of the Empire. 
Campo Formio was Bonaparte's peace, dictated and accom- 
plished by him, and at the same time he reorganized 
Northern Italy into the Cisalpine and Ligurian Republics, 
on the French Model. 

England and Portugal were now the sole enemies of 
France, and a defensive alliance between the Directory and 
Spain was made against them ; but the hopes founded upon 
this were shattered by the defeat of the Spanish fleet off 
Cape St. Vincent, 1797. The Dutch fleet were likewise 
defeated off Camperdown and Great Britain retained her 
supremacy at sea. Napoleon despaired of a successful 
English invasion and thought that the Mediterranean and 
Egypt offered better chances for an offensive, since they 
were the road to India and the East and consequently of 
great importance to England. The Directory were not 
sorry to dispatch him to Egypt for they feared his power, 
and knew that he was the idol of the people. He reached 
Cairo, and there at the battle of the Nile (1798) the French 
fleet was defeated by Nelson, and Napoleon was cut off 
from home. 

It was not long before he was sorely needed in France. 
England, encouraged by his absence, was endeavouring to 
erect a second coalition. Prussia refused to abandon her 
neutrality, but Austria was anxious to avenge the treaty of 
Campo Formio. Moreover, Paul, the young Czar of Russia, 
objected to Napoleon's annexation of the Ionian Islands, 
1797, a move which might compromise Russian interests in 
the East. France, on the other hand, had inflamed public 
opinion against her by behaviour of the most aggressive kind. 


Without the slightest justification she had invaded Switzer- 
land and founded the Helvetian Republic, while in Italy she 
had attacked the Pope and the King of Naples and estab- 
lished the Roman and Parthenopean Republics in their 
dominions. She also attacked Piedmont and Tuscany. 

These aggressive symptoms were countered by a declara- 
tion of war from Russia and Austria, and the French were 
driven from Italy. At this point, however. Napoleon 
escaped from Egypt and returned to the country which 
demanded him, A contemporary, "who was living a re- 
tired life in a remote corner of the Bourbonnais," recorded 
in his memoirs that ..." every peasant I met in the fields, 
the vineyards and woods stopped and asked me if there was 
any news of General Bonaparte, and why he did not come 
back to France. No one enquired after the Directory." ^ 

The futility of the Directory was indeed obvious, and the 
disputes between the Directors and the Councils unceasing. 
Bonaparte represented the hope of military glory, of ener- 
getic reconstruction, and of a determined and successful 
policy. Small wonder then that the country applauded 
when his troops surrounded St. Cloud, dispersed the Coun- 
cils and dismissed the Directors. Commissions were ap- 
pointed to draw up yet another Constitution for France, 
and a Provisional Government was formed, consisting of 
three Consuls. These were Napoleon, and his accomplice, 
the Abbe Siey^s, a late Director, and one Roger Ducos, a 
jurist. As a democratic movement the Revolution was 
over, and the people of France again submitted to an 

Napoleon Bonaparte 

I. The Napoleonic State 

The Napoleonic Constitution, or the Constitution of the 
year VIII, abandoned the principles of 1791 and frankly 
acknowledged the supremacy of the Executive. Govern- 

^ Fiev6e, quoted by Fisher in " Bonapartism." 


ment was vested in three Consuls, of whom the first Consul 
possessed by far the greatest authority. They appointed a 
Senate and a Council of State, which originated the laws 
and carried on administration. The laws were submitted 
to a Tribunate which could discuss but not sanction them, 
and to a Legislature which could sanction but not discuss. 
Both of these bodies were appointed by the Senate from a 
"National List" elected by taxpayers. Senate, Tribunate, 
and Legislature were but an empty tribute to an imaginary 
element of popular representation in the Government, and 
masked the fact that the Constitution of the year VUI was 
a new form of autocracy. In 1802 Napoleon was made 
first Consul for life, and in 1804 he became Emperor of the 
French, by a decision of the Senate which was ratified by 
the people in a majority of over 3,000,000 votes. Here we 
have the keynote of the Napoleonic State ; it was an auto- 
cracy founded on popular support, an Empire built on a 
plebiscite. The people voluntarily abdicated their claim to 
govern themselves. Nor was their new tyranny a light 
one, for representative government was not the only ideal 
of 1 79 1 which was abandoned. The subjects of Napoleon 
purchased a Government unprecedented in its efficiency by 
submission to a police supervision unprecedented in its 
rigour. Freedom from arbitrary imprisonment, liberty of 
thought, and of the Press were disregarded. The Old 
Regime had never produced an autocracy so effectual and 
so far-reaching in practical politics. 

In return for their renunciation of political freedom, the 
French people received good government. They enjoyed 
more practical liberty in their private lives than they had 
possessed during the democratic disorder of the Terror. 
They were secure in domestic peace and the tranquillity 
necessary to the development of trade and industry, which 
had suffered greatly from the recent internal disorganiza- 
tion and anarchy. The Napoleonic wars, with their con- 
tinual drain on the manhood and resources of the country, 
were not acutely felt as disadvantages until a decade had 
gone by. A uniform code of law was drawn up whereby 


all citizens had access to a justice which was both cheap 
and simple. The life of the country was reorganized, roads 
and hospitals were reconstructed, commercial credit and the 
currency restored, the bands of robbers who infested the 
highways were suppressed, the corruption of the official 
class was checked and a thorough system of secondary 
education was inaugurated. The people, in yielding to the 
rule of Napoleon, had to count these and many other 
material advantages against the idealist and apparently un- 
fulfilled promises of 1791. Popular religion was restored, 
for Bonaparte did not ignore its political value and recog- 
nized it as a power in the lives of men which should be 
exploited, not defied. He knew that the monarch who 
outrages the religious sentiments of his people will soon 
lose the buttress of popular support. He saw in religion a 
force wherewith to enslave men, and he made use of it ac- 
cordingly, his attitude thereon being best described by him- 
self when he said, "Religion is not made for philosophers. 
If I had to make a religion for philosophers, it would be 
very different from that which I supply to the credulous." 
He offered to restore the Catholic Church and established 
friendly intercourse with the Pope, concluding in 1801 a 
concordat with him which settled the relations between 
Church and State and constituted a State-paid and State- 
supervised clergy. Thus he transmuted a rebel priesthood 
into a powerful support, and in an impressive ceremony 
paid recognition to the newly reinstated Deity, incidentally 
drawing the public attention to his own magnificence. 

"On Easter Sunday," writes an eye witness,^ "all the 
world assembled at Notre Dame to witness the lesurrection 
of the public faith. . . . The aisles were all hung through- 
out with Gobelins tapestry, and in the most conspicuous 
parts were erected two canopies of crimson and gold 
towering with plumes of white feathers. After the priests 
had burnt incense before him on his entrance, Bonaparte 
appeared under one of these canopies with the two consuls 

^ Miss Catherine Wilmot in *' An Irish Peer on the Continent," Williams 
& Norgate, 1 801-3. 


attending, guarded by a host of generals ; the cardinal 
Caprara, the Pope's Legate, occupied the other, encircled 
by Bishops, Archbishops, priests, and deacons. . . . All 
the bishops were installed and solemnly sworn at the foot 
of Bonaparte. ..." 

This is truly illustrative of the Napoleonic methods. No 
man knew better how to capture public opinion and to 
direct it into desirable courses. Spectators on that memor- 
able Easter were never allowed to forget, in a contemplation 
of the greatness of the Church, the equally impressive mag- 
nificence of Napoleon Bonaparte. 

In the same way he built up an aristocracy, knowing 
that the pomp and pageantry of the Emperor and his court 
would appear to the people as the symbol of his greatness. 
He knew also that the ambition of human nature to rise 
in the world and to acquire superiority of status was another 
force which an enlightened despot could utilize. Emigres 
were allowed to return, if they would swear allegiance to 
him, and he surrounded himself with a new nobility com- 
posed of all those who had served him well. 

Thus he poured a new spirit into the old forms of auto- 
cracy. He was the founder of modern enlightened despot- 
ism, a far more scientific and far-reaching tyranny than any 
of the custom-bound medizeval monarchies of the Old 
Regime. The State, under him, was the moulding spirit 
of the people, training the citizens how to think, forming 
public opinion, monopolizing education, and rewarding the 
efficient and obedient. It encouraged its docile subjects by 
material benefits such as canals, harbours, roads, bridges, 
public gardens, and fortresses. It is an ideal based upon 
the study of the baser side of human nature, of man's more 
slavish qualities, his greed, his fear, his jealousy, his ignor- 
ance, his stupidity, his ambition, his superstition, and his 
love of ease. 

Both in its strength and in its weakness it offers a com- 
plete contrast to the State theory of 1789, which laid undue 
emphasis upon man's noble qualities, his passion for liberty, 
his capacity for reasoned altruism, self-sacrifice, and service, 



his ceaseless quest after truth. Bonaparte's ideal made a 
profound impression upon the autocrats of Europe ; it was 
so profound that, though they at length defeated him, they 



were in turn defeated by his ideas ; and the collapse of his 
Empire within fifteen years did not serve as an omen or a 
warning to those who, later in the century, sought to build 
on his foundations. 


2. Napoleon and Europe 

Bonaparte extended the benefits of efficient government 
and the evils of despotic bureaucracy to all the States con- 
quered by France in Europe. These increased in number 
till, in 1807, the majority of Western European States were 
included in his Empire or acknowledged his influence. Eng- 
land alone persisted in unconquered hostility, so that the 
history of his conquest of Europe eventually became the 
history of his duel with England, a duel which was carried 
on with unflagging zeal until 181 5, with the exception of 
one short interval. The peace of Amiens, in 1802, marked 
a brief truce, but none of the real issues had been settled 
and war broke out again in 1803. England had frequently 
to fight France alone. Austria and Russia soon withdrew 
from the second coalition, and Austria agreed to the Treaty 
of Lun^ville, in 1 801, yielding up all her interests in Italy, 
except Venetia. Soon afterwards the reconstruction of 
Germany was carried out, the Holy Roman Empire came 
to an end, and Francis II took the title of Emperor of 
Austria. France took all the territory on the left bank of 
the Rhine, having bribed the larger German States to 
permit this by allowing them, in turn, to absorb their 
smaller neighbours. Hence the States of Germany be- 
came fewer, larger, more powerful, and more consolidated. 

In 1805 Austria and Russia tried their fortunes again, 
and joined England in a third coalition. But they were 
no match for Napoleon, who completely defeated them at 
Austerlitz, 2 December, and forced Austria to sign the Treaty 
of Pressburg (26 Dec, 1805), whereby she ceded all her 
remaining Italian provinces to France and some of her 
German possessions to Bavaria. Napoleon was free to deal 
with Prussia, who had suddenly abandoned the neutrality 
which she had steadily preserved ever since 1795. She had 
profited by this policy ; she had secured peace when the 
rest of Europe was at war, and she had considerably ex- 
tended her territory in the recent reorganization of Germany. 
She had also preserved the peace of North German States, 


by the Treaty of 1795 ; but in attacking Hanover, a pos- 
session of the King of England, France had recently broken 
the treaty, and Frederick William III was inclined to resent it. 
Russia and England urged him to declare war, and he was 
influenced by a powerful anti-French party at court, led by 
his beautiful Queen, Louisa, and Stein, a prominent minister. 
The army, too, living on its past glories in the time of 
Frederick the Great, clamoured for war. But Frederick 
William did not join the coalition until after the battle of 
Austerlitz, and he made no attempt to co-operate with 
Russia. The Prussian army was overmatched and abso- 
lutely defeated at the battles of Jena and Auerstadt (Oct., 
1806), and the French occupied Berlin. 

Bonaparte was now free to deal with Russia, in which task 
he was assisted by the sympathetic attitude of the Poles, who 
hoped that he would restore their kingdom. After the 
defeats of Eylau and Friedland, the Tsar, Alexander I, was 
ready to come to terms, and in the peace of Tilsit, which 
followed. Napoleon obtained all his objects. In an interview 
in June 1807, he made suggestions which completely altered 
the Tsar's policy, and converted him to friendship. He 
argued that there was no real rivalry between France and 
Russia, but that their interests coincided, and that he and 
the Tsar might divide the world between them in two great 
Empires. Alexander was won, and agreed to a peace which 
gave him easy terms, abandoning thereby the cause of his 
unfortunate ally Prussia, who had to pay huge indemnities 
and yield her Polish and Westphalian provinces. Napoleon 
did not reconstitute the kingdom of Poland, but he made 
the Prussian Polish province into the Grand Duchy of 
Warsaw, under the King of Saxony, a measure which was 
represented to the unfortunate Poles as a partial realization 
of their hopes. 

So in 1807, the greater part of Europe was organized 
into subject States dependent on France. Of the vassal 
Republics of the Directory, Switzerland alone remained, 
the rest were changed into vassal kingdoms. Holland 
was given to Louis Bonaparte, Napoleon's brother ; Venetia, 


Lombardy, Modena, Parma, Bologna, and Ferrara were 
united into the kingdom of Italy, of which Eugene Beau- 
harnais, Napoleon's stepson, was vice-regent. Another 
brother, Joseph, was made King of Naples, which had been 
attacked by Napoleon in an attempt to strike at the English 
supremacy in the Mediterranean ; all the rest of Italy, in- 
cluding lUyria and the Ionian Islands, was directly joined 
to France, and only Sicily held out against the Gallic tide, 
fortified by an English garrison. 

Germany, no longer a " congeries of feudal principalities," 
was now organized into the Confederation of the Rhine, all 
the members of which were the allies and proteges of France, 
bound to her by gratitude and interest. Many princes 
were connected with Napoleon by marriage, and in the 
North, a third brother, Jerome, ruled the kingdom of West- 
phalia, which was composed of Hanover and the provinces 
taken from Prussia. 

Spain, Denmark, and Sweden were the allies of France, 
Russia was friendly, and Austria and Prussia broken. 
Great Britain remained an implacable foe, secure in her 
maritime and commercial supremacy, and able to sustain 
an untiring warfare until the tide should turn. 

3. The Seeds of Revolt 

Fate, however, was already knocking at the door, and the 
first murmurs of enslaved Europe were audible. Signs 
were not wanting that the conquered peoples would not 
for ever endure tamely an alien domination. The subject 
States had originally found compensations in the Na- 
poleonic rule ; both in Italy and Germany the people had 
benefited considerably by the possession of an eflficient 
Government. Napoleon wrote to Jerome in Westphalia : 
". . . It is necessary that your subjects should enjoy a 
degree of liberty, equality, and well-being unknown to the 
people of Germany. This will be a more powerful barrier 
against Prussia than the Elbe or fortresses. . . ." In Europe, 
as in France, Bonaparte justified autocracy by an untiring 


pursuit of the welfare of the people. But, as the war 
developed into a life or death duel with England, the mask 
of altruism was torn away, and the conquered peoples were 
sacrificed. They became aware that they were exploited 
for the military purposes of France ; huge war contributions 
were wrung from them, and they were forced to support 
enormous armies. These evils began to outbalance the 
excellencies of the French administrative system. This 
was especially apparent when, in the Berlin and Milan 
decrees, 1806-7, Bonaparte ordered all British merchandise 
to be seized, and confiscated any ship of any country which 
had touched at a British port. By this measure he hoped 
to reduce England by a maritime blockade, and with 
the navies of Europe at his back he thought he could 
starve her out and wrest her world carrying-trade from her. 
But Britain was protected by a powerful fleet and her 
supremacy in trade persisted ; the countries of Europe 
had too much need of the goods brought in English ships 
to obey the decrees. The principal effect of the " Con- 
tinental System " was to raise prices and increase the 
general discontent. 

The Napoleonic Empire suffered, besides, from the evils 
common to all autocracies. Degeneration was apparent in 
the public life of France under a system which discouraged 
independence of spirit, resource, and initiative. Napoleon had 
few subordinates whom he could trust, for efficiency and 
docility are not the most valuable qualities in a sudden 
crisis. He had incurred too much responsibility for a single 
man, but owing to his autocratic methods he could dele- 
gate none of it. And France was not the France of 1793 ; 
she was no longer fighting for freedom. Her antagonists 
fought for freedom now. For it was not financial and 
economic injuries alone which caused the people of Europe 
to rise against Napoleon. In fashioning the whole of 
Europe upon the same political mould, he had done wrong 
in a subtler, more indefinable direction. He had disregarded 
the nature and spirit of nations. From Spain to Warsaw 
he had modelled his States upon French principles, and 


the non-Gallic peoples, especially the Teutons, resented 
it. It was an attempt to enforce a uniform state idea 
upon all countries, in disregard of the fact that a people's 
institutions are the product of its history. It gave im- 
petus to the growth of national opposition which was 
originally manifested in Spain, of all European countries 
the most insensible to the benefits of French administra- 

Napoleon had deposed Charles IV, his ally, and had given 
Spain to his brother Joseph. This was the signal for a 
violent revolution against the French, and the Spanish 
insurgents were strengthened by English support. An 
English army had recently been sent to Portugal, to pro- 
tect her from attack by the French, and these forces, 
under Sir John Moore, made a diversion in order to give 
the Spaniards time to organize their defence. Napoleon 
hastened to the scene of battle, and, having effectually 
quelled the rebellion and driven the English back on Lisbon, 
he departed for Austria, under the impression that the 
Peninsular War was nearly over. He underrated the 
tenacity of the Spanish people, where their national feelings 
were aroused, nor did he foresee the genius of Sir Arthur 
Wellesley in the subsequent English campaign. The war 
dragged on, a constant drain on the resources of the Empire, 
until Spain was reconquered and freed for ever from the 
French domination. 

Austria meanwhile, fired by the Spanish example, was 
determined to try her fortunes once more. Stadion, her 
new minister, believed that Bonaparte could be defeated if 
an appeal were made to the patriotic sentiment of the 
people, but that he must be met by citizens fighting for 
their fatherland, not by the paid soldiers of an autocrat. 
He tried to rouse the patriotic feeling of Germany as a 
whole, and the attempt met with great response in the 
German provinces of Austria. The movement was prema- 
ture, however, as regards the rest of Germany ; Austria 
was unsupported, and her efforts aroused the hostility of 
Russia. After the disastrous Wagram campaign, she was 



again defeated by France and was forced to sign the Treaty 
of Vienna, yielding still more territory to Warsaw, Bavaria, 
and France. Stadion fell from power and was replaced by 

This remarkable diplomat (i 773-1 859), though possess- 
ing few of the qualities of a great statesman, was destined 
to affect the politics of Europe to a profound degree for 
nearly forty years. By birth an exclusive aristocrat and 
by temperament a rigid Conservative, his ruling passion was 
a hatred of innovation. He condemned the Revolution 
and all its works, especially the demand for representative 
government ; he distrusted all Nationalist Movements as 
arising indirectly from revolutionary sentiments ; he upheld 
throughout his career the principles of autocracy and 
legitimism. The violences, the disorders, and the mis- 
carriages of justice which had discredited the revolutionary 
era gave ample and concrete illustration to political views 
which would, under any circumstances, have been his. If 
the Revolution had been successful, it is unlikely that he 
would have regarded it with any degree of favour. But in 
that case his attack upon it would have been robbed of 
much of its force and justification. It was the apparent 
failure of so-called liberal reform which gave to his policy 
a logic and a strength which enabled him to do battle suc- 
cessfully with men of far finer temper and sounder states- 
manship. He had all the assurance of a single-minded 
individual pitted against opponents who are divided within 
themselves. He had all the strength of one who trusts no 
intelligence but his own. 

His hope was that Europe might be restored as nearly 
as possible to the conditions of the Old Regime. As a 
supporter of autocracy he had none of the hatred for 
Napoleon which inspired the policy of England and Prussia. 
As a minister of the Hapsburg Empire, which owed its 
existence to the suppression of racial differentiations, he had 
little sympathy with the Nationalist element in the uprising 
against Bonapartism. He relied very little upon the 
possible conquests of future coalitions, preferring rather to 


trick his adversary by peaceful diplomacy than to trust 
again to the fortunes of war. 

In 1808, therefore, his aim was •to win for Austria the 
friendship and alliance of France. A marriage was 
arranged, which took place in 1810, between Marie Louise, 
the daughter of the Emperor of Austria, and Napoleon, 
who had recently divorced Josephine, his first wife. The 
National Movement, instituted by Stadion, was abandoned, 
and a new order prevailed in Austria. 

The German National Movement, however, disowned by 
Austria, found new strength in Northern Germany. The 
defeat of Jena had taught all clear-sighted Prussians an 
unforgettable lesson. They saw that the new France could 
never be conquered by the old Prussia, and that the 
kingdom must be reorganized and a quantity of ancient 
abuses swept away. This work was largely undertaken by 
two great ministers. Stein and Schamhorst. 

Stein (1757-183 1) belonged by birth to the Free Knights 
of Germany. Thus, though he served the King of Prussia 
from his youth up, he was naturally inclined to consider 
the interests of Germany as a whole, rather than from the 
point of view of any one German State. He was free from 
that separatist and particularist attitude which was the bane 
of German patriotism ; he thought as a German rather than 
as a Prussianr He was one of the first to contemplate a 
real German unity, and this unity must, he saw, come from 
below rather than from above. He hoped to lay the 
foundation-stone of a German Empire by making Prussia 
a free representative State, and in preparation for this he 
wished to introduce a fuller measure of local self-govern- 
ment. He saw that people who can govern successfully 
their own towns and villages are the better fitted to rule 
the State. As an ardent German Nationalist he had always 
resented bitterly the Gallic domination, and had cast all 
his influence against the powerful Court party which had 
upheld Prussian neutrality in 1805. The defeat of Jena in 
no way changed his convictions, but he became increasingly 
sure that all hopes for the future must be based upon 


internal reform rather than upon the intervention of foreign 
coalitions. For a time it seemed as though the King would 
take his advice. Serfdom was abolished, and the privileges 
of the nobility curtailed. Reforms in local government 
were introduced. T'r* army was reorganized by Scharn- 
horst. But Napoleon, realizing the perilous import of 
these reforms, demanded the dismissal of the two ministers. 
The King was forced to comply and reactionaries were 
appointed in their places. 

The torch they had lighted was not extinguished. 
Throughout Germany resentment against the French 
domination was intense, and opposition was forming. As 
in Italy, the recent territorial rearrangements, the disap- 
pearance of so many ancient landmarks and State barriers, 
had destroyed old and local prejudices and the rising 
generation found no difficulty in canvassing the interests 
of Germany as a whole. With the disappearance of the 
old Empire, corporate feeling became stronger; it was felt 
that the Teutonic mind differs essentially from the Latin, 
and that the German State should be organized in accord- 
ance with German ideas. This movement to shake off an 
alien culture, foreshadowed in the romantic revival in 
literature, was soon to become a political reality. But 
Austria, who had sacrificed German interests at Campo 
Formio and again at Luneville, was no longer regarded as 
a leader. It was to Prussia that the young Nationalists 

The War of Liberation and the Settlement of 


I . The Fall of Napoleon 

This, then, was the temper of Europe when, in 181 1, 
Napoleon quarrelled with the Tsar. Alexander, watching 
the treatment of Charles IV of Spain, had begun to doubt 
the Emperor's faithfulness to his allies. He saw in the 
erection of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw a menace to his 


Polish provinces, and he resented the disastrous economic 
effects, in Russia, of the blockade of Great Britain. It 
seemed as though he were to be excluded from European 
affairs and pushed back into Asia. By May, 1812, war 
was imminent. Alexander knew that France had the 
active alliance of Austria and Prussia, each being forced to 
send an army to the help of Napoleon ; but he knew how 
slight were the real bonds of friendship between these 
countries. Stein, who since his dismissal had become the 
Tsar's adviser, apprised Alexander of the strength of feeling 
against France in Prussia and Germany, and of the ease 
with which a coalition might be formed, should occasion 

Napoleon invaded Russia at the head of a magnificent 
army. The Russians retreated before him, drawing him 
on into the heart of the country, and he reached Moscow 
September, 181 2. His position there, cut off from supplies 
in a desert land, with the winter coming on, was untenable. 
He embarked on a disastrous retreat through wintry Russia, 
harassed continually by enemy attacks in the rear. The 
food supplies gave out and the retreat became utterly dis- 
organi2;ed. A shattered remnant of his vast army returned 
to Warsaw to be greeted by the news of Wellington's 
victory at Salamanca. Sweden, whom Bonaparte had 
trusted to make a diversion in the Russian rear, remained 
neutral, waiting upon events; and on 14 February, 18 14, 
Prussia threw over her alliance and joined Russia. The 
PVench were driven out of Prussia, whereupon Sweden 
turned against France and attacked Denmark, Napoleon's 
ally, with the object of seizing Norway from her. 

Austria now declared herself, and joined the coalition 
at the Convention of Reichenbach. She was followed by 
several of the smaller States of Germany, who thought 
that they had better make their peace with the winning 
side, lest their former relations with Bonaparte should be 
remembered against them. The alliance of Austria was not 
won without conditions. Metternich stipulated that there 
should be no attempt to rouse the general national feeling 


of Germany against France, a course which had hitherto, 
by Stein's advice, formed part of the Tsar's programme. 
This was, to Metternich, a revolutionary and dangerous 
plan, likely to lead to the supremacy of Prussia in a united 
Germany. The war, if he supported it, was to be no 
national rising, but an old-fashioned coalition of princes, 
Russia and Prussia perforce agreed, and at Reichenbach 
the first step was taken of that great reaction which lasted, 
under the auspices of Metternich, until 1848, 

Upon the news of Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig and of 
Wellington's victory at Vittoria, Holland and the kingdom 
of Naples also joined the coalition. Napoleon could, 
perhaps, have divided his opponents, had he been willing 
to accept the peace terms offered to him at Frankfort and, 
later, at Chatillon. Some members of the coalition, es- 
pecially Austria, feared a repetition of 1793 if France 
herself was invaded. They did not desire to see the com- 
plete destruction of the Napoleonic Empire. But France 
would never yield Belgium, a condition which was England's 
" sine qua non ; " and so the war was continued. France 
was invaded, and, despite the heroic defence made by 
Napoleon and his shattered army, the country as a whole 
showed little enthusiasm for his cause. There was no 
national response like that of 1793. The allies occupied 
Paris in April, 18 14, and a provisional Government was 
hastily formed, which, following the suggestion of Talleyrand, 
the Foreign Minister, determined on a restoration of the 
Bourbon dynasty. In this way, the cause of Napoleon 
would be separated from that of France ; he alone would 
be the defeated enemy and the allies would be forced to 
mitigate the terms they dealt out to a King with whom 
they had no quarrel. Napoleon agreed to abdicate, and 
was given a large income, with the Island of Elba as an 
independent principality, and the Duchies of Parma and 
Piacenza for his wife and little son. So Louis XVIII, the 
younger brother of Louis XVI, returned to his people. 
He promised representative government, self-taxation, re- 
sponsible ministers, equality before the law, and freedom 



of religion and of the Press. His first step was to sign 
the Treaty of Paris, 30 May, 18 14, with the allies, on 
behalf of France. This reduced her to the frontiers of 

1789, with a few additions, and restored most of her colonies. 
The final settlement was to be made by a great Congress 
of all the Powers, assembled at Vienna, The vengeance 
demanded by Prussia was not wreaked, and France had 


the advantage of sending her plenipotentiary to the Congress 
upon a peace footing. 

2. The Congress and Treaty of Vienna 

The advantage of this was obvious as soon as the Con- 
gress opened. Since the fate of France was already settled, 
her representative at the Congress, Talleyrand, was able to 
stand out disinterestedly as the champion of small States, 
threatened by the greed of great Powers. He built up a 
party round France and, supported by Spain, Portugal, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Bavaria, he frustrated the policy of 
the four great Powers, England, Russia, Austria, and 
Prussia, who had intended to force upon Europe the terms 
they had previously arranged among themselves. He abso- 
lutely refused to be treated as the representative of a 
conquered country and insisted that a coalition formed 
against Bonaparte could have no quarrel with Louis XVIIL 
He further strengthened his position by fanning the 
smouldering dissensions between the allies, and playing 
upon the English jealousy of Russia and the Austrian fear 
of Prussia. In this way he broke up the solidarity of the 
enemies of France and brought his country out of that 
diplomatic isolation which is generally the lot of a recently 
defeated people. 

Under these conditions the final Treaty of Vienna was 
drawn up. In spirit it represented the views of Metternich, 
for it completely disregarded the claims of nationalism. It 
stood for legitimacy and autocracy tempered by the greed 
of powerful individuals ; that is to say, the despotic dynasties 
of the Old Regime were restored ; but, in the case of small 
and insignificant States vv'hich had been absorbed by their 
stronger neighbours, this was occasionally impossible, es- 
pecially in Germany and Italy. National ties of race and 
religion were disregarded, and the treaty expressed the 
Metternichean view of the State as possessing solidarity only 
in the person of its ruler. 

According to the main clauses of the treaty, Germany 


was organized into a confederation of thirty-eight indepen- 
dent States, of which Austria, Prussia, Denmark, and the 
Netherlands were members, for their German provinces. 
Austria and Prussia had equal weight in the Diet or ruling 
body of the confederation, and Austria fully intended to use 
her influence to prevent any closer form of union which might 
lead to the supremacy of Prussia. Belgium and Holland 
were united under the Prince of Orange as a strong barrier 
kingdom against French aggression in the North. Switzer- 
land was guaranteed by all the Powers as a neutral and 
independent confederation. Poland was repartitioned. The 
old dynasties in Spain and Italy were restored, save that 
Venetia went to Austria, Genoa to Sardinia, and Parma 
and Piacenza to Napoleon's wife. Sweden yielded Finland 
to the Tsar and annexed Norway.^ England took Malta, 
Heligoland, Mauritius, Tobago, Santa Lucia, Ceylon, the 
Cape of Good Hope, Trinidad, and the Protectorate of the 
Ionian Islands. 

This settlement was not affected by the return of Napoleon 
from Elba on i March, 1815, but, after his final defeat at 
Waterloo, the conditions with regard to France were re- 
vised and she received less favourable terms. The fact, 
however, that the French people, who had witnessed with 
apathy his abdication a year before, should have greeted 
his return with so great an enthusiasm might have been 
regarded as a gloomy omen for the Restoration. In the 
years that followed, France, chafing under the misrule of 
a reactionary clique, came to remember the good that 
Bonaparte had done and to forget the evil. It was re- 
membered that on his return from Elba he had declared 
fullest adherence to the principles of liberty and had called 
round him those revolutionary leaders whom he had mis- 
trusted in the days of his absolutism. In time he became, 
in the popular mind, the representative of the Revolution, 
rather than the inspired expositor of modern autocracy, and 
a belief arose that he had always intended to crown his 
Empire with political freedom and representative institutions. 
^ See note on p. 54. 


Through the unromantic years of the "July Monarchy" the 
legend of " Bonapartism " grew up, and the idea of a 
military empire with liberal institutions, a new domination 
of Gallic culture, found fresh strength. Of this idea 
Napoleon's nephew, who took the administrative helm in 
1848, claimed to be the true expositor. Napoleon might 
spend his exiled days on St. Helena, but Bonapartism was 
a living European force, and one of the moulding influences 
of the future. 

The Age of Transition 
(a) Social and Economic Changes 
I. The Rise of a Middle Class 

The immediate effect of great events upon the lives of 
the multitude is often exaggerated, when viewed in retro- 
spect. The way of life, the habits of thought of the large 
masses of the people are slow to change. While wars and 
rumours of wars shook the Continent, while hundreds 
perished daily at the guillotine, while the greatest army in 
history froze on the banks of the Beresina, millions con- 
tinued in the calm pursuit of their ordinary avocations, 
vitally affected, indeed, by these happenings, but never 
completely shaken out of the round of custom. Summer 
after summer the harvest was got in and the petty trade of 
country towns persisted. Yet into the lives of the small 
shopkeeper, of the peasant at the plough, .of the village 
schoolmaster at his desk, new elements were penetrating. 
Social changes are slower and less dramatic than political 
mutations but, when they have arrived, they are permanent. 
The statesmen at Vienna might restore dynasties and 
abolish Constitutions, but they could never replace the 
society of 18 1 5 by that of 1789, or remove the influences 
which had formed the character of the rising generation. 

In France the social organization of the Old Regime had 
almost disappeared. It had, indeed, received a severe 
shock throughout the Continent and would in all probability 


never completely recover its old vitality. Society in 1789 
had been largely built up on the relations between noble 
and peasant. A middle class, or bourgeoisie, existed, but 
its political influence was small. During the revolutionary 
period however, the importance of status was diminished. 
The idea that one class are born to be masters no longer found 
general acceptance. The feudal distinctions had vanished, 
and the middle class, especially in France, had developed 
in i mporta nce. Tt had profited by the spreacLot^cluc^sn 
and the redistribution of wealth. Under Napoleon, who 
was accustomed to choose his officials from among its 
ranks, it had acquired administrative experience. 

In the history of democracy the position of the middle 
class is important. When political power is snatched from 
the privileged few, it d epen ds upon "the strength and ednca:-" 
trMTqf the-middle-class^ whet her t h at ^-power is immediately 
abused_by the ig norant many. The French middle class 
demonstrated its weakness in 1789; it failed to exercise 
power with discretion. England has been fortunate in the 
possession of a large, powerful, and representative middle 
class, well able to guide her through the transitional stages 
of democracy. The growth of the continental bourgeoisie, 
and its gradual acquisition of weight and independence, is 
an important feature of the Revolutionary Period, for it is 
from this class in particular that the Liberals of the nine- 
teenth century were drawn. 

2. Tke Industrial Revolution 

The rise of the middle class is closely connected with 
great industrial and economic changes which, already ac^ 
"cbmprished in England by 1S15, were to transform the 
Continent in the near future. 

A country which turns from agriculture to industrial 
production and manufacture is generally said to be under- 
going the Industrial Revolution. England suffered acutely 
from the social and economic effects of this change in the 
period 1789-1815. The conditions then prevalent were 


reproduced in France in the thirty years following the 
Treaty of Vienna ; they reappear in Russia and Germany 
towards the close of the century. Consequently some 
analysis ot the English Industrial Revolution will cast light 
upon the general effects of the same process in other 

Prodjictinn in the early part of the eighteenth century 
was organized upon a comparatiyely„small scale. Each 
little village and town provided for its own needs. Many 
towns and districts specialized of course, even then, in the 
manufacture of ^oods.„ for foreign export, and large scale 
production was on the increase. But this was limited by 
the inadequacy of communication and transport, which 
forced nations, towns, and hamlets to be more or less self- 
sufficient. There were, generally speaking, no large fac=- 
tories ; goods were made on old-fashioned hand machines, 
worked by the people in their own homes. The village 
blacksmith, the village weaver, the shoemaker and the dyer, 
these were the principal producers of the country. They 
met the needs of a small district. Nor was industry 
necessarily divorced from agriculture, and bound up with 
urban life. These village craftsmen might well possess a 
cow or two, or a small farm, while spinning and knitting 
was a by-industry in many an agricultural labourer's cottage. 
Most skilful craftsmen worked for themselves, not for an 
employer ; the weaver owned his loom, the blacksmith his 
forge, and the potter his wheel ; and though the more 
prosperous might have journeymen and apprentices under 
them, these looked forward to becoming independent in 
their turn, when they had learnt their trade. 

This kind of production, by a host of small workers, 
could only meet a very limited market But, as the century 
advanced, fresh markets were found for English industries, 
owing to our increased naval power and the acquisition of 
fresh colonies. These demanded a much larger production, 
which, in its turn, required newer and more efficient methods 
of manufacture. The old hand machines were replaced by 
newer inventions, and this transformation received impetus 


from the discoveries of science. The application^_by_Watt, 
of steam power to mechan ics had a revolutionary effect 
upohlndustry, since a machine driven by steam could do 

The poor people could not afford to buy these new, 
elaborate, and expensive machines, nor could they compete 
against a system which produced goods at a much cheaper 
rate. They were thus forced to hecome the servants, of -the. 
new mach inf '^wnf;rs, who were rich men , and pxoduction 
Avas concentrated into the hands of a few large producers. 
The poor man, who tended a machine which was not his 
property, could no longer hope to rise to be a manufacturer, 
and the great increase of wealth which these new methods 
brought into the country all went to enrich his employer, 
so that as therich grew richer the poor seemed to become 
p oorer. _ ~ 

Town and country became more divided, fo r the workers 
were naturally gathered together near the machines, not 
spread abroad in many villages. New— tQwns_spraiig_u.p-i«- 
the_CQaI-a nd iron districts, towards which the population 
gravitated. Large numbers of people were thrown out of 
employment and were glad to take the most miserable 
wages, if they could get work. As Mr. Marvin has said : 
" Man's_pgwer_of production and of controlling nature had. 
outrun his moral powers and his social organizations . . . 
the machine_cqntrolled the man." At the end of the century 
England was a very wealthy country, and the foremost 
manufacturing, industrial, and commercial power in the 
world, but her working classes were suffering from a con- 
siderable depression. The rich owned the means of pro- 
duction and the raw material, while the poor owned merely 
their capacity to labour, a commodity which was cheap be- 
cause overplentiful. Tiifijn ass of the peop le had no educa- 
tion and lived at starvati on level, while the laws discouraged 
any attempt on their part to better their own condition. 
In the nineteenth century other^ u ropean countries followed 
the example ot H-ngland and began tn prndnre nn a lai ^e 
s cale for world markets, with f^e: samft Hjg astrous effec t 


froro the point -o£-jdfiw_Q Lthe working class ; and, as the 
movement became more universal, the tenor of social 
grievances lay no longer in the relation of landlord and 
peasant but between ca pital and lab ouf- 

Until 1815, however, England had a practical monopoly 
of the new industrial machines, and she consequently sup- 
plied the markets of Europe with her manufactures. This 
was the secret of her success Jn fighting Napoleon,^ who, for 
all his Milan Decrees, was aware that the majority of his 
subjects were glad enough to purchase English goods. 

After peace was declared, this specialization of industry 
became a moving force in that solidarity and int erdep en- 
dence of European interests which forms so large jt featur e 
of^ntneteehth-ceritury history: — Natien*^ h<^rarnfi less self- 
sufficient as each strove to produce, not for its own needs, 
but for a world market. The capital invested in the de- 
velopment of the natural resources of backward countries 
often came from richer neighbours ; and the scientific inven- 
tions of the century, the railways, telegraphs, telephones, 
and aeroplanes were the inheritance of all alike. War be- 
came a more shattering thing, and a breach between 
nations more fatal to social and economic life. Europe 
became an economic unit, despite the gradual development 
of the separatist tendency known as nationalism. During 
the Revolutionary Period there is thus a distinct manifesta- 
tion of that dualism, that interplay between national and 
international forces, which constitutes so dominating a 
characteristic of subsequent history. 

{b) European Literature 

It is in literature especially, and in the general develop- 
ment of European thought, that the unity of Western 
culture and the interdependence of ideas may be discerned. 
The give and take of literary inspirations during the years 
1 789-181 5 is at startling variance with the fact that Europe 
was at war nearly all the time. Scientific research receives 
tremendous impetus, and a group of great thinkers, un- 


concerned by national disputes, and linked by a common 
aim, reap the rich fruits of the toil of earlier scientists. The 
effect, upon social life, of the application of scientific re- 
search to industrial mechanics has already been mentioned. 
The Revolutionary Period witnesses the earliest among a 
great series of inventions which were to transform human 
existence in the following century. Nor was the sphere of 
scientific speculation and original enquiry neglected. The 
early nineteenth century was the Golden Age of scientists. 
The foundations of electrical research were laid by Galvani 
and Volta ; Lamarck prepared the way for Darwin ; 
Lavoisier and Cavendish opened new avenues in the study 
of chemistry. Between these Titan leaders there existed a 
constant interchange of ideas, establishing, in the words of 
Lavoisier, a community of opinion "so close, that the 
separate intellectual property of each was all but completely 
merged in the general stock." Bonaparte, fully appreciat- 
ing the lustres of reflected glory, was anxious to become 
the friend and patron of this European group. Volta, a 
native of Como, was called to Paris in 1801 in order to 
show his experiments in electricity, and was afterwards 
made a senator in the kingdom of Lombardy. Sir 
Humphry Davy was invited to lecture on his work in 
Paris, at the very height of the war between England and 
France, Cavendish, who died in 18 10, was made one of 
the eight foreign associates of the Institute of France. The 
consequent impression upon the European mind was not 
without its effect. It was remembered that Lavoisier, the 
founder of modern chemistry, had perished at the guillotine, 
and that the Committee of Public Safety had replied to a 
petition for his reprieve, ' ' The Republic has no need of 
Savants." The obvious contrast was calculated to reconcile 
many erstwhile republicans to an Emperor who could ap- 
preciate the value of intellectual progress. The domination 
of F'rench culture was winning fresh strength from its 
association with international science. 

In another direction, however, in the field of pure litera- 
ture, France was losing ground. In the Romantic movement 


she gained little from the mutual reaction of National 
inspirations, until after the close of the Napoleonic era. 
This movement, beginning in the Teutonic countries and 
spreading by degrees to the Latin, is indicative of much 
more than a revolt against literary form. It is expressive 
of a new attitude of mind. All art and literature express, 
directly or indirectly, man's view of himself and his relation 
to the world around him ; and this is especially true of 
the literature of the eighteenth century, of its poetry in 
particular. It is permeated with the spirit of the age, a 
spirit which, on the Continent, is signified by the domina- 
tion of French culture and of French conventions of form. 
In England it finds expression in that classicism which is 
the foundation of the French convention. The works of 
Pope, Goldsmith, and Voltaire depict with fair accuracy 
the state of mind of educated people in the middle and 
upper classes. They are a self-satisfied community, essenti- 
ally town-dwelling, with an intense appreciation of their own 
superiority to the barbarous rustic. Nature, and scenes from 
nature, are described from the point of view of the urban 
tourist, whose eye "roves from joy to joy" with the com- 
placency of the landscape gardener. Their attitude to the 
past, with the exception of the Augustan past of the 
classics, is one of contempt for the unenlightened habits of 
their "rude forefathers." Towards religion they manifest 
a heavy approbation or a polished scepticism. They are 
creatures of wit and sentiment rather than passion, morally 
reflective rather than emotional. They are a society 
thoroughly satisfied with their own achievements, with a 
superb belief in the possibilities of human enlightenment, an 
optimism which received concrete expression in the events 
of 1789. The revolt against this domination of a uniform 
culture came first from the non-Latin races. It was partly 
a revolt against accepted literary form, against the polished 
and stilted diction of the classics, the heroic couplets of 
English, the Alexandrines of French convention. Beauty 
was sought in new methods of technique, in unconventional 
rhythms and verse forms. But the young Romantics would 


not thus have sought for new ways in which to express 
themselves, had they not been stirred by thoughts which 
could not be expressed in the language of Pope and Vol- 
taire ; thoughts which, existing before the Revolution, 
received considerable impetus from events at the end of 
the century. Man, seen in the light of the revolutionary 
wars, became a creature of passion rather than of reason, 
a victim rather than a conqueror. The imagination of the 
poet could no longer dwell with complete complacency upon 
the achievements of collective culture, but was penetrated 
by a realization of the sufferings of the individual. A 
literature grew up expressive of the conflicting emotions of 
troubled times, the passionate melancholy of shattered 
illusions. Poets who, like Wordsworth, had witnessed 
with such joy the downfall of the Bastille, in that dawn of 
their hopes " when to be young was very heaven," were 
forced to seek for new ideals. Some found refuge in 
cynical gloom ; others, of greater metal, achieved a new 
optimism, based rather on faith in the ultimate purposes of 
God than on the present triumphs of mankind. Religion 
in its emotional appeal became once more a living reality 
to the poets, for a sense of the incomprehensible had come 
back to man. A new love of nature and of natural beauty 
permeated literature, no longer finding expression in the 
catalogued scene of the set description, but as a force of 
mystery and imagination, above and beyond human life. 
The supernatural and the uncanny acquired a new value 
in literature ; ghosts once more pervaded poetry and fiction, 
for the Romantics, with their love of the mysterious past, 
fully realized their dramatic appeal. From history the 
new movement drew enormous inspiration, recognizing 
the effectiveness of mediaevalism, with its picturesque 
settings and its vivid human interest. Knights and ladies, 
robber barons and hooded friars became, in the hands of 
lesser luminaries, a procession of brilliant puppets; but 
from the pen of a master like Scott they come to us as 
vital portraits, suggesting the unity of human emotions, 
the eternal kinship of human nature, which, despite 


progress, culture, and civilization, remains for ever the same. 
The literature of the past was ransacked, and the older 
forms of verse, the ballads and folk-lore of the people, 
became fresh sources of inspiration. The sphere of the 
antiquary was invaded and the new generation found 

Magic casements opening on the foam 
Of perilous seas and faery lands forlorn. 

The immortal poetry of traditional folk legends was re- 
discovered, and the possibilities of the popular dialect in 
lyrical poetry were developed. In England, Bishop Percy 
published a Collection of Ancient Poetry, 1760-65, con- 
taining many fine old ballads, which had an enormous 
influence upon continental literature. Another equally 
important English work, from the European point of view, 
was Macpherson's " Ossian," purporting to be a translation 
of a collection of old Celtic poetry, which, though a fake, 
inspired many a German poet to research in the ancient 
literature of his country. Scott followed upon the efforts 
of Percy with his "Border Minstrelsy," and in his own 
use of the ballad form shows the influence of Burger and 
other German Romantics. This was a time when trans- 
lations were fashionable, though the literary movement 
took an individual form in each country, the poets and 
critics of each group found their chief inspiration in the 
study of their contemporaries elsewhere. In ^akespeare 
is to be found the greatest influence of all ; his works in 
this period were eagerly studied and translated into most 
European tongues. 

The German Romantic Movement, while bearing witness 
to all these influences, has an especial significance of its 
own. It is part of the revolt of a people, part of the 
attempt to liberate Teutonic thought from the Latin domina- 
tion. In the time of Frederick II the cultured classes of 
Germany habitually spoke French, and despised their own 
tongue as barbarous. They could only admire the masters 
of French literature ; classicism to them meant the supremacy 


of Gaul. The literary revolt, with its emphasis on the 
romance latent in the historic past, its researches into the 
folk-lore, the ballad songs, the traditional legends of the 
people, and its quest for verse forms which would set forth 
the peculiar beauty of the German tongue, was essentially 
a national revolt Language and literature are binding 
forces in a nation, and in Germany a literature had to be 
created. The common aim of the German Romantics was 
to provide expression in thought and literature for a purely 
German consciousness, which had its origin in this period, 
and which found practical expression in the war of liberation. 
The way was prepared by Lessing (1729-81), in whose play, 
" Minna von Barnhelm," reflecting as it did the spirit of 
Germany at the close of the Seven Years' War, the first 
links of German nationality were forged. Moreover, 
Lessing's warm appreciation of pure classical beauty had 
no small influence on his disciples, and in this respect he 
was more important as a critic than as a creatorj, He pre- 
pared the way for that union of Romance and Classici^n 
which gives so potent a charm to the German school. 
The classicism of Lessing and Goethe lent an enduring 
strength to their work, and reflecting, as it did, the ideals 
of Greece rather than of Rome, a return to Hellenic rather 
than Latin inspirations, it had no power to rob German 
literature of its essentially national character. 

There grew up a school of poets and men of letters, 
mostly associated with the ancient town of Weimar, who 
set before themselves the great task of creating a German 
literature. Of this group, Goethe (i 749-1 831) was the 
commanding figure, the master mind. In him the German 
people possessed their first great national poet, and they 
owe as much to him as the Anglo-Saxon races owe to 

An early and important influence upon Goethe's art was 
that of Herder, whom he met in 1779. Herder had 
already won fame as an authority upon national poetry ; 
he had collected traditional ballads all over Europe, even 
among the Serbs, the Lapps, and the Finns. He called 


the attention of the young poet to Ossian, awakened in 
him an appreciation of Shakespeare, and roused him to a 
realization of the superiority of Homer over his Latin 
imitators. These influences are all manifested in Groethe's 
later work. His first masterpiece, " Gotz von Berlichingen," 
is the history of an imperial knight in the Middle Ages, 
and shows a complete picture of Germany in the sixteenth 
century. It was an exposition of the historical side of the 
Romantic movement, and it was the first appeal to the 
German spirit and to that national courage which is founded 
upon the memory of a glorious past. The classical element 
in his inspiration, on the other hand, found expression after 
his journey to Italy in 1788, when he wrote " Iphigenia," 
a work of great beauty, permeated by the purest classical 
ideals. After his return from Italy, Goethe met Schiller, 
and there grew up between them a historic friendship, rich 
in literary fruit. It was after meeting Goethe that Schiller's 
masterpieces, " Maria Stuart," "William Tell," " The Maid 
of Orleans," and the " Bride of Messina," were written, and 
Goethe, during the period of their friendship, wrote 
"Egmont," "Hermann und Dorothea," and " Wilhelm 
Meister," fulfilling his early promise and giving to the 
world a sublime exposition of the soul of a nation. The 
whole of Germany lives in these magnificent works, as 
Elizabethan England is immortalized for us in the plays of 

After the death of Schiller in 1805 Goethe wrote " Faust," 
a work upon which he had brooded for the greater part of 
his life. It presents that titanic struggle of good and evil 
within the human heart, common to all time, the psycho- 
logical drama, to which the mediaeval setting is but an 
accessory. " Faust " was an expression of the philosophy 
of one who had seen the rise, zenith, and decline of the 
revolutionary movement, and who had discovered that, 
in all the mutations of collective humanity, the initial 
problems of the individual are essentially the same. 

France, as a Latin country, and as the home of the 
classical tradition in literature, did not succumb to the 


Romantic movement until after the first decade of the 
nineteenth century. In 1789 French culture dominated 
Europe and French literature expressed an attitude of 
mind which, in things political, took shape in the Revolu- 
tion. The reaction against classicism did not affect her 
until the next generation, and her Romantic poets, who had 
mostly lived in exile, returned to her with the Monarchy. 
The most popular literary works, on the eve of the Revolu- 
tion, were steeped in the traditions of the eighteenth century 
and contained no hint of the Romantic revolt. The History 
of " Paul and Virginia," by Bernardin de St. Pierre, which 
took France by storm, described the lives of two children 
brought up on a desert island, in whose lofty sentiments 
the fashionable view of the " noble savage " is embodied. 
The impossibly artificial " state of nature " here set forth 
was one to which only a highly civilized and town-dwelling 
population could give credit. The comedies of Beau- 
marchais, on the other hand, especially his inimitable 
" Marriage of Figaro," carry on the best traditions of 
French satire. They paint the society of the Old Regime 
with its cynicism and its lack of ideals, and in scarcely 
veiled attacks upon the privileges of the nobility they are 
significant of the prevailing social discontent. Literature 
did not flourish during the revolutionary era, except in 
pamphlet and journalistic form. Classicism still prevailed 
in the Napoleonic State, modelled as it was upon Latin 
precedents, with its consuls, its senators, and its toga clad 
officials. Even in women's dress the classical vogue was 
apparent where each outdid her neighbour in her efforts to 
imitate the draperies of classical statuary, and " many in 
Juno's bright tiara and leopard mantle assumed the goddess, 
and decked themselves with cameo Joves." In this society 
the inspirations of Romance found no place. Moreover, 
literature of any kind languished under Napoleon. Al- 
though he cherished a personal enthusiasm for " Ossian," 
a work which he kept under his pillow, the Emperor did 
not, by his methods of government, encourage the produc- 
tion of great poetry. Of this he was apparently aware, for 


he is reported to have said that he had heard there was no 
literature and that he must speak to the Minister of the 
Interior about it. 

The most brilliant French writers lived in exile, during 
the latter part of the first Empire. Madame de Stael, the 
daughter of Necker, having written a book in praise 
of German literature, received the following communica- 
tion from the chief of police : "... it appears to me 
that the air of this country does not agree with you, and 
we are not yet reduced to seek for models among the 
nations you admire." This police supervision explains 
the sterility and lack of inspiration in the literature of the 
period. The Romantic movement was still a non-Latin, and 
in some respects an anti-Latin, revolt, and such is its 
historical significance. It is typical of the reaction against 
the ideals of the eighteenth century, and marks the transi- 
tion to modern thought. But it is not until the succeeding 
period that the full import of this transition can be 

Note. — The Union between Norway and Sweden was dissolved at the 
Treaty of Carlsbad, 1905. 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 

Nationalism and Liberalism — The Holy Alliance — The Revolutions of 
1830 — The Explosion of 1848 — Changing Europe : (i) The End of the 
Romantic Movement; (2) The Rise of Socialism. 

Nationalism and Liberalism 

A POPULACE which has acquired the habit of revo- 
lution does not easily recapture its old reverence 
for long-established authority. It will assuredly 
fail to do so in mere obedience to an international treaty, 
and this the reactionary statesmen of 1815 were soon to 
discover. Exiled kings might return to their capitals with 
much pomp and circumstance, and the Mass might again 
be sung in a hundred cathedrals; but the peoples of 
Europe, though they might, for the sake of peace, acquiesce 
in the Restoration, retained as yet their memories of other 
days. They had seen kingly and priestly power laid low 
in the dust ; it appeared to them by no means impossible 
that such scenes might be repeated in the future. Metter- 
nich and his colleagues had succeeded in restoring most of 
the forms of the Old Regime. But they could not rein- 
spire these antiquated practices and policies with any vital 
idea. The animating spirit of the mediaeval past was gone 
beyond recall. 

Yet, despite all opposition, Metternich succeeded in 
maintaining for thirty-three years the system which he 
had forced upon Europe, and he continued to be the guid- 
ing spirit of continental politics until 1848. His strength 
was founded on the weakness of the opposition. His 
system might be atrociously bad and his principles en- 
tirely unsuited to the needs of the age, but, during the 



early years of the Restoration, no other constructive pro- 
gramme was forthcoming. The people of Europe, though 
aware of continual political and social irritation, did not 
at first clearly discover the source of their discomfort. 
The political creeds of 1791 had become obsolete and they 
had no other wherewith to oppose Metternich. Hence 
their tacit submission to institutions which they had long 
outgrown, and hence also the unorganized and inarticulate 
character of the first popular uprisings. Constructive op- 
position grew but slowly, for it stood, in 181 5, in dire 
need of new men and of new ideas. Not till a decade 
had passed was there any attempt at the formulation of a 
programme, among the rising generation ; and this pro- 
gramme was eventually constructed upon the nineteenth 
century principles of Nationalism and Liberalism. 

Liberalism, as a practical political creed, took the place 
of the abstract and philosophic democracy of the eighteenth 
century. It represented a compromise between the reali- 
ties of European politics and the ideals which had inspired 
the Revolution, the ideals of individual liberty, political 
freedom, and self-government. It was, like all compro- 
mises, unromantic, and it was the product of sober thought 
rather than of emotion. In 181 5 the ideas of 1791 had 
been discredited by a series of appalling crimes committed 
in the name of liberty, by the excesses of the Jacobins, 
and by the tyranny of Napoleon. It had become apparent 
that the past could never be eliminated by the construction 
of new constitutions on paper, and that human nature 
could no longer be regarded as approaching perfection. 
These realities weighed heavily upon would-be democrats : 
to many they justified the restoration of the Old R6gime. 

In time, however, a new generation grew up to whom 
the horrors of the Terror were merely history, and who 
found the fallacies of the Restoration a most distressing 
reality. Young Europe began to ask itself whether the 
failure of France to realize her ideals in 1789 constituted 
a sufficient argument against all progress and reform what- 
soever. Absolute democracy might be a Utopian dream, 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 57 

but that was no proof that the Government might not be- 
come more popular with advantage. Crimes might have 
been committed in the name of liberty, and the principles 
of freedom of religion, of speech, of the Press, and of public 
meeting might have been abused ; yet these things might 
remain essentially good. A party arose who demanded 
that the principles of 1 789 might be allowed, in a modified 
form, to influence European politics. Some Liberals de- 
manded more radical changes than others, but all were 
united in looking to the future rather than to the past, and 
all believed in the progress if not in the perfectibility of 
the human race. They took their stand upon the axiom 
that it is, on the whole, better and safer for a democratic 
people to make mistakes in the attempt to govern itself 
than to submit blindly to the rule of an autocrat, though 
he be the wisest and best man upon earth. They admitted 
the risks of democracy, but they maintained that the risks 
of autocracy were greater and its ultimate downfall more 
complete. It is this principle which distinguishes the 
Liberals of the nineteenth century from their predecessors, 
the disciples of Rousseau, who would never have admitted 
the capacity of a democracy to make mistakes. The chief 
merit of " the general will " in the eyes of the men of 1789 
had lain in its supposed infallibility. 

The development of the principle of Nationalism is 
closely connected with the rise of Liberalism as a political 
creed. In the preceding period the origins of the nationalist 
movements of the century were discernible; in the years 
1815-48 they took shape and found powerful exponents. 
The treaties of Vienna had ignored certain natural bonds 
among the races of Europe, bonds of religion, language, his- 
tory, and tradition, which form an essential part of the spirit 
of unity in a nation, and which demand recognition from 
any intelligent State-maker. In 181 5 Catholic Belgium 
was united to Protestant Holland under a Dutch King ; 
Catholic and Celtic Ireland was part of Protestant England ; 
Greece and the other Christian Balkan races were still under 
the Turkish yoke; Poland was partitioned among three 


Powers ; the Slav and Magyar peoples in the Hapsburg 
dominions were entirely dominated by the Germans ; and 
the national ambitions of Italy and Germany were com- 
pletely frustrated. 

These wrongs to the spirit of peoples demanded remedy 
before there could be any hope of democratic or liberal 
reform, since no country could be truly democratic where 
the national ambitions of the people were continually 
thwarted. Such a condition presupposes an element of 
despotism in the Government, and Nationalism and Liberal- 
ism are both founded ultimately upon the view that a 
people has a right to choose its own rulers. So much 
they have in common, though subsequent history suggests 
that a Nationalist need not necessarily be a Liberal and that 
the two creeds are not always sympathetic. The most 
ardent Nationalists are often prompt to deny freedom to 
other countries, a fact which became clear in 1848, when 
the champions of Magyar freedom would grant no conces- 
sions to the Southern Slavs, and German patriots wasted 
their opportunities in their eagerness to check the National- 
ist movement in Bohemia. Nationalism is often the best 
friend of autocracy, and many a country has renounced 
political freedom in her struggle to satisfy her Nationalist 

In the first half of the nineteenth century, however, most 
Nationalists were Liberals, for Mettemich united the two 
creeds by his opposition to both. Of this earlier type of 
Liberal-Nationalist the Italian Mazzini is a good example, 
uniting, as he did, a cosmopolitan Liberalism and a sympathy 
for the struggle for freedom in all nations with an intensely 
Nationalist devotion to his own country. Nationalism was, 
with him, a religious principle. He looked upon the 
nation as related to humanity as the family is related to 
the State ... "a divinely constituted group with a special 
mission of its own, to be pursued independently, though in 
association with the groups around it." " To break up a 
nationality," he said, " was to deny to it the right of free 
and natural self-development." 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 59 

This view of the rights of peoples presents a strange 
contrast to the cynical Nationalism of the end of the cen- 
tury, which substitutes reciprocal egoism for the idea of 
mutual service. Though first and foremost an Italian, 
Mazzini did not cease to think as a European and to re- 
member continental interests as a whole. And he never 
lost the conception of duty in his struggle for national and 
liberal rights. Born in 1805, he was, as early as 1821, 
penetrated by "the idea of an existing wrong in my own 
country, against which it was a duty to struggle, and the 
thought that I too must bear a part in that struggle." In 
1830 he was exiled and spent the greater part of his life 
away from his beloved country, yet always working in her 
service. Mazzini was the type of Liberal-Nationalist who 
was conquered in 1848. In that year the champions of 
progress and reform raised the standard against Metternich 
and the reactionaries, and saw their cause lost and their 
hopes ruined. Despite the fall of Metternich, the fatal 
year ended in the apparent triumph of Austria, and the 
principles of autocracy, clericalism, and anti-nationalism, 
which she represented. The revolutionary party failed be- 
cause its creed was still indefinite. Aware during the crisis 
of the discrepancy between the aims of Nationalism and 
Liberalism, the insurgents did not know how to choose. 
The people of Germany hesitated between a liberal con- 
federation and national unity under a monarchy, until it was 
too late. The same problem confounded the revolution- 
aries in Italy. The Magyars were more eager to fight the 
Southern Slavs than to secure their own liberty. The 
energies of revolutionary Europe were wasted because they 
were undirected. It was not until the next generation 
that men arose who organized these dispersed forces and 
who definitely pointed out to the people the objects of 
their pursuit. And these men did not preach the creed of 
Mazzini. They moulded Europe, but not on the sure 
foundations suggested by the man who wrote : — 

" If you would emancipate yourselves from the arbi- 
trary rule and tyranny of man you must begin by rightly 


worshipping God. ... It was because I saw these two lies, 
Machiavellism and materialism, too often clothe themselves 
before your eyes with the seductive fascinations of hopes 
which only the worship of God and truth can realize, that 
I thought to warn you. . . . The sole origin of every right 
is in a duty performed." ^ 

The Holy Alliance 
I. The Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance 

Before leaving Paris in 1815, the principal Powers as- 
sembled there signed two important documents. The first, 
drawn up by the Tsar Alexander, constituted a kind of 
league of benevolent despots, and was intended to introduce 
a moral principle into international relations. The Tsar, 
in whom a strong religious feeling had recently been excited, 
had come to realize that, so long as the foreign policy of 
each State was based upon mere expediency without refer- 
ence to the common good, very little hope could be enter- 
tained of an ultimate and lasting peace. The Holy Alliance 
was a monarchical confession of faith, in which the signa- 
tories declared their intention of basing their policy solely 
on " the sublime principles of the Christian religion " and 
of rendering brotherly help to each other in so doing. The 
scheme sums up the desire, probably strong in Europe, of 
avoiding the calamity of war in the future. Alexander 
rightly diagnosed national egoism as a principal cause of 
war, and hoped to substitute association and co-operation 
for antagonism and competition. His ideas were those of 
a true pacifist ; but the other statesmen, who, to please 
him, signed the Alliance, saw in French ambition the sole 
cause of the disasters which had lately befallen Europe, and 
sought to render war impossible by crippling F>ance and 
restoring the Old Regime. Thus they sowed the seeds of 
future wars, and the Holy Alliance was doomed at the out- 
set by the attitude of those who regarded France as " the 
enemy." It became a weapon in the hands of reactionaries 

^ Mazzini, Preface to " The Duties of Man." 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 61 

rather than a harbinger of peace, and its history exemplifies 
very clearly the difficulties besetting any international 
league after a great war. It bound no power to any definite 
course of action, since it was not a treaty. Most statesmen 
derided it secretly, though they signed it out of compliment 
to the Tsar. England was the most important of the dis- 
senting Powers ; Castlereagh thought the language of the 
document too ambiguous, and could not imagine how he 
was to explain it to the House of Commons. The Prince 
Regent, however, wrote a letter expressing warm sympathy 
with the lofty aims of his brother sovereigns. 

England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia also signed a second 
equally important document, which constituted a complete 
exposition of their secret intention to continue the coalition 
which had conquered Napoleon and to maintain their supre- 
macy in Europe. In the formation of the Quadruple 
Alliance the four Powers hoped to safeguard the Treaty of 
Vienna against revolutionary outbursts and against renewed 
hostilities on the part of France. The return of Napoleon, 
the Hundred Days, and the Waterloo campaign had bred 
so profound a distrust of the French people in the minds of 
the Allies that some sort of coalition against France was 
still regarded as necessary, although Europe was nominally 
at peace. The four Powers agreed to meet occasionally in 
order to discuss means and methods suitable to their policy, 
a provision which led to a series of congresses which 
Metternich, by skilful diplomacy, exploited for his own 
ends. Russia and Prussia supported him, and England 
gradually drew away from the three absolute monarchies, 
as it was inevitable that she should. She could not, with 
a Parliamentary Government, join wholeheartedly with 
Metternich in his campaign against constitutionalism. 

2. The Policy of Metternich 

Metternich lost no time in organizing a complete reaction 
in the Hapsburg dominions. The clerical power was rein- 
stated, the universities controlled, the Press censored, and a 


strict police and spy system was set up. His avowed aim 
was to stifle all demands for constitutional government. 
He could not, however, carry out his policy if Liberalism 
triumphed in other countries. Hence his eagerness to im- 
pose his system upon the whole of Europe, and especially 
upon Germany. The entire programme of the German 
Liberals was abhorrent to his Austrian sensibilities. It was 
to the interest of Austria to keep the German confederation 
as loose as possible, so that she could exert influence upon 
individual States. She dreaded the idea of a united Ger- 
many, as being likely to lead to the supremacy of her rival 
Prussia. National unity was one of the watchwords of the 
Liberal Party in Germany, and the idea of a closer confeder- 
ation of the German States was bound up with the idea of 
constitutional government. Many South German Princes, 
in particular those of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Nassau, and 
Baden, had granted constitutions to their people, in order 
to win popular support against the aggressions of Austria 
and Prussia. Metternich was anxious to crush this Liberal 
movement, but he could not do so without the help of the 
Tsar and the King of Prussia. Frederick William was easily 
won ; he was sufficiently converted when he saw what diffi- 
culties beset the reforming princes as soon as they tried to 
put their new constitutions into practice. The Tsar, how- 
ever, who cherished liberal views, proved more stubborn 
a convert. He had always sympathized with France, and 
had granted a measure of constitutional home rule to Russian 
Poland, an action which highly alarmed Metternich, who 
feared that Russia might be going to break away from the 
Quadruple Alliance. 

In course of time, however, the Tsar changed his policy, 
largely in consequence of two incidents. In 1817a Student 
Society with liberal aims, called the Bundeschaft, which had 
branches in most of the German universities, met together 
in a great congress at Wartburg. Proceedings were, as a 
general rule, orderly and patriotic, but some of the wilder 
young men, in a fit of high spirits, resolved upon a demon- 
stration against the reactionary policy of certain German 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 63 

rulers, and made a bonfire of various symbols of autocracy, 
including a copy of the Prussian code of Police Law. It 
was a piece of schoolboy mischief, but the German Govern- 
ments took a very serious view of it as an example of the 
revolutionary spirit of the younger generation. In 1819 
the murder of Kotzebue, a journalist and a Russian spy, was 
considered to be another expression of the spirit of anarchy. 
The Tsar became alarmed, and began to listen to Metter- 
nich. Consequently Austria, supported by Russia and 
Prussia, was able to force a reactionary policy on the Ger- 
man Diet A series of conferences was held at Carlsbad, 
and, in defiance of legal procedure, the Diet was compelled 
to pass the famous Carlsbad Decrees. No discussion was 
permitted and no time was given for protest. The Carlsbad 
Decrees continued to be the law of Germany until 1848 
and a determining factor in her political history. Princes 
were forbidden to grant representative institutions to their 
people. All student societies were suppressed, and the uni- 
versities were strictly controlled. The Press was censored 
and all teachers were forced to possess a State licence. 
Liberalism was to be crushed by a system of severe perse- 
cution carried out by spies and police. Reaction triumphed 
in Germany, and the hopes of the Liberals appeared to be 

3. Reaction in Europe 

Throughout Europe meanwhile the violently reactionary 
policy of the restored monarchies had given rise to disturb- 
ances. Ferdinand of Spain had abolished the Constitution 
granted to his people on his restoration. The Jesuits were 
brought back, the Inquisition revived, and Liberalism was 
bitterly persecuted. In 1820 Revolution broke out. The 
King had gathered an army at Cadiz to reconquer his 
colonies in America, which were in revolt from Mexico to 
Cape Horn. Secretly encouraged by England and the 
United States, they had decided to claim independence 
from Spain. The King's Army never sailed, for, under the 
leadership of Riego, a colonel, the soldiers mutinied and 


demanded the Constitution of 1812. The virtues of this 
Constitution existed largely in retrospect. It was, indeed, 
very weak and quite unworkable ; but the fanaticism of the 
King's policy lent it a lustre in the Spanish memory. It 
became the rallying cry of Spanish Liberalism. The revolt 
was mainly military, since the masses of the people were 
too ignorant and too inert to participate in the struggle. 
But the King's forces were disorganized, and he was com- 
pelled to yield and to grant the Constitution to his people. 

Events in Spain strengthened the Revolutionary Party in 
Italy, which was suffering cruelly from the reactionary 
policy of Austria, the Pope, and the Kings of Sardinia and 
Naples. All those who hoped for a united Italy and who 
demanded Constitutional Reform were treated as criminals. 
The dissatisfied classes in Naples formed a secret society 
called the Carbonari, which aimed at the destruction of the 
Restoration Governments by insurrection and by conspiracy. 
The Society, of which Mazzini was at one time a member, 
soon spread to all Italian States. In 1820 the news of the 
Spanish Revolution caused an outburst in Naples, leading 
to an insurrection in which the King was forced to grant a 
Constitution on the Spanish model. A kindred revolution 
broke out in Piedmont. 

These revolutions gave forcible illustration to the doc- 
trines of Metternich. Such disturbances were, he said, in- 
fectious, and no European Power could lead an isolated life, 
since its internal conditions might at any time become a 
source of danger to others. Indeed, a State which set up 
Liberal institutions must immediately be bullied into sub- 
mission by the other Powers. This view was set forth by 
Russia, Prussia, and Austria at the Congress of Troppau, 
in 1820. It was agreed that intervention in Naples had 
become necessary, and the right of the King of Naples to 
grant revolutionary changes in his own kingdom was denied. 
England and France would not concur in this policy ; they 
challenged the right of intervention as a principle, though 
they agreed that Austria had a right to interfere in this 
particular case, if she really believed that events in Naples 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 65 

were threatening her security in Northern Italy, At the 
Congress of Laibach, in 1821, the three reactionary Powers 
agreed to enforce the right of intervention. An Austrian 
Army occupied Naples, suppressed the Revolution, and 
restored the Old Regime. The insurrection in Piedmont 
was also suppressed, and Italy was reduced to submission. 
The Spanish Question was dealt with at the Congress of 
Verona, in 1822. France, now also won over to reaction- 
ary policy, joined the party for Intervention, leaving Eng- 
land in solitary protest. A French army invaded Spain, 
crushed the insurgents, and restored Ferdinand in all his 
absolute powers. The Congress of Verona marks the 
highest point of Metternich's success. Thereafter his policy 
received a series of rebuflfs, and his diplomatic supremacy 
could no longer be regarded as unquestioned. Both in the 
South American Question and in the War of Greek Inde- 
pendence he was frustrated. 

4. The South American Question and the Monroe Doctrine 

Reaction was confined to Europe. Metternich had de- 
sired to interfere in South America, and to restore to Spain 
and Portugal their rebellious colonies. England, however, 
refused to countenance this scheme and recognized the 
independence of Brazil. Hoping that the freed colonies 
would prove good markets for her manufactured goods, she 
hinted that she would oppose any steps on the part of the 
Holy Alliance to force reaction upon South America. Since 
she controlled the sea, this was tantamount to ensuring the 
independence of South America. She was, in this respect, 
supported by the United States. In 1 82 5 President Monroe, 
in a message to Congress, declared that the United States 
would regard as a hostile act any European interference 
in American affairs. This principle has been maintained 
ever since. During the Civil War, 1 864-66, France took the 
opportunity to send troops to Mexico ; but she was forced 
to abandon the enterprise as soon as the American War was 
over, and the United States was in a position to protest. 


5. T/ie War of Greek Independence 

A revolt had broken out meanwhile among the Greeks 
against their Turkish rulers. The Greeks were not, on the 
whole, badly off. They had a large measure of local self- 
government, they were prosperous, and they had consider- 
able religious toleration. But, while they had privileges, 
they had no rights. The Turks were their absolute masters 
and could treat them as slaves if they wished. In the early 
years of the century a great Hellenic revival took place, 
beginning, as many national movements begin, with a 
literary renaissance, and a renewed enthusiasm among the 
Greeks for their ancient language and history. This de- 
veloped rapidly into a racial, religious, and political move- 
ment ; racial, because built upon the memory of the glorious 
past of the Hellenes ; religious, in that it was a Christian 
movement against Mohammedanism ; and political, because 
inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution. 

In 1 8 14, when it became clear that the Congress of 
Vienna would do nothing for Greek nationalism, the 
Hetairia Philike was founded at Odessa. This was a secret 
society which aimed at the expulsion of the Turks from 
Europe and the revival of the ancient Greek Empire. The 
Turks did not greatly trouble themselves over this society, 
and it grew apace. It was thought that Russia, the pro- 
tectress of the Greek Church and the historic enemy of 
Turkey, might intervene if an insurrection took place. In 
1 82 1 Hypsilanti, a Greek and a major-general in the Russian 
Army, endeavoured to begin a revolution by invading 
Moldavia with a small army of volunteer Greek exiles. 
The Tsar, however, regarding this as a revolutionary out- 
burst, was persuaded by Metternich to disown Hypsilanti, 
and the attempt failed. But the insurrection spread to the 
Morea and the Islands, where it was more successful. The 
Greeks suddenly rose and massacred the Turks, and a 
terrible war of reciprocal massacres began. At first the 
Turks suffered from the weakness of their fleet, which had 
been manned chiefly by Greeks; but in 1823 they were 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 67 

able to borrow the fleet and army of Mehemet Ali, Pasha 
of Egypt. These were efficient and well-equipped, and the 
fortunes of war turned against the Greeks. If they were to 
survive, some European Power must come to their aid. 

The cause of the Greeks had long aroused liberal and 
nationalist sentiment in Europe, and from many countries 
sympathizers had sent help by private enterprise. Metter- 
nich, however, tried to prevent the Governments from taking 
part in the struggle. He was jealous of Russian influence 
in the Balkans, and feared a Russo-Turkish War. He de- 
clared to Europe that the war was " beyond the pale of 
civilization." England replied to this by recognizing the 
insurgent Greeks as belligerents. Her Foreign Minister, 
Canning, was afraid that Russia might go to war with 
Turkey and become the protectress of Greece. It was the 
historic policy of England to combat Russian influence 
in the Balkans, and Canning was determined that, in the 
Greek Question, Russia should not be allowed to act alone. 
He believed that the Greeks would win their independence, 
but he did not wish to see them the satellites of Russia. 
France supported the policy of England. A Russo-Turkish 
War was the more likely since Alexander had died in 1825, 
and was succeeded by his brother Nicholas, who was de- 
termined not to ignore the various grievances which Russia 
had against Turkey. 

In 1827, therefore, England, Russia, and France signed 
the Treaty of London, in which they agreed to suggest to 
the Sultan an armistice and the concession of Home Rule to 
Greece, The Sultan refused, and the allied fleets made a 
naval demonstration which was intended to frighten him 
into submission. It led, however, by a series of accidents, 
to the battle of Navarino, in which the Turkish fleet was 
annihilated. This was somewhat of a blow to England, 
who had no real wish to go to war with Turkey. Canning 
died in 1827, and his decisive policy was abandoned. 
Russia was allowed, after all, to fight Turkey alone, for 
England shrank from further hostilities. After a campaign 
of varying fortune, Russia forced Turkey to sign the Treaty 


of Adrianople, in which she agreed, among other conces- 
sions, to the terms of the Treaty of London. England and 
Austria, however, insisted that Greece should be made an 
independent kingdom, since if she were dependent at all 
upon Turkey she would always be subject to Russian in- 
fluence. As an independent kingdom she would owe a 
debt of gratitude to England and Austria as well. 

In 1830-33, therefore, Greece, the Morea, and the Islands 
were erected into an independent kingdom under Otto, 
second son of the King of Bavaria. The Greek aspirations 
were not fully satisfied, for Thessaly, Macedonia, and Epirus 
were still part of Turkey, and she did not get the Ionian 
Islands until 1 863. The settlement is important as marking 
the first crisis in the Eastern Question in its nineteenth- 
century form. Before long the other Christian subjects of 
Turkey began to follow the example of Greece. Their 
struggles for freedom, their bitter rivalries, and the ambitions 
of the great Powers who supported them are the main 
themes in the drama of the downfall of the Ottoman 
Empire, and reappear in the explosions of 1878 and 191 3. 
The Independence of Greece has additional importance in 
that it is the first victory of Nationalism over the policy of 
Metternich. It was followed, in 1830, by another and a 
sharper blow, the triumph of Liberalism in France and the 
downfall of the Restoration Monarchy. 

The Revolutions of 1830 
I. France under the Restoration 

The return of Louis XVIII to France in 181 5 did not 
imply a complete revival of the Old Regime. The King 
granted a Constitutional Charter and intended to rule by it. 
Legislative power was exercised by two chambers. The 
House of Peers was appointed by the King, and the House 
of Deputies, which controlled taxation, was elected by the 
people. Suffrage, from which the masses of the people 
were excluded)~c!epended on property qualificationst'^and 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 69 

political power appertained chiefly to the middle and up per 
c jasses. The King, who had the supreme executive powSf; 
proposed the laws, which coul d not be amended withour~ 
his consent — ' 

This Constitution was not democratic, but, if Great Britain 
is excepted, it was the most liberal in Europe at the time, 
and the most practical ever possessed by France. The 
Legal Codes, the centralized administrative system, the 
Concordats and the Nobility of Napoleon were maintained, 
together with many of the reforms of 1791, such as equality 
before the law, equality of opportunity in the civil and 
military services, freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom of 
the Press and of religion. These concessions won popular 
support for the Restoration. 

The safety of France was, however, imperilled by the 
sharp divisions between political parties. The clergy and 
the returned Emigres thirsted for vengeance. They hoped 
to destroy all traces of the Revolution and to restore the 
Old Regime intact. They would suffer no compromises. 
Under the direction of the Count of Artois, brother to the 
King and heir to the throne, they constituted the party of 
the Extreme Right, or the Ultras, having for their main 
object the destruction of the Charter. In this they were in 
agreement with the Left, composed of Bonapartists and 
Republicans. The large Centre Party, which lay between 
these two Extremes, upheld the Charter and the policy of 
conciliation. Of these, the Right Centre regarded the 
Charter as th6 limit of their liberalism, while the Left Centre 
hoped for further democratic reforms. In 181 5 an Ultra 
majority was returned to the Chamber of Deputies, and a 
savage policy of vengeance was begun. The King, how- 
ever, saved the country by dissolving the chamber and 
appealing to the people. A more moderate chamber was 
returned, and, with the support of the Centre Party, the 
King pursued the path of reconciliation. His ministers, 
Richelieu and Decazes, paicJ6ff the immense war indemnity 
which France owed to the Allies, freed her territory from 
the foreign army of occupation, and reorganized her military 


forces. But they depended entirely upon the support of 
the Moderate Centre Party, which showed signs of splitting. 
Events had occurred which alarmed the Right Centre so 
much that it drew away from the Left Centre and began 
to join the Ultras. Evidences were not wanting of an in- 
crease in the power of the Extreme Left, for the elections 
of 1 8 17, 1818, and 1819 favoured that party. In 1820 
the Duke of Bern, younger son of the Count of Artois, was 
assassinated by a republican. All this frightened the 
Moderate Conservatives, and the control of the Government 
began to pass to the Right. The Ultra reaction was re- 
newed, and much of the work of the Moderates was undone. 
The electoral law was altered and the freedom of the Press 
rescinded, while an army was sent to restore absolutism in 
Spain, at the bidding of the Holy Alliance. 

Louis XVIII died in 1824 and was succeeded by his 
Ultra-Royalist brother, Charles X. All attempts at recon- 
ciliation were completely abandoned. The Jesuits returned, 
education was largely handed over to the Church, and a 
revival of clerical power was encouraged In 1825 a law 
was passed giving compensation to those nobles who had 
lost property in the Revolution. The National Guards 
were dissolved, and attempts were made to control the Press 
and to revive the laws giving privileges to elder sons. 
These, though failures, made the King extremely unpopular 
throughout the country. 

The effect of this policy upon public opinion was seen 
in the elections of 1827, when a substantial majority was 
returned against the Government. The King, however, did 
not regard himself as bound to choose his ministers from 
the Parliamentary Majority, and, in defiance of the Liberal 
Chamber of Deputies, he appointed Polignac, an Extreme 
Reactionary, as his chief minister. In 1830 he dissolved 
the chamber, but another crushing Liberal majority was 
returned. This expression of public opinion he ignored, 
for he would not dismiss Polignac, declaring that Louis XVI 
had lost his life through making concession. He was de- 
termined to force his policy on the country, and, in July, 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 71 

1830, he published four Ordinances, silencing Press opposi- 
tion and dissolving the newly elected Chamber of Deputies. 
The franchise was altered so as to exclude from power the 
middle class, from which the Liberal Party was mostly drawn. 
The political power of the Conservative nobility was thus 
increased. These measures were in direct defiance of the 
Charter. Charles X believed himself to be empowered to 
alter the Charter if the safety of the State demanded it, and 
this he regarded as his justification. The French people 
saw that, if they allowed the Charter to be broken, they 
would submit to absolutism ^nd no institutions would be 
safe. Charles thought an insurrection unlikely, since very 
few people had the vote or would be affected by the 
changes he had made. He underrated the political ex- 
perience of the workpeople of Paris. On 28 July revolution 
broke out there, under the direction of Democrats like 
Lafayette, and inspired by Liberal journalists and editors 
such as Thiers. Charles X was forced to abdicate, and the 
crown was offered by Thiers and his party to Louis Philippe, 
Duke of Orleans, representative of a younger branch of the 
Royal House, who was known to have Liberal views. The 
Monarchy was thus preserved and the dangers of anarchy 
avoided. Lafayette and the Republican Party agreed to 
this compromise, since they were far too loyal to plunge 
their country into civil war. The Chamber of Deputies, 
representing the will of the sovereign people, called Louis 
Philippe to the throne. 

Though this revolution was carried out by Paris rather 
than by the nation, the country as a whole accepted it. It 
constituted a triumph for the Liberal middle classes ; it was, 
besides, a proof to Europe that France was capable of con- 
ducting a revolution without a relapse into anarchy, and it 
measures the advance of the whole nation in political educa- 
tion since its first crude efforts in 1789. 

2. Revolutions in Europe 

The effect, in Europe, of the July Revolution was profound. 
Popular movements were stimulated everywhere, especially 


where national grievances prevailed. The people of Russian 
Poland immediately rose and demanded an independent 
kingdom. The Poles had received a measure of Home Rule 
from Alexander. They had Parliamentary Government, 
freedom of religion, and of the Press. Polish was the 
official language and Poles were appointed to all the chief 
military and civil posts. Their privileges, however, existed 
rather on paper than in actual fact, for Russian toleration 
never came up to its pretensions. The Poles were dis- 
satisfied and used their privileges to criticise and obstruct 
the Tsar's policy. Nicholas, the successor of Alexander, 
soon quarrelled with them, for his principles were those of a 
thorough absolutist. His repressive measures drove the 
Poles on to rebellion. They expected help from France and 
England, such as the Greeks had received. But none came. 
Louis Philippe, newly elected to the French throne, would 
not endanger his position by an immediate war with Russia. 
Austria and Prussia, the champions of absolutism, feared the 
effects of the Polish insurrection in their own Polish pos- 
sessions. England would not act alone. Left to their own 
resources, the Poles were no match for Russia. The rising 
was suppressed, Home Rule abolished, and Poland became 
a Russian province. Strict measures were taken to obliterate 
the marks of Polish nationality. 

Italy, weighed down by Austrian oppression, and par- 
titioned among a crowd of reactionary princes, did not es- 
cape the shock of revolution. There were insurrections, in 
1 83 1, in Modena, Parma, and the Papal States. These were 
swiftly suppressed by Austria. Here again, Louis Philippe 
would not intervene for fear of compromising himself. The 
movement was stamped out and the Old Regime was restored. 
But it is important to note that, while the revolutions 
of 1 82 1 were mainly military, those of 1 831 had strong 
support among the middle and working classes. Liberalism 
was beginning to make its appeal. But it was even more 
bitterly persecuted. Thousands of loyal patriots were exiled, 
among them Mazzini, though he was guilty of no political 
crime. " The Government are not fond," his father was told, 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 78 

" of young men of talent, the subject of whose musings are 
unknown to them." Living in exile, however, he built up 
the society of " Young Italy," which replaced the destructive 
organization of the Carbonari. He saw the necessity of a 
constructive programme, and he realized that Liberalism 
must present a united and international front before it could 
hope to combat the combined forces of reaction, " Young 
Italy" aimed at Italian Unity, and kept in touch with the 
democratic parties in other countries. 

There were several indications of Liberal sentiment in 
Germany, but these were instantly dealt with by Metternich. 
The Carlsbad decrees were strengthened, and in 1832 six 
new articles were forced through the Diet, which forbade 
princes to grant liberal concessions. 

3. The Independence of Belgium 

The Liberal and National movements of 1830 are thus 
to be accounted as failures as far as Germany, Italy, and 
Poland are concerned. They contributed, nevertheless, to 
the success of the revolutions in France and Belgium, since 
they occupied Russia, Prussia, and Austria to an extent 
which prevented them from interference in the interests of 

The Union of Belgium and Holland had not been a suc- 
cess. It was an artificial arrangement, patched up in the 
days when fear of France was a dominant political motive 
in Europe, and it was designed to form a strong barrier 
State on the French frontier. There was no solidarity or 
national feeling between the two countries. They differed 
in language, religion, history, tradition, and industries. A 
working compromise might have been reached if the King 
had granted Home Rule to Belgium, but he insisted upon 
treating the two countries as a single State. The Belgians 
never accepted the constitution which he gave them, which, 
in parliamentary representation, put them on a level with 
Holland. To this they objected, since Holland was the 
smaller country. They complained of the undue use of the 


Dutch language, they considered that too many official 
posts were given to Dutchmen, they disliked the system 
of taxation, and they thought that their religion was 

Insurrection broke out in 1830, and the revolutionaries 
formed a provisional Government declaring Belgium an in- 
dependent State. They decided on a Liberal monarchy as 
their future Constitution and offered the Crown to Prince 
Leopold of Coburg. Russia, Austria, and Prussia contem- 
plated intervention ; but Belgium was saved by the attitude 
of England and France. Louis Philippe, knowing that 
public opinion in France was strong on the side of the 
Belgians, let it be understood that he would brook no inter- 
vention on the part of the Eastern Powers. England acted 
with France, because she feared that Louis Philippe might 
gain an undue influence in Belgium if left to himself. So 
she supported PVench policy and suggested that a settlement 
might be reached by all the Powers in conference. Russia, 
Austria, and Prussia, paralysed by revolutions at home, 
were forced to agree. At the Conference of London, 1832, 
the separation of Belgium and Holland was recognized, and 
Belgium was guaranteed by all the powers as a neutral and 
independent kingdom. Leopold, King of the Belgians, 
promised to defend his neutrality against any Power which 
might attempt to violate it, a promise which was kept by 
his grandson in 1 9 14. 

Although the independence of Belgium was an ac- 
complished fact, the King of Holland did not recognize it 
till 1839. It was, like the July Revolution in France, a 
compromise. It was a direct defiance of the treaties of 
181 5, and a consecration of the principles of nationality and 
the right of a people to chose its own Government. But, 
since the monarchy was preserved, and political power re- 
mained in the hands of the middle classes, it was no triumph 
for democracy. The democratic element in the advancing 
tide of European Liberalism was not fully felt until 1848, 
when a second Revolution in France set the Continent 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 76 

The Explosion of 1848 

I. France under the July Monarchy 

The position of cCouis Philips ^ was of necessity far from 
secure. He was invited to the throne by the Chamber of 
Deputies, and was acclaimed as King by Paris, but the 
nation as a whole had no voice in the matter. It did no 
more than acquiesce, tacitly, in the July Revolution. The 
new monarchy had all the lack of glamour and all the in- 
security of a compromise. It was threatened by the in- 
trigues of Republicans, Bonapartists, and Legitimists, or 
supporters of Charles X and his heirs. The partisans of the 
Government were divided among themselves. The Party of 
Movement hoped for greater democratic reforms, and wished 
to support Liberal movements abroad. The Party of Re- 
sistance, which soon dominated the Government, thought 
that democracy had gone quite far enough, and feared to 
excite the revolutionary passions of the working classes. It 
declared for non-intervention in foreign affairs. This party 
was subdivided into the Right and Left Centres, led by 
Guizot and Thiers respectively, the subject of difference being 
the constitutional obligation of the King to choose his 
ministers from the Parliamentary majority. 

In foreign policy Louis Philippe received several rebuffs. 
France had long wished to establish firmly her influence in 
the Mediterranean, and hoped to do so by dominating Egypt. 
Having conquered Algiers, she made an alliance with 
Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, who was engaged in waging 
war upon his overlord, the Sultan. This policy Louis 
Philippe was forced to renounce owing to the combined 
action of the other Powers, who insisted upon a mediation 
between Turkey and Egypt and forced Mehemet Ali to make 
terms. A few years later, in 1846, the friendship which had 
existed between England and France was wrecked over the 
Spanish marriage question, and it was felt that Louis 
Philippe, in his intrigues over the marriages of the young 
Queen of Spain and her sister, had sacrificed to his own 


family ambitions the honour and the interests of France. 
Consequently he lost prestige both at home and abroad. 

As regards domestic policy, he maintained a strictly con- 
stitutional Government, adhering to the letter of the Charter. 
But he secretly dominated the Chamber of Deputies by the 
free use of bribery. He ignored demands for Parliamentary 
reform, for an increased electorate, and for measures 
the corruption of deputies. 

Political discontent was aggravated by increasing social 
and economic unrest. Franc e was, in her turn, u ndergoing 
t he Industrial Revolution, and she was suHermg ail the 
evils incident to the change. Economic distress was terribl e. 
and the oppressed workers were beg if]ningr to revolt against 
ti jgjr ca pitalist employers. Xhc^uJy monarchy, restin g as 
it clid upon midcile class' siTpport, made no atte mpt to remedy 
these conditions by social legislation on behalf of the 
\Yorkers. All the laws favoured the employers^ and the 
people, unable to combine to secure their own interests, had 
ho protection. Clear-sighted men, reviewing these facts, 
realized that political freedom is of very little use to a people 
-who are economically slaves. A new set of economic 
doctrines grew up, later known as SQ giali^m . concerning the 
organization of industry and the relations of capital and 
labour. It was felt that democracy could not be complete 
without some form of social and economic revolution which 
might very probably entail the abolition of private owner- 
ship of capital. Only thus, to many minds, could effective 
liberty and equality be obtained. 

All these conditions produced widespread opposition to 
the policy of the Government. This opposition centred 
round the demand for Parliamentary reform. Under the 
direction of the poet Lamartine, a great demonstration was 
hgldin Parisin 1847, which led to the resignation of Guizot, 
the chief minister of Conservatism. The Republicans and 
Socialists then took matters into their own hands and in- 
flamed the people of Paris to the pitch of insurrection. 
Louis Philippe fled to England and a Republic was declared. 
In the provisional Government which was set up several 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 - 77 

Socialists were included. This is of importance, since it is 
indicative of the new aspects in French politics which had 
arisen since 1815. The Drot;>)fmsi with whirh France had 
been confr onted in I78q were .sHll, tn all appearance, nn - 
solved. They had instead become more complicated, by 
the introduction, during the past fifty years, of the economic 
question. The people of France had a dual task before 
them, and this at a time when the whole of Europe was in 

2. Europe in 1848 

Events in France were, as usual, as a spark to gun- 
powder. Revolution broke out all over Europe, and the 
system of Metternich was powerless before it. The storm 
centred round Austria, so long the champion of reaction. 
The people of Vienna rose and demanded a constitution. 
Metternich fled. All the confused nationalities of the 
Hapsburg dominions began to clamour for Home Rule. The 
Magyars of Hungary led the way, inspired by Kossuth. 
Bohemia demanded recognition for the rights of the Czechs, 
and the Southern Slavs and Croats called for national 
privileges and for local self-government. In Italy the work 
of Mazzini bore fruit. Lombardy and Venice threw off the 
Austrian yoke, and the other Italian States, Tuscany, the 
Papal States, and Naples, compelled by popular demand, 
sent troops to help them. All the peoples of Italy rushed 
to arms and forced their rulers to join in a national crusade 
against Austria, under the leadership of Charles Albert, 
King of Piedmont and Sardinia. — 

The Liberal-Nationalists of Germany rose and compelled 
their princes to permit the election of a national Parliament 
at Frankfort, which should draw up a new constitution for 
Germany, substituting a close union for the futile confedera- 
tion of 181 5. It seemed likely that the King of Prussia, 
who had granted a liberal constitution to his own people, 
would lead this movement after the manner of Charles 
Albert in Italy. 



3. The Triumph of Austria 

Austria was thus faced with a threefold problem. She 
must suppress revolution at home, reduce Italy, and re- 
establish her influence in Germany. Her advantage lay in 
the deep-seated rivalries of the insurgent parties. Within 
the Hapsburg Empire Magyars could be played off against 
Slavs, and Germans against Czechs, for none of these 
peoples were ready to accord toleration to one another, nor 
had they the wit to unite against the common oppressor. 
Neither in Germany nor in Italy had the revolutionaries a 
definite object or a clear programme. Not all Nationalists 
were Democrats, many aimed merely at national unity under 
a monarchy. Others, on the contrary, rated the achieve- 
ment of Liberal institutions above national unity, should the 
choice be forced upon them. This duality of aim was their 
ruin. Nor were they fortunate in their leaders, Charles 
Albert and Frederick William were men of vacillating 
characters. Neither was ready to commit himself to any 
serious concession to democracy. Frederick William 
hesitated to make terms with the Frankfort Parliament 
until it was too late, and Charles Albert failed to attack 
Austria at the crucial moment, when she was weakest, 
because he feared the progress of democracy at home. 

Austria was thus enabled, with German help, to crush 
the revolt in Bohemia. She then defeated Charles Albert 
at Custozza, on 25 July, profiting by the recent defection 
of the Papal and Neapolitan troops. She fomented the 
disputes between Magyar and Slav in Hungary, thereby 
postponing the peril of a Hungarian Republic. This new 
decisiveness in her policy is a tribute to the ability of 
Schwarzenberg, a very competent minister who had recently 
been appointed. It was he who persuaded the old Emperor 
to abdicate in favour of his nephew, Francis Joseph, and it 
was he who enlisted the aid of the Tsar in the Austrian 
cause, a move which eventually enabled him to crush the 
Hungarian revolt. 

The intervention of Russia alarmed the King of Prussia 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 79 

to such an extent that he definitely withdrew his support 
from the Frankfort party, and refused the terms offered 
him by the German Liberals, He hoped to seize the 
hegemony of Germany by agreement with her rulers rather 
than with her people, and he not only sanctioned a 
reactionary policy in his own dominions, but encouraged 
the Kings of Saxony and Hanover to do likewise. The 
Frankfort Parliament meanwhile, deprived of the support 
of Prussia, came to an ignominious end. Austria had 
temporized over the Italian Question, until she had dealt 
with Hungary ; an armistice had been made with Charles 
Albert after the battle of Custozza, but this was merely a 
breathing-space, and Austria fully intended to renew the 
war. Revolutions had meanwhile taken place in Rome 
and Tuscany, whence the Pope and the Grand Duke were 
forced to fly. Republics were set up both in Rome and 
Florence, but this blow to Austria was of little use to 
Charles Albert, who hesitated to compromise himself by 
alliance with Republicans. He was, therefore, forced to 
begin the war again without the support of these possible 
allies, and he suffered a crushing defeat at Novara in 
March, 1849. The cause of Italy was thus lost through 
want of unity of purpose. Charles Albert abdicated in 
favour of his son, Victor Emmanuel, who was forced to 
make a humiliating peace. 

Austria was now all triumphant, only the Roman 
Republic, inspired by Mazzini and Garibaldi, defied her 
power. But the two patriots could not uphold Italian 
freedom in the face of a reactionary Europe. Their work 
was undone, the Roman Republic suppressed, and the Pope 
restored by the very nation which should have had most 
sympathy with Republican aims. The president of France, 
in 1849, was Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of 
Napoleon the first, who looked for support to the Catholic 
party in France. With this motive he sent French troops 
to Rome to protect the interests of the Pope, a measure 
which outraged all French Liberals. France was thereby 
pledged to an indefinite occupation of Rome, since the 


Pope could not maintain his power there for a single day 
without the support of French troops. The president, on 
the other hand, could not withdraw from the position he 
had taken up without alienating the French Catholic party. 
He thus became involved in the reactionary policy of Pope 
Pius IX which eventually brought him into conflict with all 
the Liberal forces of Europe. 

So ended the Revolutions of 1848, and the apparent 
failure of Liberalism and Nationalism heralded another 
restoration of the status quo. Europe was forced to re- 
assume the outworn trappings of 181 5 and to submit again 
to the system of Metternich. Though the man himself 
was gone, his spirit still breathed in the political systems 
of Europe. 

Great changes had, nevertheless, taken place during this 
period, though their full effect in political history is some- 
what disguised by the triumph of reaction. New and 
momentous forces had arisen affecting powerfully the trend 
of European thought. A generation grew up, inspired by 
new ideals, preaching new creeds and striving for new ends. 
During this period, for instance, the Carbonari of 182 1 were 
transmuted into the young Italians of 1848. The young 
student members of the Bundeschaft, who made bonfires in 
1 81 7, grew up into German Liberals, talking largely of 
Parliaments and Nationalism in 1848. These men were 
inspired by the current popular ideas of their day. By an 
examination of their inspirations and opinions the student 
may form an idea of the extent and force of the new 
influences moulding European thought and modifying 
social custom, influences which are manifested in spheres 
other than political, and which bear fruit alike in literature, 
art, religion, economics, and social life. 

Changing Europe 
I. Literature 

France has always been the workshop of European ideas, 
the mirror of contemporary continental thought ; if, during 


THE REACTION, 1815-1848 81 

the First Empire, the mirror became a trifle dim, the eclipse 
was short, and the French people soon resumed its 
accustomed place in the comity of European nations. 
The great changes supervening in French literature in the 
years 1815-50 are but typical of a transformation of ideas 
which was affecting the whole Continent. The Romantic 
movement entered upon its later phases of development, 
and a second generation of creators were to feel the impact 
of Romantic inspirations. Their work, when compared with 
that of their predecessors, is instructive both in similarities 
and in differences. It is Romantic Literature, but it is 
clearly of the nineteenth century. 

French writers, during the First Empire, followed the 
classical ideals of the eighteenth century. There were, 
however, a few brilliant exceptions, among whom Lamartine 
and Chateaubriand are prominent figures. Of them it is 
necessary to say a few words, for in the work of both the 
transition from Classicism to Romance is abundantly 
apparent. Lamartine, 1790- 1867, was a lyric poet, and 
his art is of interest to the historical student as reflect- 
ing all the tendencies and interests of the age. It bears 
traces of the revived power of Catholicism and religion, 
of the new glamour cast around republicanism and 
legitimist monarchy alike, of the nature-worship and 
sentimentalism of Rousseau and Bernardin de St. Pierre, 
of the mediaevalism of Scott and the Weimar group, and 
of the egoism of Byron. This reflective quality, combined 
with much of artistic talent, was of service in bringing 
France again into contact with the literary currents of other 
nations. Chateaubriand, 1768-1848, was another type of 
the age. By birth a Breton, he imparted to his work a 
little of that Celtic glamour, which, since the publication 
of Ossian, had played so large a part in the Romantic 
movement. After the execution of Louis XVI he lived 
for some years as an emigrant in England, and became 
conversant with contemporary English literature. In 1802 
his publication of " The Grenius of Christianity," coinciding 
as it did with the restoration of Catholicism in France, 


won for him the favour of the Emperor. The work was a 
masterpiece of eloquence and of Hterary art, a defence of 
CathoHcism from the emotional and sentimental standpoint, 
appealing to every faculty in the reader other than that of 
rational criticism. It gave voice, in poetic prose, to the 
popular reaction against the philosophic free thought of the 
preceding century. Chateaubriand might well have con- 
tinued to sun himself in the beams of Imperial approval, 
but after the murder of the Due d'Enghien he drifted into 
opposition again. In 1 8 14 he championed the Royalist 
cause, and his *' Bonaparte and the Bourbons " was declared 
by Louis XVIII to be worth a million men to him. Much 
of the fame of Chateaubriand was due to the dramatic 
timeliness of his publications, and his facility in speaking 
" the word of the moment." He was among the first of 
those egotistical Romantics, of whom Byron was the great 
type and example. The poets of the eighteenth century, 
whether in Weimar, Paris, or London, had regarded them- 
selves as part of a literary circle, and had written for the 
admiration of their friends. The artist was hardly complete 
without his clique of admirers, in coffee-room or salon. 
Even such prose essays in self-revelation as Rousseau's 
" Confessions," or such expositions of human sensibility as 
Goethe's "Sorrows of Werther" suggest, in their essence, 
the applause of a mutual admiration society. With the 
new century the production of poetry ceased to be a social 
grace. Under the tutelage of Chateaubriand and Byron 
the conception was formulated of the poet as a creature 
misunderstood, apart, finding self-expression in literature 
for the sufferings of a sensitive temperament tortured by 
contact with a Philistine world. The avowed object of the 
poet was no longer to please his friends but to solace 

With the Restoration a new era of French literature 
began. A new generation of literary men returned from 
exile and set themselves to break down that "Chinese 
wall " complained of by Madame de Stael, which separated 
French culture from that of other nations. One and all 

THE REACTION, 1816-1848 83 

they were imbued with the spirit of Romance and steeped 
in the literature of Germany and England, Translations 
abounded ; Barante translated Schiller, Constant and 
Remusat, Goethe, and Pichot, Shakespeare. In the early 
days of the German Romantic movement Lessing and 
Herder prepared the ground by their recognition of new 
canons of criticism and their contributions to the science 
of literature ; the foundations of the Romantic triumph in 
France were laid, in the same way, by three eminent pro- 
fessors, Villemain, Guizot, and Cousin. In the constructive 
criticism of Villemain was to be found that admixture of 
romantic and classical ideals which had proved so beneficial 
an influence in the early German critics. Under Guizot, 
who translated Gibbon's "Decline and Fall," the scientific 
treatment and imaginative interpretation of history made 
inestimable progress, and his lectures on " The History of 
Civilization in France and in Europe" (1828) were an 
epoch-making event in the intellectual life of France. 
Cousin, philosopher and metaphysician, student of Kant 
and Hegel, did great service to France in the cause of 
primary education. He had studied carefully the educational 
experiments of Prussia, and it was upon his recommendation 
that, under the July Monarchy, the first law of primary 
education was passed in France, following up the excellent 
system of secondary education established under the First 
Empire. This may be considered as his great work, but 
more famous were his lectures on philosophy, given in 
Paris, which drew the student-world to a degree unparalleled 
since the days of Abelard . 

This renewed and vigorous pulsation of the intellectual 
life of the country had many and diverse effects. It is 
discernible in a transformation of creative art and a sudden 
rebellion against the classical standards of poetic and 
dramatic form. A band of young and talented men 
championed the cause of the Romantic revolt, and proved, 
in the words of Mr. Lytton Strachey,^ "that the French 

* G. L. Strachey, " Landmarks of French Literature." 


tongue, so far from having exhausted its resources, was 
a fresh and living instrument of extraordinary power." 
Already the new spirit had been manifested in the works 
of Chateaubriand and Lamartine, but it was left to a 
younger generation to break the bonds of classical form 
and to free literature completely from the restraints of 
hidebound tradition. The transition from Classicism to 
Romanticism was not, as in England and Germany, gradual 
and continuous, it was sudden and violent. The whole of 
France was divided into opposing literary camps. The 
appointment of Villemain, Guizot, and Cousin to professor- 
ships in 1828 was regarded as a signal victory for liberal 
and modern ideas. The crisis of the conflict centred round 
the performance of Victor Hugo's play " Hernani " in 1830, 
when, after a fierce battle, the Romantics finally established 
their position and vindicated their claim to a place in 
literature. The dispute in 1830 was upon questions of 
style rather than of subject-matter. The Romantics claimed 
the right to introduce new words into the poetic vocabulary, 
and they upheld the innate beauty of new rhythms and 
metres. In the preceding century a revolution in style 
had followed naturally upon a transformation of artistic 
perception. Poets adopted new ways of expressing them- 
selves because they had discovered new things to express. 
They had ideas which could not be set forth in the 
language of the Classics. Coleridge, for instance, did not, 
in all probability, write the " Ancient Mariner " in order 
to exhibit the artistic possibilities of ballad form ; having 
conceived his subject he evolved a mode of expression 
suitable to it. And in this he is typical of all the first gen- 
eration. But the literary clique who acclaimed "Hernani " 
in 1830 were not of the metal of their predecessors. 
Th6ophile Gautier with his flaming waistcoat ; the delicate 
and pessimistic Alfred de Vigny, withdrawn in his "ivory 
tower " from the shocks of a rude world ; De Musset, with 
his exaggerated similes and his half-expressed doubts as 
to the eventual triumph of Romanticism, compare but ill 
with their models, the robust and full-blooded poets of the 


THE REACTION, 1815-1848 85 

early Romantic revolt. All were touched with the " Maladie 
du Siecle," with the egoism which found supreme expression 
in Victor Hugo, the greatest of the group. They were a 
second generation ; they were disciples, not pioneers. The 
artistic ideals which had originally inspired the Romantic 
movement stood in no further need of champions. Like 
the great political principles of 1789, they were, in 1830, 
already canonized. They had passed insensibly into the 
currency of popular thought, and they were accepted 
without question. It was left for the second generation 
to dispute upon points of dogma, and to exaggerate the 
importance of the letter at the expense of the spirit. 

It is perhaps for this reason that the French Romantic 
movement, despite the genius of Hugo, makes no very 
startling contribution to European poetry. The Weimar 
group was continental in its importance ; it inspired creation 
in countries other than Germany. The movement of 1830 
was purely French, as far as poetry was concerned. After 
the performance of " Hernani " Romance became fashion- 
able in Paris, but the early inspiration is not felt so forcibly. 
" Hernani " itself is not a good play. As with many other 
great movements, victory meant the beginning of decay. 
Of the triumph of the French Romantics M. Faguet has 
said: "In 1800 a few great minds protested against the 
domination of eighteenth-century ideals; in 181 5 many 
brilliant minds; in 1830 a crowd of mediocre minds." 

It is not among the poets of France that a representative 
of the age is to be found. If any poet summed up in 
himself all the tendencies of the day, that man would be 
Heine, the cosmopolitan Radical, who was at once lyricist, 
philosopher, and political pamphleteer. Heine wrote poetry 
in German and political treatises in French, but in the land 
of his birth his works were, significantly enough, forbidden. 
Although he lived in Paris for twenty-five years, and 
despite his deep affection for the Fatherland, he was, in 
spirit, neither French nor German. Racially a Jew, his 
mental outlook can best be described as European. 
Through his work there breathes that mixture of satire 


and romance which marks the rise of realism. In his 
politics and in his lyrics he speaks for youthful Europe. 

In French prose, especially in fiction, the impact of new 
inspirations is far more discernible. The poetic achieve- 
ments of the period follow paths already travelled. It is 
the prose writers who supply creative impetus to the litera- 
ture of other countries. From their work may be traced 
the new ideas which were gradually penetrating the 
European mind. They bear witness to an outburst of life 
and vigour, affecting all branches of thought and closely 
connected with the political movements of the day. This 
connexion is manifested in the political careers of many 
leading men of letters, of whom Victor Hugo and Lamartine 
are notable examples. It is the antithesis of the condition 
of France in 1800, when political repression contributed 
to the sterility of literature. Fifty years later political 
ferment and literary inspiration went hand in hand. 

In the novels of the period may be discerned the first 
traces of that realism which dominated European literature 
later in the century. The inspirations of Romance had 
not yet run their course, but already dramatic exposition 
of the emotions was replaced by critical analysis, though 
the scientific precision, which became the keynote of realism, 
was partially lacking. In the novels of Hugo, De Vigny, 
and Dumas Romance still held its place ; the picturesque 
appeal of the past was still given its full scope. But 
Balzac and Stendhal are prophets of the new order. 

Balzac (1799- 18 58) witnessed the rise, zenith, and decline 
of the Romantic movement in France. But, though he 
was inspired by the same influences, he never entirely 
belonged to it. He is typical of his age in that his work 
ranges from the most intense realism to the most extrava- 
gant romance. The element of fantasy in the mediaeval 
past had attractions for him, but his handling of this 
material was never successful. It was as the interpreter 
of his own day that he won laurels, as " the secretary of 
society, drawing up an inventory of vices and virtues." 
His best works are those of "La Com^die Humaine," in 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 87 

which he paints a complete picture of Parisian Hfe in the 
early nineteenth century. In his detached analysis of the 
motives and passions of everyday life, in his minute attention 
to detail, in his broad tolerance of the " littleness " of the 
average human being he is as far as possible removed from 
the Romantic standpoint, and earns his place as the first 
of the realists. 

It is less easy to place the delicate and subtle genius 
of Beyle (1783-1842), who wrote under the name of 
Stendhal. In his novels, " Le Rouge et le Noir" and "Le 
Chartreuse de Parme" he was a realist of so advanced an 
order that his own generation could scarcely comprehend 
him ; indeed he said himself that he should not be appreci- 
ated until 1880. In " Racine et Shakespeare" he did good 
service, as a critic, to the cause of Romanticism. Like all 
great men, he was himself rather than the representative of 
any school. But, though he has never achieved a wide 
popularity his influence upon his successors was inestim- 
able, and to some the inspiration of his work is still a 
living force. 

^>— ^ 2. The Rise of Socialism 

Socialism is a word of many meanings. No two economic 
writ6!*-"»«e it in exactly the same way. To many people 
it suggests merely a systematic attempt to improve the 
condition of the working class and to secure greater equality 
in the distribution of wealth. As such it has existed for 
centuries, and is not particularly characteristic of the nine- 
teenth century. 

Xh£r£js_ a form o f Socialism, however , w^ ich ha<; its nrigin , 
m the peculiar economic conditi ons prevalent iq Eurpp e 
after the industrial Revolution. ^ During the nineteenth 
century certain factors of modern life,^vitally affecting a 
large part of the community, came into existence for the 
first time. A ne w and_powerful capitalist class arose, 
possessing the means of production, together with a large 
labouring class or proletariat, which possessed nothing but 
its capacity to work. The Socialists of the nineteenth 


century may be defined, roughly, as those economists who 
considered this system of production to jbe_radiccfUy wrong 
and who hoped to replace it by some kind of collective 
ownership of land and capital. They are to be distinguished 
from social reformers, who hoped, by the organization of 
labour and by legislation, to secure fairer conditions and a 
more^equal distribution for the working classes, but who 
had no wish to do away with the private ownership of land 
and capital. 

The future of this newly created propertyless proletariat 
forced itself with peculiar urgency upon economists on 
account of the appalling conditions prevalent among the 
working classes of England and France in the period i 8qo- 
1850. The old small industries were gone ; they had been 
replaced by great factories. The craftsmen, the spinners, 
weavers, and potters of old times were now merely required 
to drive the machinery which had supplanted them. They 
owned neither the machine nor the manufactured article. 
The new prosperity, resulting from the development of this 
large scale machinery production, benefited only the rich 
factory owners, it brought no relief to the community as a 
whole. The cheapness of manufactured goods did not 
compensate for the fall in wages. Mr. Sidney Webb has 
pertinently remarked : " It seemed of small advantage to 
the Lancashire coal-miner of 1 842 that he might get his 
clothes cheaper by means of perfect freedom of competition, 
if this meant also that he found himself driven to work 
excessive hours, under insanitary conditions, in mines 
where precautions against accidents were omitted because 
they were expensive to the employer, and for wages which 
the employer's superiority in economic strength inevitably 
reduced to the barest subsistence level. It was a poor 
consolation to the Bolton cotton-spinner of 1842, that he 
could buy more cheaply the coal used by his wretched 
household, when the cotton mill, equipped with the latest 
mechanical inventions for diminishing human toil, was 
compelling him and his wife and his little children to 
labour for fifteen hours a day under revolting insanitary 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 89 

conditions. . . . All the discoveries of physical science, and 
all the mechanical inventions in the world have not lightened, 
and by themselves never will lighten, the toil of the wage- 
earning class." 

During the first twenty years of the century the position 
of labour in England was most miserable. The laws pro- 
tected the rich rather than the poor. Prices were rising, 
owing to the war, but wages did not rise with them. The 
population, herded together in the great new manufacturing 
towns, increased rapidly, and unemployment was frequent 
This was worse when the war was over, and hordes of 
discharged soldiers were added to the number of men 
competing for work. The factory owners, bent only on 
accumulating profits, beat wages down to starvation level 
and forced the people to labour for terribly long hours. 
Women and children were employed in the mines and 
factories under the most disgraceful conditions. In some 
cases children were bought like slaves from their parents 
and from the poor law guardians. Three-quarters of the 
people were entirely illiterate. Nor were they able, by 
joining together, to force higher terms from their employers. 
The law forbade any combination of working men, to pro- 
tect themselves against the rapacity of the capitalists. 
There were no trades unions, and strikes were heavily 

Similar conditions prevailed in France a few years later. 
Under the Restoration and the July Monarchy industrial 
development proceeded apace, and the population gravitated 
to the coal and iron districts and the manufacturing towns. 
Th^ industrial revolution had the same depressing effect 
upon the French labouring class as upon the English, and 
it was impossible for clear-sighted people to ignore so much 
practical misery and pitiless exploitation. 

The expedients suggested by economists bear distinct 
traces of a kinship with the political ideas latent in the 
French Revolution. Socialism is, in a way, the economic 
corollary of democracy. They are both expressions of the 
same fundamental idea, they suggest that the ideal of civi c 


communitie s must be the exercise of freedo m by the . many. 
Socialists would argue tEat political ireedoJffTn Itself is not 
enough, if economic freedom is not secured as well. It was 
of no avail to sweep away the tyranny of the old feudal 
class if the people were to be left groaning under the sway 
of the new capitalist class. Real liberty, equality, and 
fraternity could not exist between a grasping employer and 
a starving workman. Unless the conditions prevalent since 
the industrial revolution were modified by some drastic 
reform, the state of the people would become infinitely 
more miserable than it had been under the Old Regime. 

These arguments were countered by the supporters of 
" Laissez-Faire," a school which exerted much influence 
during the earlier part of the century. Its principles were 
founded upon a fundamental distrust of State interference. 
It was believed that " man is the best judge of his own 
interests," that he is harmed, not helped, by grandmotherly 
legislation, and that the best State is that which interferes 
least in the lives of private citizens. It was true that a 
clean sweep of many petty and outworn regulations had 
proved beneficial to both countries. The industrial revolu- 
tion had to run its course, and it was greatly impeded by 
obsolete forms of State interference. Greater freedom was 
needed in the economic sphere, in this age of private enter- 
prise, individual initiative, and ruthless competition. The 
capitalist class benefited greatly by the exercise of" Laissez- 
Faire ; " it only asked to be left to its own devices. 

But it was difficult to~prev€-thatJL he working c lasses had, 
si milarly benefited, and that laws n i3dgJi}_I]l<]jjg£t thern and 
shorten their hours of work would inevitably do them more 
harm than good. People who maintained fHat'mah is the 
best judge of his own interests failed to consider the 
number of factories which employed little children, who 
were quite incapable of judging for themselves. This in- 
congruity led many people who, on principle, supported 
"Laissez-Faire" and distrusted State interference, to make 
an exception in favour of the first Factory Acts, which dealt 
with child labour. 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 91 

The easy optimism of those who were inclined to dwell 
solely on the golden side of the industrial revolution was 
further shaken by the publications of another economist, 
Malthus, who pointed out that " population tends to outrun 
supply " and that the working class would soon increase 
beyond all means of subsistence. Malthus proved to be 
an alarmist, and history has not borne out the more sinister 
of his prophecies; but his teaching roused England to a 
realization of the terrible condition of her working population 
and the need for practical remedies. 

The first Reformers were inclined to believe that a fuller 
measure of popular government would remedy these evils. 
The belief in purely political nostrums died hard. The 
Liberal Party in England was for some years much in- 
fluenced by the writings of Jeremy Bentham, and the 
principle that the best State is that which is organized for 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It was 
obvious, both in England and in France, that constitutional 
and political organization fell far short of this standard, 
and in both countries a popular campaign for constitutional 
reform took place in the years 1830-32. In this conflict 
the social Reformer and the moderate Liberal fought side 
by side, and the Reform Bill of 1832 is, like the July 
Revolution, the joint achievement of both parties. But 
during the next decade it became clear that economic 
improvement would not automatically follow upon political 
reform. The middle classes, now firmly established in 
power, did not intend to part with any of their newly won 
prosperity. Consequently, the more advanced among social 
Reformers began to contemplate economic revolution as 
the only possible remedy ; for they judged that, even if 
complete democracy were achieved, the material condition 
of the workers would remain the same if the factory system 
were allowed to continue. 

Robert Owen was the most famous of the early English 
Socialists, and in France the leading figures are St. Simon, 
Fourier, Proudhon, and Louis Blanc. Robert Owen, 1771- 
1850, came from the lower middle class. He rose to be a 


factory owner, and in 1800 he began his famous experiment 
at New Lanark. He formed a company which was content 
to receive 5 per cent, return on its capital, and the rest of 
the profits were expended for the benefit of the people 
working at the factory. Short hours and healthy conditions 
were secured, schools were built for the children, and pension 
societies and co-operative supply stores established. But 
Robert Owen was not exactly a Socialist in the modern 
sense of the word. He thought that the capitalist em- 
ployers, far from ceasing to exist, should lead the way to 
reform and become the benefactors, not the oppressors, of 
the people. Factories would become patriarchal communities 
and the employers would be benevolent despots. 

He was therefore a firm supporter of the Reform Bill of 
1832 which placed the middle classes in power, and he was 
proportionately disappointed in the results. He saw that 
other manufacturers would not follow his lead, and he con- 
sequently turned his attention to the remedy of State 
interference, and to the protection of labour by factory 
legislation. Two other experimental communities which 
he patronized were both failures. 

StSJoiDn, 1 760-1 825, was also a patriarchalist, and hoped 
to see the new captains of industry in the place of the old 
feudal aristocracy, as leaders of the people. He spent his 
entire fortune in attempts to establish experimental com- 
munities. His theories had a great influence upon young 
French Economists, and by 1830 a regular school of St. 
Simonists had grown up, of whom Bazard was the most 
acute thinker. He saw clearly the points at issue between 
capital and labour and realized that St. Simon's benevolent 
capitalist was a Utopian figure. He definitely proposed 
that the community should become the sole owner of the 
means of production and that the laws of inheritance should 
be abolished. 

The Socialism of Owen and St. Simon was too optimistic 
and too theoretical. It was based upon a profound belief 
in the axiom that "man is the creature of his surroundings," 
and that the faults of human nature are entirely due to 

THE REACTION, 1815-1848 93 

environment and to removable causes. The remedies which 
they suggested could be carried out only by a society purged 
of every selfish passion and inspired by pure altruism. They 
ignored the elemental selfishness of mankind, which nothing 
can cure, and they expected quick results. That is why 
they were so eager to try experiments. They believed, as 
the optimists of 1789 believed, that they had only to show 
the way and the world would follow. They appealed to 
the leisured and educated classes, rather than to the workers 
themselves; they preached no gospel of revolt to the work- 
ing man, and in fact their whole tone of mind was coloured 
by philosophy rather than by economics. 

The year 1830, however, marks a turning-point in the 
history of Socialism. We have already seen how important 
this epoch was in European affairs^ marking as it did the 
end of so many survivals of the eighteenth century and 
the rise of much that was new. Under the July Monarchy 
and the Reform Parliament the antagonism between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat became more apparent. 
They were no longer bound by a common desire for 
political reform. The theoretical Socialism of the middle 
classes lost its appeal and the Socialism of the working class 
began to take its place. Crude and cynical though the new 
Socialism was, it was both practical and powerful. Its first 
exponent in France was Louis Blanc, a practical reformer 
and no dreamer of attractive dreams. His book, "The 
Organization of Labour," written in 1839, was intended to 
appeal to working men. He sets forth in it his proposals 
for the establishment of workshops, owned and controlled 
by the workers, which should gradually supersede factories 
owned by individuals. 

A very unsatisfactory trial was given to his suggestions 
under the Second Republic in 1 848. The workshops were 
superintended by men who did not approve of the plan and 
wished to discredit it. The lamentable failure of the whole 
scheme cast a shadow upon French Socialism for a time. 
France entered upon a Conservative epoch. Socialism 
spread in the towns, but in the country it made no 


headway, for the peasants disliked the idea of a com- 
munal ownership of land. They were content with dire 
poverty as long as they were left in undisturbed possession 
of their little farms. 

English Socialism also suffered a considerable decline 
after the failure of the Chartist movement in 1848. Many 
of its supporters found other remedies for the evils of the 
working classes. The reaction against " Laissez-Faire " 
gathered strength, and more people were converted to the 
necessity for factory legislation. A series of laws were 
passed 1840-50 dealing with labour in mines, and the work 
of women and children was prohibited in certain employ- 
ments. In 1844, their hours in all employments were re- 
duced by law. In 1850 a ten-hour day came in. These 
measures were the first of an enormous code of labour laws 
dealing with protection against dangerous machinery, 
cleanliness of factories, insurance of workmen, etc, which 
became more complicated and far-reaching year by year. 
State education was also begun, the criminal laws reformed, 
and wiser poor laws passed. 

Labour, on the other hand, became more able to pro- 
tect itself and to improve its own condition. The laws 
against trades unions were abolished and the working 
men were able to combine to force their employers to give 
them better wages and shorter hours. Thus a dual move- 
ment towards reform was begun, by social legislation and 
by the organization of labour; and to the English mind, 
which has a horror of abstract ideas, these gradual but 
certain improvements appeared more attractive than a 
Socialist Utopia upon paper. Hence the doctrine of social 
revolution made little progress in England in the middle 
years of the century. 

But, while it languished in France and Italy, it found 
fertile soil in less progressive countries, especially in those 
where the industrial revolution did not take place until after 
1850. During the succeeding epoch the centre of interest 
in the history of Socialist development may be said to 
shift from the west to the east of Europe ; the home of 


THE REACTION, 1815-1848 95 

Socialism is no longer to be found in France and England, 
but in Germany and Russia. And in these countries the 
development of Socialist theory is vitally influenced by the 
political events of the years 1850-70, an epoch which 
witnesses the triumph of the principles of Nationalism, and 
the comparative defeat of Liberalism as a political force. 


The Failure of Liberalism — France under the Second Republic and the 
Second Empire — The Union of Italy — Germany and Austria — The Franco- 
Prussian War and the Union of Germany — The Age of Science : (i) Scientific 
Development ; (2) Religion and Progress ; (3) The New Socialism. 

The Failure of Liberalism 

THE year 1848 marks a turning-point in the history 
of Europe. It marks the advent of new men and 
new policies. The age of Metternich, of Louis 
Philippe, of Lamartine, Proudhon, and Mazzini had come 
to an end ; the age of Cavour, Bismarck, Louis Napoleoi?, 
Darwin, and Karl Marx was about to begin; 'The old creeds, 
the catchwords, and the ideals, both of Liberals and of 
reactionaries, were modified to suit new conditions. 

The ensuing period sees a partial triumph for the cause 
of Nationalism. The wrongs of smaller nations are not, 
indeed, redressed ; but the racial ambitions of Germany 
and Italy are fulfilled, and they become united nations. 
Italy, moreover, did not achieve national unity at the 
expense of Liberalism. Her salvation was wrought by 
Cavour, a great and Liberal statesman, who sought in 
monarchy and Parliamentary Government a solution to 
Italian problems. His legacy to posterity was a united 
and progressive nation. 

The fate of German Liberalism was not so kind. The 
inadequacy of the Liberal party had been sufficiently 
exhibited at Frankfort, and it soon lost the support of the 
Nationalists. Bismarck, the founder of German Unity, was 
no Cavour. He dealt the final blow to the lingering 




European superstition that Liberalism is necessarily or 
naturally the ally of Nationalism. Himself an ardent Ger- 
man Nationalist, his hatred of popular government was so 
profound that he would countenance no form of German 
Unity which involved a compromise with Liberalism. For 
this reason he besought his master, in the crisis of 1848, to 
act with Austria, the hated rival of Prussia, rather than 
listen to the proposals of the Frankfort Parliament. In the 
Empire of 1871 Liberalism had no place. It was not an 
affair of plebiscites and agreement among the peoples of 
Germany, as the Union of Italy had been. It was rather 
the submission of princes to a dominating power, German 
Unity was, to Bismarck, the supremacy of Prussia. His 
solution was founded upon the belief that Prussia's good 
was necessarily Germany's good. For nearly fifty years 
the German people submitted to Prussian domination, 
identifying Nationalism with Imperialism, and sacrificing 
their Liberalism to their hopes of a world power. 

The years 1 8 50-70 are disappointing. They do not ful- 
fil the bright hopes raised by the preceding period. The 
successful achievement of German and Italian Unity lend it, 
indeed, a somewhat meretricious glow of romance, but in 
reality lasting wounds are inflicted upon the solidarity and 
civilization of European nations, the hope of progress, 
and the common work for good. 

Liberalism, in many countries, is still persecuted. This 
is disastrous, since the idea of Liberal democracy has become 
one of the motive forces of the age. The history of the 
period demonstrates the ultimate futility of any attempts to 
suppress it. In countries where such a policy is pursued 
the day of reckoning, inevitable in any case, is the more 
bitter, since persecuted Liberalism is liable to lose its 
reasoned and compromising character and to become 
revolutionary and fanatical. In States where all healthy 
forms of expression are denied to public opinion, where the 
Press is not free, where education is supervised, and where 
public meeting and speech are shackled, popular criticism 
of the Government is likely to take unhealthy forms, 


Opposition becomes sedition, and the cause of progress falls 
into the hands of cranks, fanatics, and martyrs. In no 
country is this more evident than in France. The French 
people again fall under the fatal spell of Bonapartism, 
Imperialism, and Catholicism. They again renounce their 
freedom and their place among the Liberal nations. They 
are, for a second time, overtaken by dire calamity. 

Although the principles of Nationalism find, during this 
period, many and powerful advocates, the rights of small 
and weak nations are disregarded in an unprecedented 
fashion. In the cases of Poland, Denmark, and Alsace- 
Lorraine national rights are consistently disregarded. 
England, withdrawn in insularity, fails to protest with 
any adequacy, although these injuries to public justice tend, 
inevitably, to involve her in the greatest of all wars. The 
Slav nations in the Austrian Empire are anew crushed 
under a German and Magyar tyranny, in the compromise 
of 1867. The natural collapse of the Ottoman Empire is 
checked, and Turkey finds new champions in England and 
France. The unfortunate Balkan races see their hopes 
of freedom fade, when a congress of Christian Powers 
guarantees, in 1856, the integrity of the Turkish Empire 
and admits Turkey as a member of the Concert of Europe. 

The trend of international politics during this period is 
such as to present a state of war as natural between nations, 
and peace as an unnatural interlude, artificially created by 
diplomatists. Mazzini's idea of international co-operation, 
of associated free development, is submerged. The things 
of war flourish and the things of peace are discredited. 
The hope of reciprocal free trade between European nations 
receives its death-blow, since it was founded on the hope 
of lasting peace. Socialism becomes more revolutionary, 
for, since the State in most countries becomes identified 
with a war policy, the mass of the people, whose interest 
must always suggest the maintenance of peace, and who 
are bound to suffer by war, become dissociated from the 
State. Their hope lies in overthrowing it. The seeds of 
bitterness and struggle are sown in political, social, and 


economic life, and a belief in the use of force as a solution 
to all problems is encouraged. Not only Germany, but all 
Europe founds a new creed upon the Bismarckian dogma 
that " Not by speeches and majority votes are the great 
questions of the day settled, but by blood and iron." 

France under the Second Republic and the 
Second Empire 

I. The Second Republic 

The Republic declared in France in 1 848 lasted about 
five years. The first provisional Government was torn by 
the dissensions between Republicans, like Lamartine, who 
desired no great social changes, and Socialists, like Louis 
Blanc, who regarded the Republic as a means to an end, 
and who aimed at the reorganization of society in the 
interests of the working class. They hoped to abolish the 
private ownership of capital and to carry on production by 
means of great co-operative workshops and factories owned 
and managed by the workers themselves. This was far 
too radical a programme to be acceptable to the majority 
of people in F'rance, and it was especially disliked by the 
bourgeois class, who feared the confiscation of their property. 

The provisional Government declared the freedom of the 
Press, and in consequence a large number of cheap Socialist 
newspapers were published, which were read with avidity 
by the working classes. A Commission of Labour was set 
up to enquire into and improve the conditions of work. 
This Commission immediately reduced the twelve hours' 
working day to ten, but, as it had no power to enforce its 
decisions, this regulation was universally disregarded by 
the employers. The result was increased discontent among 
the poor people, whose hopes had been thus fruitlessly 
raised. National workshops were established which were 
supposed to be on the model of Louis Blanc's scheme for 
productive co-operative societies. But they did very little 
justice to his ideas and were a distinct failure. They 
offered no opportunity for skilled labour, but massed 


together large numbers of men on unskilled and unproduc- 
tive work. The pay was wretchedly bad, and there was 
not sufficient work to go round. 

The effect of this fiasco was apparent in the elections to 
the new Constituent Assembly, in May, 1848. There had 
been a great reaction against Socialism in the country and 
the Republicans had a large majority. The new Executive 
included Lamartine and four others, all anti-Socialist in 
their views. Their refusal to form the Commission of 
Labour into a Ministry of Labour caused a riot among the 
workpeople of Paris, which hastened the decision of the 
Government to close the national workshops. This led to 
street fighting of the most appalling kind between the 
supporters of the Government and the men thus thrown 
out of employment. A military dictatorship, lasting until 
October, was the only means by which order could be re- 
stored. The middle classes were all alienated from the 
Republic, for they thought that it would never give security 
to property and stability to business. The peasants feared 
that the Socialists would seize their land. The new taxes 
whereby the Government hoped to establish French credit 
were very unpopular in all quarters. Thus, before the first 
presidential election, the strength of the Republican Party 
in France was much impaired. 

2. The First President 

The new Constitution drawn up by the Assembly gave to 
France a legislative body of 750 members, elected for three 
years, by universal suffrage. The President was elected, 
also by universal suffrage, for four years, and was then not 
eligible for re-election for another four years. He had great 
powers. He commanded the Army and the Navy, made all 
official appointments, had the power to propose legislation, 
and controlled foreign policy. On 10 December, 1848, 
Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew of the first Emperor, 
was elected President by an enormous majority. He was 
but an insignificant adventurer at the beginning of the year, 
but his name acted as a charm with the ignorant peasants 


who, under universal suffrage, formed the greater part of 
the electorate. " How should I not vote fol" this gentle- 
man," said one, " when my nose was frozen at Moscow?" 

Since Bonaparte's political views were at that time un- 
pronounced and supposedly moderate, he experienced no 
very bitter opposition from any one political party. Of the 
other candidates, Lamartine and Cavaignac were opposed 
by the Socialists, and Ledru Rollin by the Republicans. 
Louis Napoleon was tied to neither party and was, more- 
over, supported by the Monarchists, who preferred him to 
any other candidate. 

The character of the Legislative Assembly elected in 1849 
demonstrated the effect of the June days upon the minds 
of the people. It was largely anti-Republican, and it pro- 
ceeded, under the direction of the President, to destroy the 
Republican Constitution under which it had been elected. 
The leaders of the Republican Party were removed and 
arrested, and, in 1850, the franchise laws were altered in 
such a way that the labouring classes were largely excluded 
from the vote. ' The Press was restricted, and many of the 
cheaper newspapers were suppressed. 

Meanwhile, Louis Napoleon filled all civil and military 
offices with satellites of his own, and in 185 1 he felt strong 
enough to strike a blow at the Legislative Assembly, 
which would not, he knew, support him in any attempt to 
increase his independent power. On 2 December, all the 
leaders of Republican and Monarchist opinion were arrested, 
and the Legislative Assembly was dissolved. All attempts 
at opposition were put down by military force. Having 
destroyed organized protest, Louis Napoleon asked the 
country to vote on the changes which he proposed in the 
Constitution. He was to hold office for ten years ; the 
Senate and the Council of State were to be revived. It 
was, practically, the Napoleonic Constitution of 1801. A 
huge majority of the people voted for these changes, which 
really made the President into an autocrat. It was, indeed, 
only a matter of time before the Second Empire was pro' 
claimed. After again referring to the people, Louis 


Napoleon took the title of Napoleon III, Emperor of the 
French, on 2 December, 1852. 

3. The Second Empire 

France under the Second Empire was no longer free. 
Parliament and the Press were shackled by the most 
elaborate precautions. The ministers were not responsible 
to the Legislative Assembly, which had no real control over 
taxation and could only discuss the bills laid before it by 
the President. Elections were largely manipulated by 
the Government in its own interests. Debates were not 
published except by official report. The public were not 
encouraged to take an interest in politics. 

Yet Napoleon III was not, on principle, an enemy to 
Liberalism. He considered that his first duty was to build 
up an orderly and prosperous State ; but he intended 
eventually to crown his Empire with liberal institutions. 
He did not regard autocracy as a permanent condition, 
but he looked to the consummation of his work in a great 
" Liberal Empire," which was to be achieved when France 
was sufficiently strong and educated to incur the risks of 
popular government. She was meanwhile to be treated as 
though she were under age. 

This explains certain apparent inconsistencies in his 
foreign policy. Though he was an autocrat at home, he re- 
garded himself as the friend and ally of Liberalism and 
Nationalism in Europe. He supported oppressed peoples 
rebelling against autocracies. He wished to see France 
surrounded by free and united nations who owed to her aid 
their freedom and their unity,, and who were indeed her 
spiritual children. Just as the first Napoleon ringed France 
round with vassal republics and satellite kingdoms, so his 
nephew hoped to re-establish the supremacy of France 
among liberal nations. 

Louis Napoleon believed himself to be the true successor 
of Napoleon I, and the logical exponent of Bonapartism as 
a political creed. He repeated the experiment of founding 
an autocracy upon a plebiscite, and he preached the hybrid 


doctrine of Liberal Imperialism peculiar to his uncle's de- 
clining years. It will be remembered that on his return 
from Elba Napoleon I made his terms with the Republican 
Party. He declared that it had always been his intention 
to grant Liberal institutions to France when a fit occasion 
arose, and that he had merely retained her in a temporary 
tutelage. Only the unremitting hostility of England and 
the wars forced upon him had prevented the fulfilment of 
his Liberal intentions. This fiction, carefully cherished, 
became a leading principle in Napoleonic ideas, as con- 
ceived by Napoleon III, 

It found little favour with French Liberals. They de- 
manded free institutions at once, and objected to autocracy, 
temporary or otherwise. Their opposition, increasingly 
formidable as the years went on, threw the Emperor into 
the arms of the Clerical Party, which, under the direction of 
Pope Pius IX, was daily becoming more hostile to the 
principles of modern progress and Liberalism. This party 
had the support of the Empress, a Spaniard, and a devout 
Catholic. The alliance of Napoleon with a reactionary 
Church increased the antagonism of the Liberal Party, and 
when, in 1868, the reforms of the Liberal Empire were 
carried through, the day of reconciliation was past. 

Nor did the Emperor's foreign policy meet with a better 
fate. His attitude towards the national ambitions of 
Germany and Italy was founded upon a misconception of 
their real problems. He thought that the forces of national 
revolt, once liberated, could be chained up again, when he 
saw fit. In Italy he hoped to see a confederation of In- 
dependent States led by Sardinia ; in Germany a similar 
confederation led by Prussia ; but in both cases the process 
of unification went much further than he had expected, and 
neither the Kingdom of Italy nor the North German Con- 
federation proved very grateful allies to France. 

As an autocrat. Napoleon III tried to do his duty. 
Economic development was stimulated, railroads and canals 
were constructed, and the resources of France were 
materially increased. The condition of all classes improved, 


and this went far to reconcile the people to his sway. But 
though he announced from the beginning that his policy 
was peace, he was forced into warlike courses. Since he 
had deprived France of liberty, he was, like his uncle, 
obliged to dazzle her with military glory. " He needed a 
war;" and it was his military enterprises which largely 
contributed to his ruin. 

4. The Crimean War 

The Crimean War, the first of the conflicts in which the 
Second Empire became involved, is important from the 
point of view of European diplomacy rather than as mark- 
ing a stage in the development of the Eastern Question. 
It began indeed with an attempt on the part of the Tsar 
Nicholas to extend his power in the Balkans and to domi- 
nate Turkey. In 1853 he sent an ambassador, Prince 
Menschikoff, to Constantinople, ostensibly to negotiate in a 
dispute which existed between Russia and France over the 
Holy Places in Palestine, which both countries claimed the 
right to protect. This dispute, however, was soon settled, 
and the real object of the mission became evident. Prince 
Menschikoff suddenly demanded that Russia should have 
a right of protection over all Christians living in Turkish 
dominions. This would give the Tsar an endless right of 
interference in Turkish affairs, and would practically make the 
Sultan his vassal. Turkey, urged by the English and French 
ambassadors, refused. The Tsar occupied the Turkish 
Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, and war began. 
England and France felt that they could not behold unmoved 
the triumph of Russia in the Balkans. On 27 March, 
1854, therefore, they formed an alliance and declared war 
on the Tsar. They drove the Russians out of the Princi- 
palities and embarked upon an expedition to the Crimea. 

The death of the Tsar Nicholas in March, 1855, followed in 
September by the fall of Sebastopol, caused Russia to reduce 
her demands. The new Tsar, Alexander II, was anxious 
for peace ; so also was Louis Napoleon, who had been 


alarmed at the recent mobilization of Prussia. At the 
Treaty of Paris in March, 1856, the Black Sea was declared 
to be neutral and opened to the merchant vessels of all 
nations. No armed ships might be kept there. The free 
navigation of the Danube was secured under an international 
commission. Turkey was admitted to the Concert of Europe, 
her dominions were guaranteed, and the Powers renounced 
any claim to interfere with her internal affairs. She, in 
return, promised to reform her treatment of her Christian 
subjects. The immediate objects of the allies were attained, 
and the ambitions of Russia were thwarted. It was obvious, 
however, that she would take the first opportunity to throw 
over the treaty. Turkey did not, of course, reform her ways, 
and the treaty made it difficult for Europe to insist upon 
her doing so. Her Christian subjects still fought for 
freedom. Moldavia and Wallachia, encouraged by Russia 
and France, and despite the protests of Austria and England, 
effected a union, and in 1862 became the principality of 
Roumania. Other Balkan races hoped soon to follow their 
example. But the hopes of these people met with the con- 
sistent opposition of England, who had constituted herself 
the protectress of Turkey, and who refused to believe in the 
disadvantages of the Turkish rule in the Balkans. 

The results of the war in non-Eastern politics were more 
permanent. It hastened a breach between England and 
France, for England had wished to continue the war. 
Russia and Austria, formerly close allies, were alienated. 
Russia had expected that Austria would join with her, or at 
least display a benevolent neutrality, and considered that 
she had lent far too much support to the allies. Austria 
had been frightened into this policy by the alliance of 
England and France with Victor Emmanuel, King of 
Piedmont and Sardinia, who had always been her chief rival 
in Italy. She feared that it would mean a re-opening of the 
Italian Question. But, though she would not compromise 
herself against them, she would not support the allies 
sufficiently to earn their gratitude, and by the end of the war 
she had succeeded in irritating both sides and in isolating 


herself. This proved admirably convenient to her German 
rival,. Prussia, as she discovered to her cost in the ensuing 
years. Without allies and without friends she was forced to 
face the increasing difficulties of her situation in Italy. 

The Union of Italy 
I. Victor Emmanuel and Cavour 

The States of Italy, ever since the collapse of the Roman 
Republic in 1848, had been subjected to a policy of savage 
reaction. Liberals were persecuted everywhere, especially 
in the Papal States and in Naples, Their only hope lay in 
Victor Emmanuel, who had refused to abolish constitutional 
government in Piedmont and Sardinia, though Austria had 
tried to force him to do so. He gave countenance to 
Liberalism and to the demand for Parliamentary institu- 
tions and for a United Italy. Patriots throughout the 
Peninsula regarded him as their champion. 

In 1850 he appointed Count Camillo de Cavour as his 
Prime Minister. This great statesman had been interested 
for years in political and economic questions. He had a 
strong belief in the value of constitutional freedom and 
desired to see a Parliamentary system established in Italy. 
But, unlike Mazzini and Garibaldi, he was no Republican, 
and he hoped to preserve the monarchical form of govern- 
ment, as it has been preserved in England. In 1847 he 
edited a Liberal paper in Piedmont, called the *' Risorgi- 
mento." He was elected to the first Piedmontese Parlia- 
ment in 1850. On becoming Prime Minister he immediately 
set himself to reorganize Piedmont and to render it as 
prosperous and modern a State as possible, in view of the 
great struggle with Austria which the future would inevitably 
bring. He trained and equipped a large army, stimulated 
education, built railroads, and encouraged agriculture and 
commerce. Liberalism in the other Italian States was en- 
couraged by the founding of the •* National Society " with 
the motto " Independence, and down with the Pope and 
Austria." Many who had been Republicans now felt that 


the Union of all the States in a single monarchy, under 
Victor Emmanuel, was the best hope for Italy. 

Cavour knew that Piedmont could not fight Austria 
without allies. It was for this reason that Victor Emmanuel 
had joined in the Crimean War. He had no quarrel with 
Russia, and no interest in the fate of Turkey, but he hoped 
to win the friendship of France and England. The presence 
of Sardinia at the Conference of Paris in 1856 was a moral 
victory for Cavour. He took the opportunity to lay the 
grievances of Italy before the great Powers, and spoke 
tentatively of the need for reforms, indicating Austria, the 
Pope, and the King of Naples as the chief obstacles to 
Italian progress. 

2. Cavour and Napoleon III 

The Emperor of the French was not disinclined to become 
the ally of Victor Emmanuel. He resented the accusation, 
brought against him by many Italians, of treachery towards 
Italy in 1849, He believed in the principles of nationality, 
and hoped to add to the lustre of his crown by assisting 
in the formation of a free Italian confederation, bound by 
gratitude to France. This confederation should, he thought, 
consist of the Kingdoms of Naples, Central Italy, and 
Northern Italy. The Pope should be president, a provision 
calculated to reconcile the Holy Father to the annexation 
of some of the Papal States to the Kingdom of Central 
Italy, which the Emperor destined for his cousin Prince 
Napoleon. Northern Italy, including Piedmont, Venetia, 
and Lombardy, was to go to Victor Emmanuel, who was to 
cede Savoy and Nice to France, as the price of this ag- 
grandizement. The Emperor did not see that this scheme 
would never satisfy the demands of the Italian Nationalists, 
who would, in all probability, continue the war until they 
had achieved complete political unity. 

He realized, however, that war with Austria was inevitable, 
and he faced the prospect with equanimity, as that country 
had been isolated since the Crimean War. In deepest 
secrecy, therefore, he met Cavour at Plombi^res on July 21, 


1858, and came to an understanding with him. It was 
agreed that France and Sardinia should bring about a war 
with Austria. Cavour gave the Emperor to understand that 
he concurred with his plans for the re-organization of Italy. 
Secretly he did not agree at all, for he hoped to unite the 
whole of Italy under Victor Emmanuel. But this was not 
revealed until later. Cavour was resolved to wait upon 
events, and to keep the alliance of France through the war, 
before he risked a disagreement with Napoleon III. 

3. The War of 1859 

By inimitable diplomacy, Cavour avoided the dangers of 
a European mediation and forced Austria into war. She 
seemed to be the aggressor, and Napoleon III was able to 
declare that his ally had been unjustly attacked. In June, 

1859, the battles of Magenta and Solferino were fought and 
won by the French and Italian armies, and the Austrians 
were driven from Lombardy. The prospects of Italian 
Nationalism grew bright. But suddenly, in the height of 
success, and without even consulting his ally, Napoleon made 
peace with Austria. He had realized the true objects of 
Cavour's policy; he had become aware that Italy would 
never be contented with a confederation. The States of 
Central Italy, Parma, Modena, Tuscany, and the Papal pos- 
sessions in the Romagna had revolted, had turned against 
their rulers, and were clamouring for annexation to Piedmont. 
Other States might follow their example. Napoleon III 
did not want a united Italy. A strong party in France ob- 
jected to the idea, for they thought that Italy would be a 
dangerous rival to France in the future. The Catholic party, 
his chief support and stay, disliked a war which would rob 
the Pope of his possessions. The French victories, more- 
over, had cost much in troops and munitions, and the 
Austrians still occupied a strong position. Prussia, too, was 
massing troops on the Rhine, as she had done in 1855, a 
cause of alarm to Napoleon III. 

Austria, on the other hand, was glad enough to make 
any peace which might check the process of Italian 


unification. The Preliminaries of Villafranca, 1 1 July, 
1859, created an Italian Confederation under the presidency 
of the Pope, ceded Lombardy to Victor Emmanuel, and re- 
stored the States of Central Italy to their princes. Venetia, 
still an Austrian province, was included in the confederation, 
and Austria hoped thereby to dominate Italy. Napoleon 
III expected to force this settlement on his unwilling ally 
and to check the movement towards a closer unity. 

This was a cruel blow to Victor Emmanuel, but, despite 
the entreaties and the eventual resignation of Cavour, he 
accepted it. In this he showed his wisdom, for he could not 
fight Austria alone and to refuse would be to imperil all that 
he had won. He would, in any case, ensure the possession 
of Lombardy, and it was very possible that the provisions 
of the treaty as regards Central Italy might prove impracti- 
cable. So he agreed to the terms of Villafranca at the 
Treaty of Zurich, 10 November, 1859. 

4. Italy in Revolt 

It soon became evident that the treaty could not be 
carried out in Central Italy. Only force could restore the 
deposed princes, and the mutual jealousy of France and 
Austria was so great that neither would allow the other to 
send troops for the purpose. England, moreover, protested 
against such a proceeding. Lord Palmerston had a lively 
sympathy with the aims of Italian Nationalists and declared 
that the people of Italy had a right to choose their own 
rulers. Napoleon III began to realize that the treaty was 
impossible. Cavour, moreover, who had returned to office 
in i860, alarmed him by prophesying that Central Italy 
would certainly become an independent Republic, if not 
annexed by Piedmont. He determined to give way. But, 
resolved to retrieve his credit by gaining some sort of ad- 
vantage for France, he demanded from Piedmont the cession 
of Savoy and Nice. Victor Emmanuel yielded the provinces, 
realizing that France would thereby be compromised and 
unable in future to object to any further annexations which 
he might make. He felt the cession of the provinces to be 



worth while, since it reduced France from the position of 
an arbiter to that of an " accomplice." 

The annexation took place in i860. England and 
Austria, despite their protests, did not dislike the arrange- 
ment, for they knew that it would prove to be a bone of 
contention between France and Italy. Modena, Parma, 
Tuscany, and the Romagna were soon afterwards an- 
nexed to Piedmont, when the people had, by a plebiscite, 

I Kingdom of Piedmont and 

n Acquired by Sardinia at the 
Treaty a< Zurich IBS9 
HI Anr>axed to Sardinia Mwchiaao 

IV Annexed to Sardinia Oct I860 

V Annexed to Sardinia Nov I860 
M Yielded to Italy by Austria IS66 
TI Annexed by Italy 1870 
m Cadad to France I860 


expressed their wishes. Thus the right of a people to 
choose their Government was maintained, in defiance of 
the principles of 1815. But the union of Italy was not 
yet accomplished. Venetia, Naples, Sicily, and the greater 
part of the Papal States were still under foreign rule. 
In i860, however, a revolt against the Neapolitan Govern- 
ment broke out in Sicily, and the famous soldier. Garibaldi, 
who had fought for the Roman Republic in 1848, went to . 


the aid of the insurgent Sicih'ans. He had for years lived 
the life of a hunted exile, always struggling for Italian 
freedom, and in 1859 he had fought heroically against 
Austria. He sailed for Sicily with a thousand volunteers. 
He was not openly recognized by Cavour, who could not 
risk the censure of Europe by an open attack on the King 
of Naples, with whom Victor Emmanuel was nominally at 
peace. Secret encouragement was, however, given to the 
expedition, for Cavour knew that he could reap some profit 
from it, if it proved successful. 

Garibaldi and his thousand triumphed in the face of the 
most appalling odds. The King of Naples had 24,000 
troops in Sicily, but they were badly commanded and 
offered little resistance. Garibaldi quickly mastered the 
Island, with the aid of the native insurgents. He then 
crossed to the mainland, and conquered the kingdom of 
Naples in the course of a few weeks. He was welcomed 
as a liberator upon all sides, for the rule of the Neapolitan 
Government had been intolerable. King Francis II fled, 
and Garibaldi set up a provisional Government in Naples 
and Sicily. His intention was to proceed to Rome and to 
liberate the Papal States. 

Cavour felt that it was now time for Victor Emmanuel 
to intervene. He feared that Garibaldi, a convinced Re- 
publican, might establish a Republic in Naples and Sicily, 
and possibly in Rome, a proceeding which would tend to 
divide Italy rather than to unite her. He knew also that 
an attack on Rome might lead to the intervention of France 
on the side of the Pope. Garibaldi must be allowed to go 
no further. The Piedmontese army therefore entered the 
Papal States, defeated the Papal Legion at Castelfidardo, 
and crushed the remaining Neapolitan forces at Capua. 
Napoleon III was induced to allow this by a guarantee 
that Rome should be left unmolested. 

Plebiscites were taken in Naples and Sicily, resulting in 
an overwhelming demand for annexation to Piedmont. 
Garibaldi, though he had wanted a Republic, was too 
loyal to resist the popular wish, and handed over the 


government to Victor Emmanuel. The Papal States of 
Umbria and the Marshes were also annexed, but, in ac- 
cordance with Cavour's promise to the Emperor, the patri- 
mony of St. Peter and the small strip of territory immedi- 
ately round Rome were left for the Pope. 

The first Italian Parliament met at Turin in 1861, when 
Victor Emmanuel was proclaimed King of Italy "by the 
Grace of God and the Will of the People." The same 
year saw the death of the master-statesman who had led 
his country to unity and greatness. Cavour left behind 
him a nation united save for the province of Venetia, which 
was still held by Austria, and for Rome, which was gar- 
risoned by the French. But the hour of Austria's weak- 
ness was at hand, and the crisis of her struggle with Prussia 
was fast approaching. Italy took advantage of her rival's 
misfortunes, and Venetia was added to the kingdom of 
Italy in 1866. Rome could not be won until the Emperor 
of the French should abandon his pro-Catholic policy. 
Upon the downfall of the Second Empire in 1870 "the 
Eternal City" became the capital of Italy. 

Germany and Austria 

I. Bismarck 

The general reaction against Liberalism, after the explo- 
sion of 1848, was pronounced in all German States, and 
especially so in Prussia. That country had a Constitution, 
but its Parliament was largely manipulated by the King in 
his own interests, and had no control over the Executive. 
Liberals were universally persecuted and kept from pro- 
fessional advancement. The Press was strictly censored, 
police and spies were active, arbitrary arrest and imprison- 
ment, even the use of torture, were not infrequent. Gov- 
ernment was carried on by the Junker class of landed 
nobility, who had also the monopoly of the higher posts in 
the army. 

A great economic and industricil transformation was 


meanwhile apparent in Germany. Railways, factories, 
and mines were under construction, and the country was 
rapidly becoming industrial. This led, as usual, to the 
rise of a capitalist middle class who had little sympathy 
with the narrow and conservative views of the Junkers. 
This class, together with the literary, scientific, and intel- 
lectual classes, looked to a closer unity of the German 
States as the high road to the best kind of economic and 
intellectual achievement. The recent events in Italy 
greatly stimulated the German impulse towards unity, and 
indicated for Prussia the same role as Sardinia had played 
in the years 1859-60. 

The weak and timid Frederick William IV of Prussia was 
succeeded in 1861 by his brother William, a man of strong 
character and decided policy. He was determined to 
dominate Germany, and meant to do it by his army. He 
immediately embarked on extensive reforms of the Prussian 
military system, but was baffled by the opposition of his 
Parliament, which, with unwonted spirit, refused to grant 
him the necessary supplies. A deadlock ensued in which 
he very nearly abdicated. In 1862, however, he appointed 
to the presidency of the ministry Count Otto von Bismarck- 
Schonhausen, whose support proved invaluable. 

Bismarck had always been the enemy of Liberalism, es- 
pecially of German Liberalism. He believed that Prussia 
had achieved greatness through her Kings, and not through 
her people, and he identified Prussia with Germany. He 
thought that any form of popular government would even- 
tually ruin Germany, and that Prussia would be committing 
suicide if she seized the hegemony of Germany at the price 
of such concessions. He urged his sovereign to reject the 
proposals of the Frankfort Liberals in 1 848, for he thought 
that if Germany was to be united under Prussia it must be 
done by conquest rather than by popular agreement. He 
was convinced that Prussia must eventually fight Austria 
and drive her out of the confederation, but he considered 
that common cause must first be made against Liberalism. 

Encouraged by Bismarck, the King pursued his quarrel 


with Parliament with unflagging vigour. For four years 
did Parliament refuse to grant the necessary money ; but 
the King ignored this and collected the taxes without 
Parliamentary sanction. In this course he was supported 
by the Upper House, which was composed of Junkers, 
Parliament was not formally abolished, but it was ignored 
and its protests were in vain. The army reforms were 
carried through and the whole military system was 
thoroughly reorganized by the able general, Helmuth von 
Moltke, who had studied deeply the relation of war to the 
modern means of communication and transport. Every 
effort was made to render the Prussian army thoroughly 
and scientifically efficient. Bismarck meanwhile defied 
German Liberalism, and in foreign politics laid the founda- 
tions of that career of subtle and forcible diplomacy which 
won him his laurels. 

The Polish insurrection of 1863 gave him an opportunity 
of gaining the friendship of Russia. The Poles, fired by 
the example of Italy, and driven to extremity by the 
harshness of the Russian rule, struck a last blow for 
national liberty. Their cause was hopeless unless they 
could win foreign support. None came. Bismarck im- 
mediately made an alliance with Russia to crush the 
rising, thereby breaking up an understanding between 
Russia and France which had for some time disturbed 
European statesmen. The position of Napoleon III was 
difficult, since the cause of Poland had excited great 
sympathy among French people of all classes. Forced by 
public opinion to make a protest in favour of the Poles, 
which entirely alienated the Tsar, his late ally, he was 
afraid to intervene actively when he saw that Prussia was 
supporting Russia, While England, France, and Austria 
disputed as to the extent of their possible intervention, 
Russia put down the rising with extreme brutality, and the 
hopes of the unfortunate Poles were finally extinguished. 
Bismarck felt assured of the reciprocal support of Russia 
in the Schleswig-Holstein question, which, ever since 1848, 
had troubled the peace of Europe. 


2. The Schleswig-Holstein Question 

The Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, lying between 
Hanover and Denmark, had for centuries belonged to 
the King of Denmark. The population of Holstein was 
wholly German, that of Schleswig was partly Danish. 
They did not form a part of Denmark, however, any more 
than Hanover could be called a part of England in the days 
when the Kings of England were Electors of Hanover. 
Holstein was a member of the German Confederation, and 
the King of Denmark, as hereditary Duke of Schleswig- 
Holstein, was represented at the Diet of Frankfort The 
Germans in Schleswig wanted Schleswig also to join the 
confederation, and this was strongly supported by the 
German Nationalist party. On the other hand, the Danish 
population hoped to see Home Rule abolished in the Duchies ; 
they wished to be united to Denmark. Prussia had, in 
1848, adopted a menacing attitude on behalf of the rights of 
the German Confederation, but the great Powers had inter- 
vened and the question had apparently been settled by the 
Treaty of London in 1852. An agreement was reached 
concerning certain legal complications which had arisen in 
the order of the Danish succession. The integrity of the 
Danish monarchy and the succession of the Danish Crown 
were guaranteed by all the powers. The rights of the 
confederation were maintained in Holstein, and the King 
of Denmark promised to preserve Home Rule in the Duchies 
and relinquished the attempt to unite them with the rest 
of his dominions. 

In spite of the treaty, however, he took advantage of the 
Polish insurrection to ignore his promise. On 1 3 Novem- 
ber, 1863, he gave a new Constitution to Denmark, incor- 
porating Schleswig with the monarchy. Upon his death, 
which occurred two days later, his successor, Christian IX, 
had to choose between two evils. If he ratified the new 
Constitution he would break the treaty made by Denmark 
in 1852 ; if he did not, he would outrage popular sentiment 
in Denmark. He preferred to conciliate his people and 


adhered to the policy of his predecessor. Nationalist 
feeling was rampant in Germany at this outrage to the 
rights of the confederation, and the troops of Hanover and 
Saxony were ordered to occupy Holstein. 

Bismarck did not openly support the action of the con- 
federation, since he intended to act independently. He 
did not wish to appear as an aggressor, or to seem to break 
the treaties of 1852, for he did not want the other Powers 
to intervene. He was sure of the co-operation of Austria, 
who would be too jealous to allow Prussia to act alone. 
The two Powers therefore occupied Schleswig, declaring 
their intention of upholding the rights of the King of Den- 
mark and of maintaining the treaty of 1852. Bismarck 
then presented an ultimatum which he knew the Danes 
could not accept, and forced them to declare war. As soon 
as a state of war existed he declared that the treaty of 1852 
was at an end. After a short campaign the King of Den- 
mark was forced, by the Treaty of Vienna (Oct., 1864), to 
yield the Duchies to Austria and Prussia. England and 
France, as signatories to the treaty of 1852 guaranteeing 
the integrity of Denmark, might have protested against 
this breach of treaty obligation ; but they were unable to 
co-operate in any attempt at mediation, for, as in the case 
of the Polish insurrection, their mutual distrust was so great 
that neither Power would compromise herself for fear of 
treachery on the part of the other. 

By the Convention of Gastein, August, 1865, it was settled 
that the Government of Holstein was to be carried on by 
Austria and that of Schleswig by Prussia, while the suc- 
cession question, re-opened by the collapse of the settlement 
of 1852, was being debated. The little Duchy of Lauenberg 
was annexed by Prussia. This treaty was a triumph for 
Bismarck, as it ignored the claims of the German Confedera- 
tion to dispose of the Duchies. It did not preclude a further 
settlement and left the way open for Prussia to annex the 
Duchies when a fit opportunity arose. It would supply 
endless causes of dispute, whenever Prussia might wish to 
pick a quarrel with Austria. 


Bismarck next sought the alliance of Italy. In his 
approaching struggle with Austria he intended that Italy 
should attack her in the rear and seize Venetia. He secured 
the neutrality of France by hinting that she might annex 
something on the Rhine frontier, in the event of war. No 
formal engagement was made and no definite promise was 
given, but, after interviewing Bismarck at Biarritz (Oct., 
1865), the Emperor of the French encouraged Italy to make 
the alliance with Prussia. In April, 1866, a secret treaty 
was signed between Prussia and Italy, agreeing on the 
latter's participation in the war should it occur within three 
months. Napoleon III would attach himself definitely to 
neither side. He thought that Austria would probably win, 
but he expected the war to be long and exhausting. On 
both points he was mistaken. 

3. The War of 1866 

Bismarck was now almost ready for war. In order to 
conciliate Liberal opinion in Germany during the coming 
struggle, he proposed various reforms in the constitution of 
the confederation, including the establishment of a popular 
chamber elected by universal suffrage. This is typical of 
the way in which he could, on occasion, exploit the Liberal 
Party. His power of " using the Revolution" distinguishes 
him from all the earlier reactionaries. Despite the protests 
of Austria, his proposals won the Liberal Party, temporarily, 
to the side of Prussia. 

Secure of Liberal support, he picked a quarrel with Austria 
over her administration of Holstein, and accused her of hav- 
ing broken the Convention of Gastein. Austria asked the 
Diet of the Confederation to send troops to protect Holstein, 
which was threatened by a Prussian invasion. Bismarck 
declared that such an act on the part of the Diet would be 
considered by Prussia as a declaration of war. When the 
Diet granted the request of Austria, he announced that the 
federal pact was broken and the German Confederation dis- 
solved, since it was illegal for its members to declare war 
on one another. 



The war which began on i6 June, 1866, lasted only seven 
weeks. Austria was supported by Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, 

Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt, in the south, and Hanover, 
Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, and Nassau, in the north. This was, 
to all appearances, a formidable coalition, but its internal 


weaknesses were great. Prussia first invaded and conquered 
North Germany. The States of South Germany might have 
held her up, but they failed to co-operate ; each petty prince 
was afraid of falling a victim to Austria's selfishness. Hav- 
ing isolated South Germany, Bismarck risked the chance of 
a French attack upon the Rhine provinces, and concentrated 
all his forces upon Austria. A brilliant campaign was 
crowned by the victory of Konigratz or Sadowa, 3 July, 
which counterbalanced the Italian defeat at Custozza on 
24 June. 

Bismarck knew that France might intervene ; Napoleon 
III was vacillating distractedly between two policies. At 
one moment he favoured an alliance with Prussia, at another 
he would decide that Austria was more likely to permit him 
to annex the Rhine provinces. It was to Prussia's interest 
to make peace before he had made up his mind. For this 
reason the terms offered to Austria by Bismarck were such 
as she was glad to accept. At the Preliminaries of Nikols- 
burg, 26 July, 1866, Venetia was ceded to Italy and the 
German Confederation was dissolved. The States north of 
the river Main were to be united in a confederation under 
the leadership of Prussia. The Southern States were to be 
independent. Austria agreed to the annexation, by Prussia, 
of Hanover, Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, Schleswig-Holstein, and 
the city of Frankfort. These annexations were made by 
right of conquest, without any attempt at plebiscites. They 
constituted the first step in the " blood and iron " policy 
which was to unite Germany. 

The North German Confederation included practically all 
the German States except Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, and 
part of Hesse-Darmstadt. It was ruled by a President (the 
King of Prussia), a Bundesrath, or Federal Council, and 
a Reichstag, or Parliament, elected by universal suffrage. 
This concession to democracy was, however, more apparent 
than real, for the Reichstag was almost entirely subordin- 
ated to the Federal Council. This was composed of the 
forty-three delegates of the princes of the confederation, of 
whom the majority were in some way dependent on Prussia. 


It was divided into seven departments, under the Presidency 
of Bismarck. Its debates were secret, and its members had 
the power of sitting and speaking in the Reichstag. No 
laws could be made without its consent. Prussia alone 
exercised the powers of war, peace, and diplomacy, and 
she immediately began to organize a large army for the 
confederation. When the Preliminaries of Nikolsburg were 
signed. Napoleon III suddenly demanded of Prussia the 
Bavarian and Hessian Rhine provinces, as compensation 
for the neutrality of France during the recent war. Bis- 
marck professed himself to be too good a German to allow 
France to annex the Rhine provinces, and suggested Belgium 
instead. But he made use of Napoleon's efforts to terrify 
Bavaria and Hesse. Armed with written proof of the 
Emperor's designs, he succeeded in frightening the States 
of South Germany. He convinced them that France was 
their secret enemy, and, by offering them easy terms of 
peace, he induced them to make secret treaties of offensive 
and defensive alliance, which practically rendered them the 
satellites of Prussia. Consequently, the clause in the Treaty 
of Prague, stipulating that the States of South Germany 
should be independent, was broken before it was made. 

Bismarck continued to dazzle Napoleon III with offers of 
Belgium, well aware that such an annexation would always 
arouse intense opposition in England. When the final peace 
was signed with Austria at Prague, 23 August, he broke off 
negotiations with France and said that he could not assist 
Napoleon in any schemes of annexation. Cheated and 
baffled, the Emperor of the French began to think that 
war with Prussia was the only means by which his position 
could be improved and his European prestige restored. 

The Franco-Prussian War and the Union of 

I. The Liberal Empire 

The policy of Napoleon III had become increasingly un- 
popular in France. The Italian War pleased no one but 


the ultra-Democrats. The Catholics disapproved of the 
attack on the Pope, the Monarchists were opposed to an- 
nexations by plebiscite, and the patriots disapproved of the 
rise of a new State on the French frontier, as likely to be 
prejudicial to French interests. The Democrats, on the 
other hand, were not completely satisfied, since Napoleon 
continued to garrison Rome and to protect the Pope ; but 
he could not abandon this policy without alienating the 
Church Party. His position was a false one, and he could 
not extricate himself 

His commercial policy was condemned by a large financial 
party in France, especially in the case of a treaty with Eng- 
land which made some advance towards free trade. His 
position was still further endangered by the Mexican fiasco, 
the most disastrous of his many undertakings. He had, in 
i86i, taken advantage of the American Civil War and, in 
disregard of the Monroe Doctrine, had embarked upon the 
conquest of Mexico, which was at that time a Republic. He 
hoped to establish French influence in Central America and 
to conciliate the Catholic Party, which was much scandalized 
at some recent anti-clerical legislation of the Mexican Re- 
public. He intended to bestow the country, when he had 
conquered it, upon some satellite of his own, and in 1864 
he offered the Mexican crown to Maximilian, brother of the 
Emperor of Austria. But he found the task more difficult 
than he had expected. The whole country rose against the 
French, and the United States, at the close of the civil war, 
indignantly resented this disregard of the Monroe principles 
and insisted on the withdrawal of the French troops. The 
whole attempt was a failure. It wasted Napoleon's resources, 
both in men and money, damaged his European reputation, 
and prevented his intervention in the wars of 1864-66. 

Under these successive blows he turned to the Liberal 
Party for support. France was at length endowed with 
liberal institutions. In i860 the powers of the Legislature 
were enlarged, the full publication of debates was permitted, 
and it was decreed that the ministers representing the 
Executive should defend and explain its policy before the 


Assembly. In 1867 the Legislature acquired the right 
to question ministers at any time as to their acts. The 
Press was largely freed in the following year. In 1870 the 
Senate was deprived of much of its power, the Legislature was 
given full Parliamentary privileges, and a Liberal Ministry 
was formed. But these concessions came too late. They 
did not reconcile the Liberal Party, they merely afforded it 
greater opportunities for opposition. Under the direction 
of Gambetta, a Republican Party grew up which made use 
of its Parliamentary privileges to attack Napoleon's posi- 
tion and policy. These movements were stimulated by the 
liberated Press. Nor was it a safe time for France to be 
divided against herself, for war with Prussia was fast ap- 
proaching. Yet the Republican Party bitterly opposed the 
Emperor in his attempts to prepare and strengthen the 
French Army. 

2. The Quarrel between France and Prussia 

Bismarck and Napoleon III both wanted war. The 
Emperor thought that a successful war against Prussia 
would retrieve his credit in France. He resented bitterly 
the way in which Bismarck had tricked him in 1866, and 
he realized that Prussia would never favour his schemes of 
annexation. Bismarck, on the other hand, knew that he 
could not complete the unity of Germany while France 
stood in the way. Napoleon III was anxious to check the 
progress of German nationality, as he had tried to stifle 
Italian aspirations at the peace of Villafranca ; he would 
never permit the inclusion of the South German States in 
the German Confederation. Bismarck had to rouse Teu- 
tonic feeling, which was mostly race hatred of France, 
before he could complete the union of Germany. In the 
glory of a victorious war with France he thought that 
national unity would finally be consummated. But, in 
order to rouse the German animosity to France, he must 
make Napoleon III seem to be the aggressor. He must 
also provoke the war soon, in order to justify the heavy 


armaments prepared by Prussia, which were already caus- 
ing discontent in North Germany. Also he must act be- 
fore South Germany had time to rebel against the Prussian 

Under the circumstances Napoleon should have sought 
alliances at any cost. He should have secured the friend- 
ship of Austria and Italy. But France and Austria were 
mutually distrustful, each fearing to be compromised 
for the other. The price of the Italian Alliance was, of 
course, the evacuation of Rome. On this point the 
Emperor would not give way. He came to the conclusion 
that he did not need allies ; he was convinced that his 
army was prepared, " down to the last gaiter button," and 
he had no idea that South Germany would probably 
support Prussia. 

Bismarck's opportunity arose when a revolution took 
place in Spain, resulting in the flight and exile of Queen 
Isabella and the vacancy of the throne. The Spanish pro- 
visional Government offered the crown to Prince Leopold of 
Hohenzollern, a kinsman of the King of Prussia. France 
demanded that the candidature should be withdrawn, as 
prejudicial to her interests. King William, who did not 
quite follow the war views of Bismarck, yielded to the 
pacific persuasions of Austria, England, and Russia, and 
agreed to advise his kinsman to withdraw his candidature. 
It seemed as if the matter might end peacefully, which 
would have been a severe blow to Bismarck's policy. But 
the French Ministry, in its utter folly, played into his 
hands and, supported by the Paris War Party, sent an 
emissary to demand a promise that Prussia would refrain 
from any support of the candidature in future. King 
William courteously refused. Bismarck, seizing his oppor- 
tunity, published an account of the interview in which all 
expressions of courtesy were omitted. It seemed as if the 
King had rudely dismissed the French envoy. France, 
upon this publication, was roused to fury, for she believed 
herself insulted. Thiers, who besought the Assembly to 
make sure of the truth of the account before going to war, 


was shouted down as a pro-German. The nation as a 
whole was rushed into hostilities by the court and the 
clamorous War Party in Paris. France declared war on 

3. The Franco- Prussian War 

France found herself isolated. The whole of South 
Germany, thinking that France was the aggressor, supported 
Prussia. Austria and Italy had agreed to remain neutral, 
Russia was friendly to Prussia, and intended to take the 
opportunity of a European conflagration to throw over the 
Black Sea treaties. England, having been furnished with 
written proof of Napoleon's recent designs upon Belgium, 
had little sympathy with his misfortunes. Indescribable 
confusion reigned in France, where a disorganized and 
utterly unprepared army offered little resistance to the 
Prussian troops. The French had expected to invade 
Germany ; but it was the Prussians who invaded France. 
Upon I September the battle of Sedan was fought, the 
French army surrendered, and the Emperor was taken 
prisoner. The Empress fled to England, a Republic was 
declared, and a provisional Government was appointed. 

The Government of National Defence, as it was called, 
had to face almost impossible conditions. It was composed 
of inexperienced men who had grown old in opposition. 
It had no diplomatists who could cope with Bismarck. It 
did not immediately take a plebiscite and secure the support 
of the people, a mistake which was useful to Prussia, for 
Bismarck refused its offers of peace, declaring that it was 
an illegal Government. Since its headquarters were in 
Paris, it was cut off from the rest of the country, as soon as 
the siege of that city began. Ignorant of the course of 
events in the provinces, it insisted upon carrying on the 
Government for the whole of France. 

The Germans advanced on Paris and began to besiege it. 
The city made an heroic defence, enduring four months of 
terrible famine. Gambetta, who escaped in a balloon, 
formed a delegacy of the Government of National Defence 


at Tours, which organized the armies of the provinces. 
This delegacy, always handicapped by its want of communi- 
cation with headquarters, organized and equipped armies 
which fought desperately, but which failed to relieve Paris. 
The German tide swept on, and Strassburg surrendered 
(28 Sept.) with 19,000 men. In October Metz fell, and 
172,000 men with huge stores of armaments and munitions 
were taken. Thiers meanwhile had made a tour of Europe, 
endeavouring to win allies for France. But, though the 
aged patriot roused in all countries the deepest sympathy, 
he was too openly despondent about the future of his 
country to induce foreign Governments to befriend her. 
Paris fell at last, and, on 28 January, 1871, the Government 
of National Defence consented to an armistice. Unfortun- 
ately Jules Favre, who acted for the Government, agreed to 
the suspension of warfare all over France. He did not 
know of the progress of the provincial armies and ordered 
them to retire to places indicated by Prussia. Bismarck, 
who knew all the military positions, saw to it that the 
French forces were isolated and rendered helpless. France 
was thus compelled to make peace with no military strength 
at all, and she could not refuse the terms offered to heV by 
Germany, however bitter they might be. 

At a general election in February, 1871, a huge 
majority for peace was returned, and, as the Republican 
Party desired the continuation of the war, the first Assembly 
elected under the Third Republic was anti-Republican and 
Monarchist. Meeting at Bordeaux, on 12 February, it 
appointed Thiers, as Chief of the Executive, to treat at once 
with Prussia for a definitive peace. He had a terrible task. 
A Socialist revolution broke out in Paris which enabled 
Bismarck to raise his demands, pretending to disbelieve in 
the stability of the new Government. At length, on 10 
May, 1 87 1, the Treaty of Frankfort was signed, by which 
France yielded her provinces of Alsace and Lorraine to 
Germany, and undertook to support a German Army of 
Occupation which should be withdrawn gradually while the 
indemnity of ;^200,ooo,ooo was paid off in instalments. 


4. Europe and the War 

Italy and Germany had, meanwhile, completed their 
unification. Italy had taken the opportunity to seize 
Rome, which became her capital, 20 September, 1870. On 
18 January, 1871, King William of Prussia was proclaimed 
first German Emperor at Versailles. The German Empire 
included the Southern as well as the Northern States, and 
its constitution was similar to that of the North German 
Confederatioa Bismarck was right in thinking that the en- 
thusiasm of a victorious war with France would charm the 
German people into accepting the Prussian ideal of national 
union. In their hatred and fear of the "hereditary foe" 
the States of Germany momentarily forgot their mutual 
jealousies, their separatist traditions, and their dislike of 
Prussia. Bismarckian principles were crowned with the 
most radiant success, and the creed of blood and iron no 
longer needed an apologia in European politics. Russia 
had lost no time in denouncing the Black Sea treaties, and, 
despite the protests of England and Austria, she was able 
to carry her point. She was secure of the secret support of 
Prussia, and at a conference held in London in 1871 the 
treaties were revised in her favour. Although the principle 
of the inviolability of treaties was nominally maintained, 
this incident served as a most baneful precedent, impairing 
as it did the sacredness of treaty obligations ; the action 
of Russia is but characteristic of the general principles 
governing European politics in this epoch of force and 

The Age of Science 

I . Scientific Progress 

If the student of History finds the political events of the 
period 1850-70 a disappointing record, he will, in another 
field, discover ample evidence of advance in human civiliza- 
tion. This epoch, so barren in democratic progress, wit- 
nesses startling victories in another direction. Inestimable 


advances arc made in man's knowledge of, and control 
over, nature and the world around him. The scientific 
development of the age becomes a dominant factor in the 
social history of Europe, leaving its mark alike upon 
political institutions, literature, economics, and religion. 

Mention has already been made of the series of inven- 
tions with which the century opened ; inventions which had 
a transforming effect upon transport, industry, and com- 
munication. These were, throughout the period, followed up 
and amplified by the best thinkers of Europe. The use of 
steam was supplemented by that of electricity ; steamboats 
and railways were followed by telegraphs and cables, and 
these, at the end of the century, were reinforced by auto- 
mobiles, aeroplanes, telephones, and wireless telegraphy. 
Countless varieties of the earth's resources were pressed 
yearly into the service of man, from the oil wells of Texas 
to the rubber plantations of Sumatra. New and un- 
dreamed of comforts and luxuries were introduced into the 
homes of civilized people. This great advance was built 
up on the patient toil and labour of a vast army of nine- 
teenth-century workers, mechanicians, engineers, scientists, 
and explorers, men famous and men obscure, all co-operat- 
ing in the same tremendous task. 

Of the work of these men, of the various stages of their 
progress, of their triumphs and failures, this is no place to 
speak in detail.-' But a little must be said of the effects, 
taken as a whole, of their achievement upon society. 
Politically their work is of extreme importance. The ad- 
vance in transport and communication served to increase the 
bonds of union between European nations, despite the racial 
and national animosities which still divided them. Europe 
was soon covered with a network of railways and telegraph 
posts, which all served as so many links between one nation 
and another. This advance in the use and knowledge of 
the natural resources of the world was made by all civilized 

^ A good general survey of the scientific advance of the century may be 
found in Marvin, " The Century of Hope," and Wallace, "The Wonderful 


nations in common, and the benefits accruing were shared 
by all alike. The movement was truly international and 
intercontinental. From every country pioneers were re- 
cruited, who worked in co-operation not for any individual 
race or people, but for the benefit of mankind. This grow- 
ing tendency of the scientist to think internationally cannot 
be over-emphasized, since, as the century proceeds, the 
scientist becomes the leader of the people. As goods, 
manufactured by new processes, became more plentiful and 
varied, the countries of Europe became more dependent 
upon one another ; just as, in the history of any individual 
country, towns and villages, formerly independent and 
self-sufficing, became more interdependent with the growth 
of civilization. Countries began to specialize in the goods 
they produced ; labour became more fluid and international, 
following in the wake of employment. Many industries 
depended for their existence upon raw material imported 
from other parts of Europe. The great industrial towns of 
Northern Italy, for instance, depended entirely upon im- 
ported coal. The complicated relations between the German 
foundries and the supplies of iron in Alsace-Lorraine became 
a leading factor in the international dispute concerning these 

The whole of this international production depended 
upon the maintenance of peace and the preservation of the 
status quo. A war of any magnitude would shatter it 
Such a calamity would not only involve disaster to the 
people living directly within the area of hostilities, it might 
mean that whole nations could be cut off from some, at 
least, of the necessities of life. We have seen how, in the 
Napoleonic wars, the internationalization of European 
economics had already begun ; the people of Europe 
depended upon English goods. As each country passed 
through the phases of the Industrial Revolution it became, 
automatically, dependent upon the rest, and this unity of 
economic interest became especially binding in the forty 
years of peace which succeeded the Franco-Prussian War. 
While the seeds of war were sown by short-sighted states- 


men, the peoples of Europe were swiftly becoming one 
economic civilization. 

The consequent rise in general standards of comfort and 
decency was, of course, only partial. The position of a large 
portion of the community deteriorated, as we have seen, 
with the progress of the Industrial Revolution. The very 
poor did not immediately share the benefits of the new 
order to an extent which compensated for their losses ; 
but a new ideal was set up, a new standard of what ought 
to be. Many difficulties and dangers besetting human 
existence, formerly regarded as inevitable, had been removed 
by scientists. This encouraged men to attack remaining 
evils with higher courage and fiercer energy. Nothing 
seemed to be absolutely impossible to human effort, and 
consequently no evil appeared to be tolerable. The effect 
of this new form of collective effort is seen in the rapid 
progress of medical science, the rise of a new crusade 
against pain and suffering. Investigations were made in 
the use of anaesthetics, in consequence of which mankind 
was saved a world of agony. Simpson, of Edinburgh, first 
used chloroform in 1 846, following the work of Wells and 
Morton in the United States. Pasteur, 1822-95, developed 
Jenner's experiments in vaccination, and made far-reaching 
investigations into the germ theory of disease ; he was 
followed by Lister, who revolutionized the science and 
practice of surgery, making operations safe and possible by 
the discovery of new precautions against septic poisoning. 
It is in medical science that we have, in particular, an 
illustration of the growth of international co-operation. In 
the Great War of 1914-18, when Europe as a political unit 
had ceased to exist, the moral and social unity of the 
nations was singularly exemplified in the work of the Red 
Cross, the greatest of all international societies. This 
society, founded by a series of international agreements, 
measures the moral progress of a hundred years ; it em- 
phasizes the growth of humanity and civilization in the 
popular mind ; it marks the protest of society against 
human suffering, against the consequences of war, and 


against the forcible exploitation of any one section of the 

The inventions which thus transformed the face of society 
were, for the most part, the fruit of applied scie xe. They 
were founded upon the great principles evolved by earlier 
thinkers, upon the work of Galileo, Newton, Linnaeus, and 
Lamarck. Applied science, however, does not fill the 
measure of the achievements of the nineteenth century ; 
this period is also fruitful in the growth of scientific theory. 
The new truths evolved, the new investigations pursued 
are still, at the present day, the subject of discussion. Their 
full bearing upon human life has yet to be disclosed ; 
but it is certain that they, in their turn, will be rich in 
benefits to mankind. Immeasurably important in the 
history of scientific theory is the growth of the idea 
of evolution, and its effect upon the modern sciences 
of human life, such as biology, anthropology, psycho- 
logy, and sociology. 

In 1858 Darwin published "The Origin of Species." 
His greatness does not lie in his originality. He formulated 
into scientific propositions ideas which had been " in the 
air " for some time ; indeed Wallace simultaneously came 
to the same conclusions in consequence of entirely in- 
dependent observations. But, by patient and untiring 
labour, by minute enquiry and far-reaching investigations, 
Darwin transformed a vague and indefinite theory into a 
working hypothesis. According to Huxley, the quint- 
essence of Darwinism is to be found in " . . . the sugges- 
tion that new species may result from the selective action of 
external conditions upon the variation from the specific 
type which individuals present." 

"During the last 150 years," says another eminent 
scientist,^ " the whole conception of the natural universe has 
been changed by the recognition that man, subject as he is 
to the same physical laws and processes, cannot be con- 
sidered separately from the world around him, and the 
assurance that scientific methods of observation and experi- 

^ Mr. Dampier Whetham in the " Cambridge Modern History," Vol. XII. 


ment are applicable, not only to the subject-matter of pure 
science, but to all the many and varied fields of human 
thought and activity." 

Man, in the light of evolutionary theory, was seen as 
the creature of the past, as modified by environment, and 
as transmitting these modifications to his children. This 
conception of human life had, naturally, a profound effect 
upon political science and upon the study of history. 
Political institutions, religious beliefs, art, and literature 
were studied from a new point of view, and the laws 
governing their development and variation became the 
subject of scientific investigation and enquiry. The func- 
tions of the State acquired a new importance. The Ideal 
State was no longer regarded as static, the product of 
a universal formula, but as that which suits the require- 
ments of a particular people at a given stage of its develop- 
ment. An illustration of the effects can be seen in the new 
treatment of criminals and paupers as the accidents of a faulty 
environment rather than as inevitable pests. This treatment 
becomes consistently more scientific and more humane, and 
tends to prevent crime and poverty by striking at the cause. 

In these ways evolutionary theory has already influenced 
State action and legislation. Its influence upon religion 
and social life was at once more direct and more definite. 
Upon religious beliefs, and upon the growing theories 
relative to social reform, the searchlight of scientific 
enquiry was now turned, and the results were of immense 
importance, both to Catholicism and to Socialism. 

2. Science and Religion 

The latter half of the century witnessed a distinct conflict 
between scientific theory and accepted religious belief 
Scientific theory was based upon a view of truth as pro- 
gressive and upon the development of human reason ; 
religious belief regarded it as static and based on revelation. 
A large number of people who believed literally in the first 
chapter of Genesis, and who supposed that species were 
created separately and distinctly, found, in the teaching of 


Darwin, a contradiction to accepted dogma. Christianity 
was criticized from a new standpoint, and a new philosophy 
of religion was evolved, based upon the investigations of 
archaeologists in Palestine, Asia Minor, and elsewhere, and 
reinforced by comparative studies of early religions by 
anthropologists. The scientific analysis of religion aroused 
bitter resentment among the orthodox, especially in Catholic 
countries. One of the most eminent of the new critics, 
Kenan, was prohibited by the French Imperial Government 
from lecturing at the College de France after the famous 
disquisition in which he described Christ as : 

". . . an incomparable man, so great that, although 
everything here must be judged from the point of view of 
positive science, I would not wish to contradict those who, 
struck by the exceptional character of His work, call Him 

The consequence of this obstructive spirit is seen in a 
quarrel between the Catholic Church and the pioneers of 
modern thought, which proved to be incalculably disastrous 
to society. This quarrel was made the more bitter in 
that it coincided with the triumph of Nationalism and 
Liberalism in Italy, in spite of the fierce opposition of the 

Pius IX had begun his career as a reformer. But the 
events of 1 848 taught him a sharp lesson and bred in him 
a profound distrust of modern movements. Henceforth he 
stood for the cause of reaction, and all his energies were 
directed in a powerful campaign against modernism. He 
replied to the clamours of Liberalism and Democracy by 
increasingly emphatic statements of Papal authority. In 
1864 his comment upon the recent events in Italy is to be 
found in the Encyclical Quanta Cura, in which he declared 
war against modern ideas, liberties, and institutions, and 
solemnly condemned those who dared to maintain : 

•* , . . that it is no longer expedient that Catholicism 
should be the only religion in the State to the exclusion of 
all others, that freedom of worship should be granted to 
foreigners resident in Catholic countries, that the Roman 


Pontiff can, or should, reconcile himself with progress, 
liberalism, and modern civilization." 

The declaration of Papal Infallibility, which occurred in 
1870, coincides naturally with the fall of Rome and the 
completion of the Kingdom of Italy. With the loss of the 
last of his temporal possessions, Pius IX made good his 
highest claim to spiritual supremacy. 

The consequences of this uncompromising attitude were 
most unfortunate for Europe. A secularist and anti- 
religious spirit grew up among the pioneers of modern 
thought. It was felt that Catholicism and Liberalism are 
of necessity irreconcilable, and that a religion based upon 
authority and tradition could not be tolerated in a State 
where democracy was practised. In many countries, 
especially in France and Germany, an attack was made 
upon religion, in which the Catholic Church was actually 
persecuted. The educated middle classes ceased, to a large 
extent, to order their lives in accordance with the principles 
of religion, and social and democratic movements suffered 
from the loss of those higher spiritual elements which co- 
operation with the Church might have lent them. The 
effect of this general weakening of religious discipline was 
manifested to many thinkers, in the catastrophe of 1914, 
when all the inventions and discoveries of science, all the 
powers of the human intellect, all the virtues of democracy 
and of the altruism bred of social reform failed to avert the 
calamity of war. 

The Papacy, however, after the death of Pius IX, adopted 
a policy of concession. Under Leo XIII many of the 
principles of modern science were recognized and adopted, 
and Catholic education was brought more into line with 
modern requirements. Although the principle of infalli- 
bility was maintained, the policy of the Encyclical was 
ignored, and reconciliation appeared to be no longer im- 

3. Science and Socialism 

In the history of Socialism the manifestations of the 
influence of scientific methods of thought are even more 


interesting. Socialist theory was, after 1850, developed 
chiefly in Germany, where it acquired an abstract and logical 
form calculated to appeal to the Teutonic mind. The 
English and French Socialists of the early part of 
the century had combined their theory with numerous 
measures of practical social reform, to be carried out 
immediately. This practical and experimental element 
was eliminated from the development of Socialism after 
1850. The stream of social reform flowed on, but it existed 
apart from the growth of Socialist theory. And this despite 
the fact that social reformers aimed at removing those evils 
and injustices against which the Socialists had most loudly 
protested. The gradual organization of Trades Unions, 
the increase of popular education, and the growth of co- 
operative movements enabled the proletariat to secure better 
conditions, while factory legislation, sanitary regulations, 
compulsory insurance, and the like, forced the capitalist 
class to take into consideration the well-being of the working 

Socialists, however, influenced by the current economic 
theories of the day, would lend but little support to such 
measures. In the middle of the century all economists 
were very much influenced by the theory of the " Iron Law 
of Wages," based upon the ideas of Ricardo. It was 
believed that wages, under the capitalist system, could not 
rise far above subsistence level. The employer, having 
paid the labourer just enough to keep him alive, pockets 
all the remainder of the wealth produced, and thereby robs 
labour of the fruits of its toil. According to this theory, 
any attempt to force up wages in one trade would only lead 
to their decrease in another, Eflbrts to decrease the cost 
of living, by means of co-operative and insurance societies, 
etc., would merely lower the subsistence level and cause a 
fall in wages. 

Socialists, influenced by these ideas, came to the con- 
clusion that the only way to reform must lie in the abolition 
of the entire capitalist system. They would not encourage 
reforms and modifications by which a state of things might 


be prolonged which seemed to them to be radically wrong. 
They did not, naturally, wish to do away with capital (i.e. 
wealth used in production), but they wished to put an end 
to the private ownership of capital by the non-labouring 
classes. They were, therefore, distrustful of labour legis- 
lation and of the work of Trades Unions. They despised 
the social programme of the German Liberals, who aimed 
at gradual reform by means of voluntary unions, worker's 
associations, and co-operative societies. The German 
Socialists would not compromise with the Liberal Party, 
or work with them, to gain any common ends. They pre- 
ferred to keep their principles intact and to forego any 
form of practical experiment. 

Lassalle (1825-64) was the first great German Socialist. 
He definitely broke with the Liberal Party. In 1863 certain 
working men, discontented with the Liberal programme, 
met at Leipzig in a Working Men's Congress. They de- 
cided that Labour ought to form a separate political party. 
A " German Working Men's Association " was founded 
under the auspices of Lassalle with the immediate object 
of securing universal suffrage. It was thought that com- 
plete democracy would lead as a matter of course to the re- 
organization of society in the interests of the proletariat; 
but the results of universal suffrage when, in 1870, it be- 
came the law of the German Constitution, were disappointing, 
and ministered to the general feeling that the democratic 
State is not necessarily the Socialist State. Under the 
guidance of Lassalle, Socialism became an affair of class 
antagonisms ; its programme involved a seizure of power on 
the part of the proletariat rather than a genuine effort on 
the part of the whole community to rectify the inequalities 
of distribution. Socialists refused to participate in the 
existing Government, or to countenance reforms in existing 
institutions ; they preferred to wait until the proletariat, fully 
aroused by their teaching, should rise and sweep away the 
capitalist system. Socialism, in consequence, has a slender 
political record during this period. Its influence is not 
to be estimated from the study of Parliamentary records. 


But the new spirit is obvious, even as early as 1847, when 
the first "Communist Manifesto" was published by Karl 
Marx and his friend Engels. 

Karl Marx (1818-83) developed to its fullest extent 
the theory of class war and the conflict between labour 
and capital. In his thesis on the evolution of capital he 
presents history anew from the economic standpoint. He 
traces the exploitation of human labour from the days of 
slavery, through the Middle Ages, when a feudal aristocracy 
appropriated the labour of a serf population, to the nine- 
teenth century and the exploitation of the industrial pro- 
letariat by the capitalist bourgeoisie. His whole theory 
of capital is founded upon his idea of surplus value, which he 
regards as the accumulated booty stolen by the rich from the 
poor. Penetrated by the thought of evolution, he regards 
capitalism as a necessary stage in social development, doomed 
to give place, eventually, to Socialism. The capitalist bour- 
geoisie, like the feudal aristrocracy, had performed certain 
functions useful to society. It had organized industry upon 
the large scale necessitated by modern production and 
consumption ; by its very selfishness and greed it had 
accumulated large quantities of capital very necessary to 
commercial prosperity, which would one day, become the 
heritage of the working class. According to Marx, how- 
ever, the usefulness of the bourgeoisie was already declining, 
and its fate was sealed by its selfishness, its ruthless com- 
petition, and its disregard for the consumer ; it was becoming 
harmful to society. It was responsible for great economic 
evils, cheap wares, adulteration, waste in advertising, 
sweated labour, and artificial gluts and scarcities. 

Socialism was to be the next stage towards which Europe 
was inevitably tending. No reaction could permanently 
prevent this. When the proletariat had seized political 
power, society would be composed of gigantic syndicates 
representing a number of productive associations. The 
product would be divided equally, a certain part being set 
aside for further production. The State, as known in the 
nineteenth century, would disappear, being merely an 


organization by which the bourgeoisie maintained its power. 
As soon as the " class war " had disappeared, representative 
political institutions would no longer be needed. 

Marx spent much of his life in exile, for he had to leave 
Germany after the disturbances of 1848, in which he took 
a prominent part. He fled from France to England, where, 
often in great poverty, he devoted his life to the cause of 
Socialism, He was largely instrumental in drawing up the 
" Communist Manifesto," in which the principles of social 
revolution are set forth. He was, however, too great a 
man to ignore completely facts which would not square with 
his theories. His attitude towards the seizure of the power 
by the proletariat became modified as the years went on. 
He admitted that in some countries this might not be 
necessary. In 1872 he said that "he would not deny that 
there were countries like America and England, and, so far 
as he knew its institutions, Holland also, where the work- 
men could attain their goal by peaceful means." The 
failure of the French Socialists in 1871 to establish a 
republic of Federated Communes, upon Marxist lines, had 
a great influence upon him. He was led to deprecate 
revolutions carried out by minorities, for he felt that the 
French fiasco had been due to the fact that the majority of 
the proletariat were not yet converted to Socialist principles. 
Revolution must wait until the majority were behind 
it. After 1871 he was unwilling that the "Communist 
Manifesto" should be republished. Engels, in his preface 
to Marx's " Civil War in France," says : " The time for 
small minorities to place themselves at the head of igno- 
rant masses and resort to force to bring about revolutions 
is gone." 

The Marxist school, however, retained all the rigid 
dogmatism so congenial to the Teutonic mind. Marxists 
found fertile ground in Russia also : Marxism pure and 
undiluted had a longer lease of life there than in Germany 
and became the gospel of a party subsequently known as 
the Bolsheviki, who professed all the most revolutionary 
principles of Marx and admitted none of his later concessions. 


Marx appealed to the working classes, and in doing so 
preached a far more powerful gospel than did the early 
French Socialists, whose cultured philosophy appealed 
mainly to the educated. He was the author and founder 
of International Socialism. The Communist League of 
1847 was the first attempt at an international society of 
working men. It aimed at ; " The overthrow of the Bour- 
geoisie, the rule of the Proletariat, the abolition of the old 
society resting on class antagonisms, and the founding of a 
new society without classes and without private property." 

In 1864 a meeting was held in London, attended by 
working men from all countries in Europe. They deter- 
mined to form an International Association which should 
include all existing Socialist societies and form a common 
bond. Mazzini was originally entrusted with the task of 
drawing up the constitution for this society ; but he was 
too much of a statesman to recognize the necessity of the 
class war, and Marx eventually took his place. Annual 
conferences were held and matters of common interest were 
discussed. It was agreed that Trades Unions and Co- 
operative Societies should be encouraged as temporary 
measures ; an eight-hour day was advocated ; an elaborate 
scheme for the education of the people was drawn up ; and 
the advisability of the nationalization of land, mines, forests, 
transport, etc., was decided upon. 

International Socialism was, in the days of Marx, pre- 
mature, and accomplished little. The peoples of Europe 
could not fight together in their great economic struggle 
while they were still divided by serious political issues. 
But the movement is of importance as marking that growth 
of internationalism which becomes, in the succeeding period, 
so marked a feature, and as a proof of the spirit of solid- 
arity existing among Europeans, despite so many forces 
which make for disunion. 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1 870-1920 

The Armed Peace — The Formation of Alliances — The Eastern Question 
— War and Peace. 

The Armed Peace 

THE period immediately succeeding the Franco- 
Prussian War is generally known as the Armed 
Peace. Save in the ever-troubled Balkans, Europe 
enjoyed an uneasy calm for forty-three years. Her battles 
were fought out in Asia and Africa, but not on European 
soil. Not until 1914 was a generation inexperienced in 
the realities of war to learn afresh its grim lessons. This 
prolonged peace did not, however, bring any great sense 
of security to the peoples of Europe. It was not the re- 
sult of greater friendliness and co-operation between the 
nations ; it was rather the product of elaborate, skilful, and 
secret diplomacy. The distrust between the great Powers, 
the equivocal position of the small ones, did not diminish. 
In spite of peace, greater preparations were made for war 
as the years went on. Huge armies were trained and 
equipped, armaments were prepared upon increasingly 
large scales. All the resources, all the new discoveries of 
science were pressed into the service of war ; in this period 
the submarine, the torpedo, and the aeroplane came into 
being. The cost of this was appalling ; ruinous to the large 
countries, and annihilating to the small ones. In 1910 
the whole amount of the yearly war budgets of European 
nations reached a sum 50 per cent greater than that ex- 
acted from France by Germany in 1871. Well might 
M. de Staal, the Russian delegate at the Hague Conference, 



exclaim: "Armed peace to-day causes more consider- 
able expense than the most burdensome war of modern 

Diplomats could only postpone the conflict. They could 
not remove those causes of strife which were yearly render- 
ing catastrophe more inevitable. Not one war but a series 
of wars seemed to menace the peace of Europe. Bismarck 
had ensured for his country the undying hatred of France. 
He himself had realized the probability of war should 
France ever find herself in a position to take revenge. But 
he calculated that she would never be strong enough unless 
she had allies, and he trusted to German diplomacy to 
maintain her in isolation. But in the course of time 
Germany made other enemies and found other rivals. Her 
Eastern policy, especially in the Balkans, aroused the 
hostility of Russia, while her commercial, colonial, and in- 
dustrial expansion brought her into collision with England. 
For some years her diplomats succeeded in keeping her 
enemies apart and preventing their combination against 
her. But the recognition of their common peril and of the 
danger of isolation drew them at length together, and in 
191 4 Germany was forced to fight the triple war of which 
the armed peace had been but a prolonged preparation. 

It is clear that Europe was not entirely unconscious of 
the direction in which she was drifting. Some attempts 
were made to stem the tide. There was, on the part of 
certain Powers, a real movement towards international 
agreement, indicative of a desire for mutual co-operation. 
These attempts, though they did not succeed in averting 
war, yet in some measure succeeded in ameliorating its 
conditions. From 1 863 onwards there had been a move- 
ment, beginning with the Geneva conventions, to secure 
international privileges for war nursing ; this led to the 
establishment of the Red Cross Society and the recognition 
of its neutrality. Better and more humane provisions 
were made as to the treatment of prisoners, and these 
regulations were, by most countries, observed during the 
war, 1914-18. 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1870-1920 141 

The most important, however, of all attempts to avert 
the impending horror were those made in the two Hague 
Peace Conferences. The Tsar Nicholas suggested, in 
1898, an international conference on the question of a 
general limitation of armaments, and he issued to European 
States a paper which contained the following statements : — 

" In the course of the last twenty years the longings for 
a general pacification have become especially pronounced 
in the consciences of civilized nations. The preservation 
of peace has been put forward as the object of international 
policy; in its name great States have concluded between 
themselves powerful alliances ; it is the better to guarantee 
peace that they have developed, in proportions hitherto 
unprecedented, their military powers, and still continue to 
increase them without shrinking from any sacrifice . . . 
all these efforts nevertheless have not yet been able to 
bring about the beneficial results of the desired pacification. 
. . . Hundreds of millions are devoted to acquiring terrible 
instruments of destruction which, though to-day regarded 
as the last word of science, are destined to-morrow to lose 
all value, in consequence of some fresh discovery in the 
same field. National culture, economic progress, and the 
production of wealth are either paralysed or checked in 
their development ... It appears evident then that, if 
this state of things were prolonged, it would inevitably 
lead to the very cataclysm which it is designed to avert, 
and the horrors of which make every thinking man shudder 
in advance." 

In accordance with the wishes of the Tsar, a conference 
was held at the Hague in 1899, at which twenty European 
Powers were represented, and also the United States, 
Mexico, China, Persia, Siam, and Japan. The conference 
could not agree upon any measures for the limitation of 
armaments owing to the strenuous opposition of Germany. 
It succeeded, however, in establishing a permanent court 
of arbitration at the Hague, in the hope of preventing in- 
ternational disputes. Good work was done in smoothing 
over small quarrels, especially in the case of the Dogger 


Bank dispute between England and Russia. The Russian 
Baltic Fleet fired on some British trawlers in the North Sea 
during the Russo-Japanese War of 1 906. In the subsequent 
quarrel the two countries were brought to the verge of 
war, but, by an agreement on both sides to submit the 
dispute to the Hague Tribunal, peace was preserved. A 
second Hague Conference, held in 1907, also failed to 
check the preparations for war, but succeeded in making 
several conventions for the humanizing of warfare and for 
securing certain advantages to non-combatants. 

The failure of these attempts to avert disaster finds a 
partial explanation in the fact that the people of Europe, 
as a whole, gave them little support. Some nations were 
united in their will to war; others did not love peace 
sufficiently to be ready to make sacrifices to secure it. All 
trusted to chance rather than to organized effort, and all 
paid, in 19 14, the forfeit for their long sojourn in a fools' 

The Formation of Alliances 

The international politics of the armed peace depended 
generally upon the relations between France and Germany. 
Bismarck's aim was to isolate France, so that she could 
never take her meditated revenge. For this reason he 
cultivated a cordial understanding with Russia and Austria, 
although, owing to their rivalry in the Balkans, an impar- 
tial friendship towards both was not easy to maintain. The 
Russo-Turkish War of 1878 forced him to betray his secret 
partiality for Austria ; he supported her at the subsequent 
Congress of Berlin and helped her to rob Russia of the 
fruits of victory. The closer association of the two Powers 
was signalized in 1879 by the formation of the Dual 
Alliance, when each promised support to the other in the 
case of an attack from Russia, and neutrality in case of 
attack by any other Power. 

In 1882 the Dual Alliance became the Triple Alliance, 
and Italy joined the Central Powers. In this she was 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1870-1920 143 

moved rather by fear of France than by love of Germany 
and Austria. She had recently quarrelled with France 
over their respective spheres of influence on the North 
Coast of Africa, and her fear and jealousy were manifested 
in a bitter tariff war. Despite her increasing discontent, 
Italy remained a member of the Triple Alliance until 191 4. 
But she felt that, by so doing, she was sacrificing her hopes 
of expansion on the Adriatic, a renunciation demanded by 
Austria, and was gaining nothing in return. In 19 14 she 
broke with the Triple Alliance definitely and in 191 5 threw 
in her lot with the other side, hoping thereby to secure the 
possession of the Adriatic territory which the Central Powers 
would not guarantee to her. The war of 19 14-18 was to 
Italy, as were the wars of 1866 and 1870, an opportunity 
for territorial expansion. 

Germany had thus secured two allies in 1882, and France 
had none. Any union between England, France, and Russia 
seemed unlikely, for they were divided by serious disputes. 
England and Russia were opposed over the Balkan problems, 
for England had, in 1878, constituted herself the protectress 
of Turkey, as she had done in 1856, England's policy was 
based on the determination that *' Russia shall not have 
Constantinople." In Asia the two Powers had causes of 
dispute in Persia, Thibet, and Afghanistan, and England 
regarded Russian expansion with a jealous eye, as prejudicial 
to the British supremacy in India. 

Great Britain and France, on the other hand, were em- 
bittered towards each other over the question of Egypt. 
England had acquired a special interest in this country by 
the purchase, in 1875, of half of the Suez Canal shares. 
The subsequent extravagance of the Khedive having en- 
dangered Egyptian finances, England and France sent out 
a commission, in 1878, to enquire into the matter and to 
control the revenue. In an outburst of native resentment, 
a massacre of Europeans occurred at Alexandria, and 
England invited France to a joint intervention. Upon the 
refusal of France, she intervened alone, bombarded 
Alexandria, and defeated the insurgent Egyptian forces at 


Tel-el-Kebir, in 1882. She was, however, forced to prolong 
her military occupation of Egypt indefinitely, owing to the 
unsettled state of the country, and France accused her of 
having purposely schemed to obtain the entire control of 
Egyptian affairs. Nor was the hostility of the two Powers 
allayed by the problems arising out of the division of Africa 
among European nations. The colonial dispute had indeed 
acquired formidable dimensions. Its increased importance 
was largely due to the rapid development of communication 
and transport. To every large Power which had undergone, 
or was undergoing, the Industrial Revolution, colonies were 
no longer luxuries, they were necessities. They supplied 
raw material to the new industries which were springing up 
in Europe, they furnished good markets for European manu- 
factures, and they met the needs of a surplus population. 
The recent discoveries in Africa had opened up the new 
possibilities of the " Dark Continent " to the nations of 
Europe, and in a series of treaty agreements England, 
France, Germany, Portugal, and Italy divided the spoils 
between them (1880-90). In this lottery Great Britain 
obtained the best prizes, a fact which was bitterly resented 
by Germany in after years. The Germans had joined too 
late in the struggle for colonial expansion ; the best parts of 
the world had been appropriated before they began to look 
for colonies. Australia offered no openings and South 
America was barred from them by the Monroe Doctrine. 
Russia and England already dominated the greater part of 
Asia ; while the German hopes of expansion at the expense 
of China collapsed after the Russo-Japanese War of (1904-5), 
when Japan indicated her intention of establishing a Monroe 
Doctrine of her own, where the Celestial Empire was con- 
cerned. Only in the Pacific Islands had Germany a sphere 
of operations ; moreover, the colonies which she possessed 
were a disappointment to her and failed to satisfy her 
economic ambitions. Yet she could not add to them without 
the risk of war with England, France, or possibly America. 
There remained to her the possibility of supremacy in the 
near East. She might establish herself in Asia Minor, whence 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1870-1920 145 

she could dominate Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, and the 
Persian Gulf, a scheme closely bound up with the construc- 
tion of the Berlin to Baghdad railway. But the way to the 
Middle East lay through the Balkans, and here she was 
bound to encounter the opposition of Russia. It seemed as 
though she must either forego her ambition to become a 
first-class Power, or adopt an aggressive policy towards one 
or more of her rivals. 

With the year 1 890, which marks the dismissal of Bis- 
marck from the chancellorship, begins the German policy of 
world domination. The new Emperor, William II, abandoned 
the Bismarckian system of defensive alliances for a pro- 
gramme of determined aggression. Though he cultivated 
peace and friendship with the other Powers of Europe, he 
followed an ambitious colonial policy, which he intended to 
carry out by means of a powerful navy. But he was not as 
successful as Bismarck had been in his attempts to separate 
the possible enemies of Germany. Russia and France be- 
gan to come together, and the foundations of an understand- 
ing were laid by the granting of large loans by France to 
Russia. These enabled the latter Power to carry out her 
long-cherished scheme of a trans-Siberian railway. 

England and France, however, were still divided, and in 
1898 they quarrelled over their respective claims to the 
Upper Nile, a dispute which reached its climax over the 
Fashoda incident, when the two countries were brought to 
the verge of war. The eyes of England were opened shortly 
afterwards, however, and she began to realize the dangers 
of isolation and her great need for allies. The open hostility 
of Germany during the Boer War of 1 899- 1 901 convinced 
Great Britain that France was not her only rival in Africa, 
and she was further alarmed by the rapid growth of the 
German Fleet. In 1904 she settled her differences with 
France, and the Dual Entente was established. France 
agreed to the British occupation of Egypt, and she received, 
in return, the promise of a free hand in Morocco. The 
disputes of the two Powers in Nigeria and Newfoundland 
were likewise arranged. 


This agreement caused much irritation in Germany, and 
the Kaiser replied by a violent campaign against French 
interests in Morocco. He declared that German interests 
were prejudiced by the Anglo-French Entente, hoping thereby 
to drive France to reprisals which might shake the newly 
cemented friendship with England. The moment was op- 
portune, for Russia could not help France ; all her energies 
were employed by the Japanese War. France, however, 
weathered the danger by her moderate behaviour, submitting 
the whole dispute to a conference held at Algeciras in 1906. 
Great Britain firmly supported her ally at this conference, 
and their friendship survived the crisis. 

In 1907, moreover, an understanding was at last established 
between England and Russia, and their differences in Thibet, 
Persia, and Afghanistan were settled. A leading cause of 
dispute between Russia and England had been eliminated 
by the gradual alteration of the British policy towards 
Turkey. England was abandoning her position of protectress 
of the Ottoman Empire, and it had become evident that 
Germany was taking her place. 

The reply of the Triple Alliance to the Entente between 
Russia, England, and France was the annexation, in 1908, 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the Treaty of Berlin, in 
1878, Austria had been given the protectorate of these 
provinces, but it was understood that she should not annex 
them. Hence her action was in flagrant breach of the 
treaty. Serbia and Russia protested, but, since Austria 
had the full support of Germany, the annexation was ac- 
complished. A second blow aimed at the Triple Entente 
was not so successful. In 191 1 Germany sent a battleship 
to seize Agadir in Morocco, declaring again that the French 
policy was compromising German interests. Great Britain, 
however, supported France and insisted that the ship must 
be removed. France adopted a conciliatory attitude, and 
yielded up a small portion of the French Congo, as com- 
pensation to Germany ; but the war party in Germany was 
not satisfied, and, indeed, very indignant at the pacific 
action of the Emperor in consenting to withdraw the ship. 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 18T0-1920 147 

It had become clear that a large party in Germany desired 
war with France and England and, possibly, with Russia. 
But it was not clear how far this party represented the 
wishes of the Emperor or how far it controlled his policy. 
Events, however, were impending in the Balkans which 
hastened the issue. The formation of the Balkan League 
and the rapid collapse of the Ottoman Empire spelt ruin to 
the Emperor's cherished schemes in the near East and 
forced the choice of war upon him. In the Austro-Serbian 
quarrel of 19 14 there arose a crisis with which the diplomats 
of Europe were unable to deal, and the armed peace came 
to an end. Europe had become organized into two enorm- 
ous camps, and it was impossible for either member of the 
Dual Alliance to be at war with a member of the Triple 
Entente without involving the whole Continent. Each party 
depended too entirely upon its allies, and separation upon 
both sides appeared to involve ruin. England and France 
could not with equanimity behold the downfall of Russia, 
for they knew that their turn might come next. Their par- 
ticipation in the struggle altered its character. It was no 
longer merely a Balkan dispute. It was the long-expected, 
greatly dreaded day of reckoning between the Central 
Powers and the Triple Entente. 

The Eastern Question, 1870 191 4 
I. The Problem of the Balkans 

The Eastern Question of the nineteenth century centres 
around the division of the Turkish Empire. The greed and 
ambition of the great Powers plays no small part in the 
drama ; of equal importance are the internal rivalries of 
the Balkan races. The Turkish rule was one of conquest, 
not of assimilation, and after centuries of subjection the 
peoples of the Balkans still retained their racial and religious 
characteristics. Once released from the power of Turkey, 
they cherished among themselves hatreds and rivalries as 
bitter as any to be found on the Continent 

The Bulgarians were originally a Mongolian race, dwellers 



on the River Volga. They did very little to secure their 
own freedom, which was won for them by Russia and 
secured at the Treaty of Berlin. Their chief national tie, 
indeed, is a hatred of the Greeks, with whom they dispute 
the right to Macedonia. The Greeks, on the other hand, 
fought with much heroism for their national freedom in the 
early part of the century. They are a mongrel race, chiefly 

.._> Serbian Atpirstions] ***** Roumanian Aspiration* 
.~. Greek Atpirations ) -"^'^^—Bulgarian Aspirations 


Byzantine in origin. They aspire to the revival of the whole 
of the ancient Empire of Greece, including the Islands, 
Epirus, and most of Albania. The Roumanians are a Latin 
race, the descendants of a band of Roman colonists. Unlike 
the other Balkan races, which are of the Greek Church, they 
are Roman Catholics. Their ruling classes, however, are 
mainly Greek in origin, the descendants of the ofificial class 
who administered the State under Turkish rule. The out- 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1870-1920 149 

look for Roumanian nationality is, therefore, not so en- 
couraging. In the latter part of the century the great 
ambition of Roumanian patriots was the annexation of 
Transylvania, a province of Hungary, whose population 
belongs to the Roumanian group in racial and national 
characteristics. The most interesting of the Balkan groups 
are the Serbs. These are a Slav race and, owing to the 
unequal pressure of the Turkish rule, they have never en- 
tirely lost their national consciousness. Their State is 
organized much after the fashion of a peasant democracy, 
and they resemble very nearly the Montenegrins, a Highland 
race, who never really submitted to the Turks. Serb 
Nationalists hoped to group all the Southern Slav races 
into a Greater Serbia, an ambition which brought them into 
conflict with Austria and with Bulgaria. 

For the greater part of the century, England sought to 
arrest the Balkan problem by preventing the further de- 
cline of Turkey and by maintaining the status quo. This 
was her policy in 1856 and in 1878. In 1870 the greater 
part of the Balkan peninsula was still under Turkish rule, 
with the exception of Greece and Roumania. Serbia en- 
joyed a comparatively ample measure of Home Rule. In 
1875, however, the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
rose against the Turks. Kindred excitement was mani- 
fested in Bulgaria, which alarmed the Turks to such a 
degree that a series of frightful massacres took place and 
shocked the whole civilized world. Serbia and Montertegro 
rose against Turkey, and Russia, deeply affected, appealed 
to England for a joint intervention. To this England, 
true to her policy, would not agree. Russia and Roumania 
therefore declared war on Turkey in 1877, and, under 
pressure of Russian victories, the latter Power was forced 
to sign the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. The indepen- 
dence of Serbia, Montenegro, and Roumania was recognized. 
Bulgaria was constituted as a self-governing tributary State 
with very ample frontiers, including almost the whole of 
Macedonia, a provision which aroused the jealousy of Serbia 
and Greece. Still less were England and Austria satisfied. 


for they both regarded with jealousy the increased pres- 
tige of Russia in the Balkans and looked upon Bulgaria 
as her satellite. They intervened and insisted that the 
Eastern Question must be settled by the Concert of Europe. 
A conference was accordingly held at Berlin. 

The Treaty of Berlin, 1878, made Montenegro, Serbia, 
and Roumania into separate and independent States, but 
divided Bulgaria, as constituted by the Treaty of San Stefano, 
into three parts. Bulgaria proper became a self-governing 
tributary State, Eastern Rumelia was given Home Rule 
under the Sultan, while Macedonia was again yielded to 
Turkey. Austria was to ** occupy " the provinces of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and administer their government, but she 
was not to annex them. This was a disappointment to 
Serbia, who had hoped to annex them herself and, together 
with Montenegro and Northern Macedonia, to form a United 
Kingdom. Roumania was forced to yield Bessarabia to 
her " ally " Russia and to receive in return the inferior 
district of the Dobrudja, and Russia gained also consider- 
ably in Asia Minor. Greece received part of Epirus and 
Thessaly, an extension which fell far short of her hopes. 
Turkey was compelled to permit England to occupy Cyprus, 
as a reward for her support at the conference. The treaty 
was thus a disappointment to everyone. Allies quarrelled 
and considered themselves betrayed. The hostilities of the 
Balkan Powers were in no wise allayed. Greece, Bulgaria, 
and Serbia were all determined to claim Macedonia, should 
an opportunity arise, and their rivalries were played upon 
and fomented by Turkey. In the background was Austria, 
supported by her ally Germany ; her ambition to dominate 
Serbia and to extend her sphere of influence towards the 
port of Salonika was soon to become a factor in the 
Teutonization of the Middle East. 

In the Turkish Revolution of 1908 the slow decline of 
the Ottoman Empire was apparently checked, and a more 
vigorous policy inaugurated. The Sultan abdicated, and 
the young Turkish party, which dominated the Government, 
professed a policy of progressive reform. But the young 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1870-1920 151 

Turks were, in reality, a military clique, bent on establish- 
ing a strong and centralized State in Turkey. The racial 
problems of the Balkans they hoped to solve by a rigid 
system of Turkification. Races within the Empire, which 
could not be assimilated and which would not become 
Turkish, must be wiped out ; a primitive solution of 
Nationalist problems which has since been adopted in 

Austria seized the occasion of the Revolution of 1908 to 
announce her intention of annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the first step on the road to Salonika. The control of this 
port was of great importance to her, since her own seaboard 
was all upon the Adriatic and subject to attack from Italy. 
The great Powers protested against this breach of treaty 
obligations, and Serbia and Montenegro prepared for war, 
regarding the annexation of the provinces as a blow to their 
cherished Nationalist schemes. England suggested a con- 
ference, but this was rendered impossible by the intervention 
of Germany. On 13 October the German Imperial Chan- 
cellor, Prince von Biilow, notified Sir Edward Grey that 
" Germany could not, any more than Austria-Hungary, 
allow the discussion of the annexation at a conference." 
At the same time, Germany persuaded Turkey to agree to 
the annexation, in return for a substantial compensation, 
and the foundation was laid for that alliance of Turkey with 
the Central Powers which so largely influenced the crisis, 
1 91 2-1 4. Serbia would have declared war had Russia 
supported her, but the Tsar, exhausted by his recent 
struggle with Japan, would not take the risk. He had re- 
ceived a distinct intimation from the Kaiser that, in the 
case of war, Germany would throw in her lot with Austria. 
The annexations were recognized, and Serbia was forced to 
submit, since England and France, though outraged at this 
breach of treaty obligation, would not fight on a question 
which did not touch their own interests. 

This crisis marks a stage in the development of the 
Austro-Serb quarrel and it manifests the nature of Germany's 
Eastern policy. In 1897 Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, 


one of Germany's ablest men, was sent to the Porte, in 
order to strengthen German interests in Turkey. Two years 
later the Kaiser made a visit to Jerusalem, during which he 
announced: "The 300,000,000 Mohammedans that are 
scattered about the globe can be assured of this, that the 
German Emperor will be their friend at all times." Since 
he had no Mohammedan subjects, this statement was calcu- 
lated to interest Russia, France, and England. In the 
same year the Berlin to Baghdad railway was begun. 
Lichnowsky has written : " It was our political ambition to 
dominate on the Bosphorus," The railway would be a 
highway to India and the rich corn-fields of Mesopotamia. 
It would become the pivot of the economic life of the Near 
East, and it could be used as a weapon against England 
and Russia. But the whole scheme, which depended on 
the exploitation of Turkey, involved the maintenance of 
Turkish integrity. It also meant that Bulgaria and Serbia, 
lying as they did between Germany and the Bosphorus, must 
be dominated. Brailsford, in " Turkey and the Roads to the 
East," remarks that "... so long as an independent Serbia 
remains free to ally herself with the Western Powers and 
with Russia, the Berlin to Baghdad line does not exist as 
a strategical road. The Serbian Question is the key to 
the mastery of the East." 

It was this fact which led Germany to support Austria 
in the crisis of 1908 and in her subsequent quarrels with 
Serbia. These quarrels became more acute with the de- 
velopment of the racial crisis in Austria-Hungary. 

2. The Problems of Austria-Hungary 

The effect of Nationalism in Germany and Italy had been 
to unite ; its effect in Austria-Hungary was rather to divide. 
Germany and Italy, by nature single States, were artificially 
dissected in the Treaties of Vienna ; the Hapsburg dominions, 
on the contrary, were composed of a variety of races and 
interests forcibly united. The past history of Austria- 
Hungary had been the record of the dynastic prosperity of 
the Archdukes of Austria. The Hapsburg family had, by 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1870-1920 153 

conquest and by marriage alliances, extended their patrimony 
in three directions. They had spread south and east along 
the Danube and had become Kings of Hungary, adding to 

their dominions piecemeal conquests from the Turks. They 
had aspired to become German potentates, and had estab- 
lished their position in Central Europe by the acquisition 
of Bohemia and a part of Poland. Of their ambition to 



dominate Italy and the Adriatic, sufficient illustration is 
afforded by the records of the early nineteenth century. 
Kingdom, Province, and Duchy were thus added to their 
dominions by purely dynastic ties, till, at the opening of 
the twentieth century, the Hapsburg Empire included 
twelve main nationalities, ten principal languages, and five 
religions. The following table will partially indicate the 
complexity of the race problem : — 



Racial Group. 






Ural Altaic. 

Bohemia and Moravial 
Galicia J 

Czechs and Slovaks 



Poles and Ruthenian 


1 stria \ 

Italians \ 



Slovenes \ 






Bosnia and Herzegovina 






The only tie among these confused races existed in their 
common ruler, the Emperor of Austria. 

In the days of Metternich purely Teutonic interests had 
prevailed and the demands of the non-German peoples 
within the Empire were ignored. But, after her defeats of 
1860-66, Austria definitely renounced her ambition to be- 
come a German power. She could no longer resist the 
rising tide of Nationalist grievances, and she knew that her 
internal divisions had been a source of weakness. The 
Emperor therefore compromised with the Magyars of Hun- 
gary, the strongest Nationalist party in his dominions. 
The Magyars, though they had long demanded recognition 
for Hungarian nationality, had never been very ready to 
accord toleration to the other races. They were particu- 
larly jealous of the Southern Slavs, of the Slovenes and the 
Serbo-Croats, a jealousy which Austria had exploited in 
1848. The Compromise of 1867 was in reality an agree- 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1870-1920 155 

ment between the German and the Magyar elements of the 
Hapsburg dominions upon the establishment of a joint 
dominion over the Slavs and the Latins. A dual system 
was set up, in which the Slavs were divided. Bohemia, 
Moravia, Galicia, Istria, Dalmatia, and Carniola were in- 
cluded in the Austrian Empire, while Transylvania and the 
other Slav provinces formed part of the kingdom of Hun- 
gary. Each moiety of the Empire had a Parliament and a 
Diet and was in fact a separate State. A joint ministry, 
provided from a committee of delegates from each Parlia- 
ment, was responsible for war, finance, foreign affairs, etc. 
In Austria, where some attempt at racial toleration was 
made, the efficiency of the central Government was soon 
crippled by the Slav opposition, especially after 1907, when 
the suffrage was reformed, in accordance with the continual 
demands of the Democratic party. The Czecho-Slavs be- 
came as obstructive as the Irish party in the British House 
of Commons in the days of Parnell. It was impossible to 
accomplish any useful legislation, and the German clique 
could neither dominate the Slav element nor co-operate with 
it. Austria, as she became weaker, was forced to depend 
more and more upon Hungary, on whom she relied to 
suppress the Czech demand for a separate Czecho-Slovak 
State in Bohemia and Moravia. Hungary, the dominant 
partner in the Empire, made no attempts at racial tolera- 
tion, and admitted no rights to the non-Magyar peoples. 
Mr. Seton Watson, in " The Racial Problems of Hungary," 
has written of the Magyar Regime, 1906-9 : — 

"... Primary and secondary education, instead of rest- 
ing upon the principle of instruction in the Mother tongue, 
has been for a generation past enlisted in the cause of 
Magyarization. . . . The local administration is in the 
hands of a narrow and powerful caste, which, by means of 
an illiberal franchise, is able to hold the non-Magyars in a 
permanent minority, and to exclude them from the control 
of their local affairs; the officials treat the nationalities 
as foreign interlopers and show little or no consideration 
for their languages and national customs. A far-reaching 


system of electoral corruption . , . makes it impossible for 
one-half of the population to gain more than twenty-five seats 
in Parliament, and concentrates all political power into the 
hands of a small clique of ecclesiastics and nobles, pro- 
fessional politicians and Jewish financier-s. The dependence 
of the Judicature upon the Executive renders the non- 
Magyar leaders liable to continual vexation at the hands 
of the law ; judges, prosecutors, and juries are all alike 
recruited from the ranks of their bitterest enemies. . . , 
The persecution of the non-Magyar Press is carried on with 
the deliberate purpose of reducing it to a state of bankruptcy 
or subservience. The absence of any rights of association 
and assembly places the nationalities at the mercy of the 
authorities and renders infinitely more difficult the task of 

The effect of this treatment was to create disloyalty 
among the Southern Slavs. The demand for Home Rule 
within the Austrian Empire became a movement for com- 
plete separation. The Croats, the Serbs, and the Slovenes 
began to dream of national unity. Of the 10,000,000 
Sputhern Slavs, about 2,000,000 were under Austria, 
3,000,000 under Hungary, 2,000,000 were in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and 3,000,000 in Serbia and Montenegro. 
They began to resent their national subjection and to 
demand union in one great kingdom. Serbia did not dis- 
courage this movement. 

The internal problems of Austria-Hungary acquired, 
therefore, an international importance, involving the 
welfare of many countries. In addition to the agitations 
among the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, the integrity 
of the Empire was threatened by the ambitions of Roumania 
to absorb the kindred State of Transylvania. Any recon- 
struction of the kingdom of Poland would rob Austria of 
Galicia ; Dalmatia and Istria were coveted by Italy as 
part of the " Italia Irredenta " of Nationalist ambition. It 
seemed as though the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary 
was at hand, for the discontented races could no longer be 
placated by a compromise in the form of federation. 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1870-1920 157 

The possibility of an internal collapse in Austria was as 
great a peril to German policy, as was the impending down- 
fall of Turkey. Bismarck and his successors, having once 
driven Austria out of Germany, had aimed at making her 
their ally, a bulwark for Teutonic interests in the Balkans. 
Germany's route to the East lay through a friendly Austria 
and a submissive Turkey, and the collapse of either might 
spell ruin to her plans. The establishment of a strong 
Southern Slav kingdom might entirely block her way, and 
must be prevented at all costs, if Germany was to dominate 
the Bosphorus. 

After the annexations of 1908 the Austro-Serbian quarrel 
developed rapidly, Austria accused Serbia of fomenting 
discontent and encouraging sedition in her Slav provinces, 
and, after the Friedjung trial, in March, 1909, friendly 
relations between the two States became almost impossible. 
Forged documents, implicating Serbia in a Southern Slav 
conspiracy, were discovered, which were alleged to proceed 
from the Austro-Hungarian legation at Belgrade. It 
seemed that, even if Serbia were not guilty, Austria was 
determined to prove her so and, by picking a quarrel and 
forcing the issue, to annihilate her. Under the circum- 
stances the rapid development of the Serbian army is 
scarcely surprising, for it was obvious that she would have 
to prepare for war. 

The events of 191 1 -13 precipitated the Austro-German 
policy in the East. It seemed likely that Turkey would 
collapse altogether, after a disastrous war with Italy in 
191 1, in which the latter Power had annexed Tripoli, The 
young Turkish Government was weakened by insurrections 
in Macedonia and Albania and was, in addition, threatened 
by the Balkan League, Turkey had always been saved, in 
former crises, by the jealousies of her enemies ; but in the 
years 1911-13, owing to the labours of four very able 
statesmen (King Nicholas, M, Pasisch, M, Gueschoff, and 
M, Venizelos), Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece 
succeeded in sinking their differences, A League was 
formed for the conquest and division of European Turkey. 


These schemes were assisted by the policy of wholesale 
massacre pursued by the Turkish Government, which roused 
the people of Macedonia and Albania to revolt. The Balkan 
League, encouraged by the success of Italy, declared war 
against Turkey in October, 19 12. The fortunes of war 
favoured them, but they were not allowed to make their 
own peace. The great Powers insisted that the settlement 
must be made at a conference held in London. All the 
previous arrangements, made by the members of the 
League for the division of their spoils, were disregarded, 
and the slender chance of a peaceful settlement vanished 

The Balkan States had agreed among themselves that 
Serbia and Greece were to divide Albania. On 13 March, 
1 91 2, Bulgaria and Serbia had settled the diflficult question 
of their respective frontiers in Macedonia. These arrange- 
ments proved to be fruitless owing to the diplomacy of 
Austria, who insisted on the creation of an independent 
Albania, She hoped thereby to prevent Serbia from gain- 
ing access to the sea, and, by robbing Serbia and Greece 
of the fruits of victory, to embroil the Balkan Powers in a 
fresh war. Serbia demanded a revision of her treaty with 
Bulgaria which should give her compensation in Macedonia 
for her loss of Northern Albania. Bulgaria, at the instiga- 
tion of Germany and Austria, refused, and the second 
Balkan War broke out in 191 3. Germany and Austria, 
who had watched with dismay the progress of the first war, 
hoped to see the victory of Bulgaria and the defeat of 
Serbia. But it was Bulgaria that was defeated by Serbia, 
Greece, Montenegro, and Roumania, and on 29 July, 191 3, 
she was forced to sign the Treaty of Bucharest. She was 
shorn of all her gains, save a portion of Western Thrace 
and some of Eastern Macedonia, and she could only bide 
the time sullenly till an opportunity for revenge arose. 

It became evident that Germany and Austria must 
take prompt steps if the expansion of Serbia was to be 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1870-1920 159 

War and Peace, 1914-1918 

I. The Outbreak of War 

There is some evidence that Austria intended to settle 
scores with Serbia in 191 3, but was dissuaded by the joint 
protests of Germany and Italy. In 191 4, however, the 
position for war, on the part of the Central Powers, was 
improved and the need more urgent. Heavy armament 
bills had recently been carried through, strengthening the 
German army and navy, and the internal situation of the 
Empire was becoming increasingly insecure with the 
development of social democracy. The Triple Entente, on 
the other hand, appeared to be suffering from an accumula- 
tion of internal weaknesses. Russia was suffering from 
acute industrial conflict and severe strikes ; France was 
torn in two by a great syndicalist campaign ; and England 
was, to European eyes, threatened with civil war in Ireland. 
The moment, therefore, was favourable to a settlement of 
the Balkan question which would satisfy the Central 

The murders at Serajevo, 28 June, 19 14, furnished 
Austria with an excellent "casus belli," since they alienated 
the sympathies of Europe from Serbia. The Archduke 
Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Hapsburg throne, was 
assassinated with his wife at Serajevo, the capital of 
Bosnia. The murderers were Austrian subjects, and the 
crime took place on Austrian territory ; but they belonged 
to a secret society for spreading pro-Serb propaganda 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many Serbian Government 
officials were members of this society, and Austria accused 
the Serbian foreign office of complicity with its designs. 
She was determined to put an end to pro-Serb propaganda. 
Serbia, on the other hand, knowing that Russia would 
support her, was equally determined to resist aggression. 
For nearly a month, however, no further developments 
aroused the anxiety of Europe, and the chief indication of 
coming war was to be found in the clamours of the war 
parties at Vienna and Belgrade. 


On 23 July an ultimatum was suddenly presented by 
Austria to Serbia which left no doubt as to Austria's 
ultimate intentions. Serbia could not possibly have re- 
mained an independent State had she agreed to it. The 
rumour that it had been accepted caused keen disappoint- 
ment in Vienna, on the following day, since it was never 
intended for anything but a provocation to war. Nor 
would Austria increase the time limit allowed for an answer 
beyond forty-eight hours, despite the entreaties of England, 
France, and Russia. Serbia, however, urged by these 
Powers, replied in as conciliatory a manner as possible. 
Sir Edward Grey, commenting on the Serbian reply, has 
said : " It seemed to me that the Serbian reply already 
involved the greatest humiliation to Serbia that I have 
ever seen a country undergo." 

Upon the reception of the Serbian reply the Austrian 
minister immediately left Belgrade, nor would Austria con- 
sent to enter upon any European discussions of the matter. 
On 26 July Sir Edward Grey, with the concurrence of 
France, Italy, and Russia, suggested a European Congress ; 
but this suggestion was opposed by Germany. He then 
asked Germany to state any other form of mediation which 
she would prefer, but received no reply. The German 
White Book admits that Germany definitely supported 
Austria and undertook to fulfil her obligations as an ally 
in the event of war with Russia. Owing to statements 
made by the Russian ambassador on 27 July, both 
Germany and Austria must have known that war with 
Russia was imminent. War was declared on Serbia on 
the 28th. Although a state of war did not exist between 
Austria and Russia until 5 August, Germany declared war 
on Russia on i August, on the pretext of a Russian attack 
upon Austria. The participation of Russia in the conflict 
involved her ally France, and the neutrality of England 
acquired an extreme value for the Central Powers. Sir 
Edward Grey had made it clear that England was not 
going to war for Serbia, and that public opinion in his 
country would not support him if he joined in the struggle 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1870-1920 161 

of Teuton against Slav. The attitude of England was, 
however, changed by the altered aspects of the war in the 
first days of August. Both honour and interest forbade 
her to watch calmly an attack on her ally, France, or to 
permit the invasion of Belgium whose neutrality she was 
by treaty obliged to defend. 

On 2 August the Belgian Government received a note 
from Germany stating that, in view of an impending attack 
from France in that quarter, the Germans were compelled, 
for reasons of self-defence, to anticipate it by invading 
Belgium first. They demanded passage for their troops. 
Belgium, however, refused, saying that she would regard 
herself as bound to defend her own neutrality if it was 
violated by France. The German Chancellor, speaking in 
the Reichstag on the necessity for the invasion of Belgium, 
said : — 

" Gentlemen . . . necessity knows no law. . . . We 
were forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Govern- 
ments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong, I speak 
openly, the wrong we therefore commit, we will try to 
make good as soon as our military aims have been attained." 

But it was difficult for Europe to believe in the contrition 
with which the Germans invaded the " rightfully protesting " 
Belgium, in view of their subsequent behaviour when oc- 
cupying that country, and their treatment of the persons 
and property of non-combatants. The justification of a 
sudden and unexpected necessity is also impaired by the 
fact that, for several years past, strategic railways leading 
to the Belgian frontiers had been under construction in 
Germany. These, which could have no obvious use save 
for the transport of troops, had for some time alarmed the 
Belgian Government. Even if the Germans had not invaded 
Belgium, it would have been difificult for England to pursue 
the path of neutrality with wisdom or with honour. The 
French Fleet had departed to the Mediterranean, leaving 
the North Coast of France unprotected, on the understand- 
ing that the British would protect the Entente interests in 
the North Sea. England could not therefore have permitted 


Germany to make any, naval attack against France, without 
betraying her ally. Moreover, though she did not want a 
war, England knew that Germany was her rival, and it was 
suicidal to allow herself to be isolated by the annihilation 
of all her friends. But there is some evidence that Germany 
hoped to break the back of the French resistance before 
England should wake up to these realities. 

The invasion of Belgium, however, hastened this awaken- 
ing. England, as a guarantor of Belgian neutrality, was 
forced to protest. Upon 4 August, when the Germans had 
refused to withdraw their invading armies, she declared 
war. The Teutonic incapacity to grasp the national psy- 
chology of other peoples had involved Germany in war 
with the entire Triple Entente. The Germans were prob- 
ably counting on the fact that, during the last fifty years, 
treaties had been broken in Europe without causing war. 
Over the Danish Question in 1864, over the Black Sea 
treaties in 1871, and over the annexation of Bosnia in 
1908, England had protested, but she had not supported 
her protests by force. She had never gone to the length of 
war over the breach of a treaty of which she was signatory. 
Germany consequently overrated the British capacity to 
ignore treaty obligations ; she did not read aright the lessons 
of history, and she did not remember that England has 
never allowed a Great Power to dominate Belgium. She 
counted too far upon that insular sense of security which 
might prevent the British people from realizing their peril 
until too late. 

2. The World at War 

The autumn of 191 4 saw the oncoming tide of the 
German army sweeping over Belgium and Northern France. 
The British and French retreated before it, until, on 5-10 
September, the invasion was checked at the battle of the 
Marne and the first peril averted. The invaders were driven 
back across the Aisne and into trenches. From Nieuport 
to Switzerland the long line stretched, and the war became 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 18T0-1920 163 

a struggle for small tactical positions ; its victories and 
defeats were counted in yards, its battles were fought round 
villages, until the second great German advance in the 
spring of 1918. 

The decisive battle on the sea, which might have decided 
the fate of the war at once, was never fought. The German 
Fleet remained shut up in Kiel Harbour, and Great Britain 
succeeded in transporting her large colonial armies to the 
field of battle before the danger from submarines became 
very great. On the Eastern Front meanwhile the successes 
of Russia in East Prussia were balanced by the victories of 
Hindenburg ; but the Serbs and the Montenegrins succeeded 
in driving back the Austrians. On 3 November, however, 
Turkey threw in her lot with the Central Powers, and con- 
sequently Asia Minor, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Egypt 
were brought within the arena of conflict. Japan, on the 
other hand, joined the Entente on 23 August 

In the spring of 191 5 Germany made an unsuccessful 
attack, in which poison gas was first used, upon the French 
line. Upon her failure to break through, she abandoned 
the plan of crushing France first, and turned her full atten- 
tion to Russia. The Russians were driven from East 
Prussia and, by June, Poland, Lithuania, and Kurland were 
overrun. The concentration of the struggle upon the 
Eastern Front magnified the importance of the attitude of 
the remaining Balkan Powers. An attempt was made by 
the Entente to secure Constantinople, and the British tried 
to force the Dardanelles. Landings were made on Gallipoli, 
but the attempt was a failure and in December it was 
abandoned. It was impossible that all the Balkan Powers, 
divided as they were by mutual jealousies, should be united 
upon one side. In October, Bulgaria joined the Central 
Powers, who were now linked with their ally Turkey. The 
fate of Serbia was sealed, since Greece would not support 
her. She was again overrun arid completely crushed, and, 
''n January, 191 6, Montenegro also was invaded. Italy, on 
the other hand, joined the Entente in May. She had 
negotiated for some time with the Central Powers, but had 


failed to extract any definite promise from Austria. She 
therefore came to the conclusion that alliance with the 
Entente was the most likely course to secure to her the 
coveted provinces on the further shores of the Adriatic. 

The year 191 6 saw a renewed German offensive on the 
French line, and from February till October a series of 
terrific blows were aimed at Verdun. An Anglo-French 
attack was made on the Somme in July, which drew the 
German forces off Verdun and from the Eastern Front. 
The Russians were still further relieved by an Italian 
attack upon Austria. The cause of the Balkans, however, 
seemed to be lost with the defeat of Roumania, who had 
joined the Allies in August. 

In naval warfare, the Jutland Battle (May, 1916) was not 
ostensibly a victory for the Allies, but it had the effect of 
keeping the German Fleet in Kiel Harbour till the end 
of the war. In 191 7, however, the Germans announced a 
vigorous submarine campaign whereby they hoped to starve 
England into surrender. Any ship found within a certain 
zone of British shores might be sunk with entire disregard 
for the lives of neutrals or non-combatants. This measure, 
and the subsequent horrors of submarine warfare, contri- 
buted largely to the alienation of American sympathy from 
the cause of the Central Powers. Germany had calculated 
that the United States was profiting far too well, financially, 
by its neutrality, to abandon it for any cause whatsoever. 
She again displayed a complete incapacity to grasp the 
temper of a nation. America could not disregard the con- 
tempt with which Germany treated her neutrality, she 
resented the loss of life among her citizens through sub- 
marine action, and she could not contemplate with equani- 
mity the German methods of warfare. She declared war 
in April, 191 7, and her example was followed by Cuba, 
Panama, Siam, Liberia, China, and Brazil. The war was 
now waged by nations in all the five Continents and it had 
become a world struggle. A Revolution took place in 
Greece, June, 191 7, in which King Constantine was deposed 
and Greece joined the Allies. 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1870-1920 165 

These triumphs for the Entente were, however, counter- 
balanced by events in Russia. A Revolution had taken 
place in which the Tsarist Government was overthrown, and 
which led to the eventual triumph of the Pacifist Party and 
the collapse of the Russian army. By the Treaty of Brest- 
Litovsk peace was made between Russia and Germany, and 
all the German troops employed upon the Russian Front 
were set free for operations elsewhere. Poland, Lithuania, 
Kurland, Livonia, and Esthonia were surrendered to 
Germany, and the Ukraine and Finland were made into 
separate States. The effect of the defeat of Russia was 
felt in Italy during the following autumn. The enemy 
troops on the Italian Front were reinforced, and the munition 
factories in the Plains of Lombardy were threatened. It 
seemed as though Italy might be forced to make a separate 
peace. But she succeeded in holding the line of the Piave. 
The Entente, moreover, pursued with increasing vigour the 
attack on the Eastern Front. An expedition was sent to 
Mesopotamia in order to ensure the safety of Egypt and 
India. Kut and Baghdad were recaptured. Another ex- 
pedition was despatched to Palestine, and Jerusalem was 
taken. The Central Powers risked all on the chance of 
crushing the Anglo-French troops on the Western Front 
before America could get her men across the Atlantic. In 
March, 191 8, the great German attack began. Its objective 
was Amiens, where the British and French lines met. In 
April a tremendous blow was struck at the British at Ypres, 
but they managed to hold out until French reinforcements 
arrived. A month later another attack was made on the 
French at Soissons, and their line broken. By June the 
Germans had again reached the Marne. They were taken 
by surprise, however, by a sudden counter-offensive in July, 
and the French and American troops drove them back 
across the Aisne. During the whole of August they re- 

Simultaneously the fate of the East was determined 
The British, under Allenby, drove right up through Palestine 
to Aleppo, cutting off the Turks in Mesopotamia. In 


September, Bulgaria was forced to terms, and Turkey and 
Austria soon followed her example. 

On 7 November, 191 8, a Revolution broke out in Germany 
and the Emperor abdicated. Four days later an armistice 
was signed between Germany and her enemies, providing 
for the immediate evacuation of all invaded territory, the 
occupation of the Rhine districts by an allied army, the 
abrogation of the Treaties of Peace made with Russia and 
Roumania, the surrender of an enormous quantity of guns 
and aeroplanes, a considerable number of locomotives, all 
submarines, and a large part of the German navy. These 
terms made it sufficiently impossible that Germany should 
renew the conflict, and the victors were able to concentrate 
their undivided attention upon the creation of a permanent 

3. The Peace, 1918-1919 

For seven long months the Allied and Associated Powers 
sat in conclave at Versailles, near Paris, endeavouring to 
determine a fit consummation of this "war to end war." 
The Peace Conference was not, like that of Vienna, a dis- 
cussion between all the belligerents in the recent war ; it 
was a consultation between the victors as to the terms 
which they should impose. Germany was not represented 
at the conference, nor were the terms presented to her until 
the Allies had settled their differences. There was to be 
no German Talleyrand in 191 8. The Allies had, indeed, 
a sufficiency of difficulties. It was understood that Poland 
must be reconstituted as a separate State, and that the 
Nationalist demands of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo- 
slavs must be recognized, Transylvania must go to 
Roumania, and some at least of " Italia Irredenta " must be 
given to Italy. The disputes of Italian and Jugo-Slav 
upon the Adriatic must be arranged, and the relations 
between the conference and the existing Government of 
Russia must be determined. 

The men upon whose shoulders this colossal burden had 
fallen were not, for the most part, trained diplomats. They 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1870-1920 167 

were chosen because they commanded the confidence of 
an electorate. Mr. Lloyd George, the British representative, 

could understand no language save English and his native 
Welsh. President Wilson, owing to similar limitations, 
could establish no direct communications with M. Orlando, 


the Italian representative. This was not, of course, uni- 
versally the case ; the conference benefited by the attend- 
ance of some brilliant diplomatists, including the forceful 
and inconspicuous Baron Makino, the representative of 

The usual conventions of diplomatic procedure were not 
followed. There were no protocols and no signed notes. 
Business was conducted in informal discussion between the 
"Big Four" — M. Clemenceau, President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd 
George, and M. Orlando — with the aid of their interpreters. 
Consequently, the first conference of the "people's repre- 
sentatives" is wrapped in greater mystery than any pro- 
ceedings in the old days of secret diplomacy. Nothing 
was vouchsafed to Europe until the treaty in its entirety 
was presented to the world. 

The definitive peace was signed in June, 1919, by the 
United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Belgium, 
Bolivia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, 
Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Peru, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, the 
Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, Siam, and Uruguay on the one 
hand, and by Germany on the other. 

The first part of it sets forth the constitution of the 
League of Nations, a device whereby President Wilson, 
a democratic Alexander, hoped to give the sanction of 
international right to public law, and to prevent wars in 
the future by the concentration of force behind the moral 
decisions of public opinion. The second part of the treaty 
contains specific remedies against renewed aggression on 
the part of Germany, in case the League of Nations should 
prove an insufficient safeguard for the peace of Europe. 

The Covenant of the League was made between the 
Allies and their associates, but they announced their in- 
tention of inviting the Argentine, Chile, Colombia, Den- 
mark, Holland, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and Venezuela to join them. Other 
States might join the League if two-thirds of the existing 
members agreed to their admission. Thus a little door 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1870-1920 169 

was left whereby a reformed Russia, Austria, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, or Germany might eventually be admitted. The 
League was to be ruled by an Assembly of Representatives, 
each member having one vote. There was also to be a 
Council representing Great Britain, the United States, 
France, Italy, Japan, and four of the other members. This 
Council was to nominate a Secretary, who must be approved 
by the Assembly, and he was to appoint the other officials 
of the League. The seat of the League was to be at 
Geneva, where all officials and representatives were to have 
diplomatic privileges. In the Council unanimity was neces- 
sary for any decision, and in the Assembly a majority. 
The business of the League was to arbitrate in international 
quarrels, to limit armaments, and to give mandates to 
nations to administer certain backward countries, etc. It 
was to supervise labour, transport, quarantine, and other 
affairs of international importance. 

This institution impinged, in theory, upon the sovereign 
rights of all nations. It gave to international law a con- 
stitutional sanction. From the date of the Covenant of 
the League, the right of its members to do exactly what 
they pleased ceased to exist. If the provisions of the 
League were to become effective, they must henceforth 
submit to a higher power. In practice, however, this 
curbing influence was only likely to be exercised upon 
the smaller States, not represented at the Council, and 
upon non-members of the League. The provision which 
stipulated unanimity in the Council enabled any of its 
members effectually to obstruct such of its decisions as 
might be disagreeable to them. 

The remainder of the treaty dealt with the dismember- 
ment of Germany. She yielded Alsace-Lorraine to France, 
also the coal-fields of the Saar Basin, in compensation for 
the damage done to the mines of Northern France during 
the German occupation. These were to be worked by 
France for fifteen years and then repurchased by Germany, 
if the population should desire it. 

Polish Prussia was given up to the new Polish State, and 


Schleswig was to be returned to Denmark, after the wishes 
of the population had been discovered by a plebiscite. 
Lower Silesia was to go to the new Czecho-SIovak State. 
All claims to Luxemburg were renounced, and some 
frontier territories were ceded to Belgium. The left bank 
of the Rhine was to be neutral and the harbours of Heligo- 
land were to be destroyed. Dantzig was to be a free city. 
Germany renounced her intention to unite with the di- 
minished province of Austria, a blow at nationalism and 
self-determination which is not in harmony with the general 
ultranationalist tone of the treaty. All German colonies 
were yielded, and the German army, navy, and air forces 
were severely limited. Germany pledged herself to hand 
over to trial, by the Allies, William II and a specified list 
of Germans accused of heinous breaches of international 

Germany also agreed to pay reparation for damage done 
in the war. This could not, of course, be paid entirely, 
since the whole loss to the Allies was incalculable and far 
beyond the paying capacities of Germany. But an approxi- 
mate sum was to be named, before May, 1921, by a com- 
mission especially appointed for the purpose. Germany 
agreed, in any case, to pay 20,000,000,000 marks in gold 
at once; she ceded all her mercantile marine over 1600 
tons, half her vessels over 1000 tons, and a quarter of her 
fishing boats. She agreed to build ships for five years, as 
a form of reparation, if required to do so by the Allies. 
She yielded 5000 locomotives and 1 50,000 wagons. By a 
special provision of the treaty it was stipulated that, in 
all territories and colonies ceded by Germany, the private 
property of Germans might be taken from them and 
handed over to the Reparation Commission as" part pay- 
ment of the indemnity. This meant that all German 
enterprise in the ceded districts would be discouraged. 
Germany agreed also to hand over to the Reparation Com- 
mission, if she was so commanded, the property of any 
of her subjects living in allied districts, in Russia, China, 
Turkey, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and in the new States 

ARMED PEACE AND WAR, 1870-1920 171 

created by the treaty. Thus the possibilities of German 
industrial and commercial competition were reduced, and 
the development of the resources of these countries was 
assured to the non-German peoples. 

The Reparation Commission, which was to supervise 
the payment of the indemnity, was composed of the repre- 
sentatives of Great Britain, France, the United States, 
Italy, Japan, Serbia, and Belgium. Its duty was to ensure 
the correct payment of the sums due and to decide, during 
the next thirty years, the form which payments should 
take. It was to enquire into the finances and taxation of 
Germany and supervise them in such a way that she would 
be able each year to pay as much as possible. It was, in 
fact, to supervise German finance, as the creditors of a 
bankrupt administer his estates. Its decisions were to be 
supported by force, since, by Article 430 of the treaty, it 
could, at any time during the next fifteen years, appeal to 
the allied armies to occupy Germany, should she refuse to 
observe her financial obligations. The Reparation Com- 
mission was thus a unique body, without precedent in 
history. It was created by unique circumstances. Never 
before had the question of reparation achieved so prominent 
a place in a peace treaty. The indemnity exacted from 
France by Germany in 1871 had been intended to crush 
her and to embarrass her financially for a term of years ; 
but the celerity with which she paid off the sum gave 
warning to the Powers in 191 8. The objects of the Allies 
could not be attained by the exaction of any fixed sum. 
The establishment of a Commission which had power, for 
an entire generation, to check any form of German enter- 
prise by the confiscation of profits as part payment of 
reparation, was the safeguard which they eventually evolved. 
A couple of decades will demonstrate its efficacy as a 
weapon, and will reveal its true relation to the League of 

A criticism of the treaty of 191 9 would pass from history 
into prophecy. Time alone can prove its justice and its 
wisdom. But one thing is clear. It is founded upon an 


optimistic view of European finance and economics. It 
ignores the fact that the entire industrial organization of 
Central and Eastern Europe has broken down, or, rather, 
it treats this disaster as a temporary collapse. It expresses 
the view of the pre-war capitalist, and it contains no 
suggestion of the possibility that the Continent is on the 
verge of social revolution. Its merits and its defects depend 
alike upon its applicability to the social and economic con- 
ditions of 1920-60, with reference to the growth of the 
Socialist problem during the period of the Armed Peace. 


The Growth of the Socialist Problem — Russia and the Bolsheviki — The 
Third French Republic — Germany under the Empire — Europe in 1919. 

The Growth of the Socialist Problem 

THE years 1 870- 1 920 saw the rise and consummation 
of a great crisis between the nations of Europe, 
A series of economic and national disputes led to an 
explosion which involved nearly the whole world in the 
catastrophe of war. This colossal drama throws somewhat 
into the shade the evolution of another great crisis, affecting 
the internal politics of most European States. 

The development of Socialism however is, in its way, 
as important as the growth of the international dispute ; 
posterity may decide that it is more important. The full 
force of the Socialist movement has not yet been felt in 
Europe, nor has it reached any logical consummation. 
Combustible material is, in 1921, still in process of ac- 
cumulation, and the future alone can decide how far the 
recent events in the East of Europe are the harbingers of 
social revolution in the West. 

The internal history of most States suggests that, in 
1 91 4, some sort of reorganization of society, in the interest 
of the proletariat, was imminent. In some countries, 
especially in England, the transformation had begun in the 
shape of a series of changes which were gradually affecting 
the whole of the social structure. The approach of a New 
Regime was heralded by the rapid development of the power 
and organization of the Trades Unions, by increased taxa- 
tion upon invested incomes, and by an abundance of 



legislative measures, such as Old Age Pensions and Com- 
pulsory Insurance, all of which tended to lessen the 
economic gulf separating the middle classes from the pro- 
letariat. On the other hand, in backward and half-civilized 
countries like Russia, where a reactionary Government 
opposed Socialist measures, the symptoms of impending 
upheaval were of a more alarming description. The 
possibilities of a peaceful settlement were small in States 
where political freedom was non-existent, and where social 
reform was closely bound up with the unfought cause of 

In England and France the factory system had come to 
its maturity, and the Industrial Revolution had run its full 
course before the rise of the great Socialist prophets. In 
the East of Europe this was not so. The Industrial Revolu- 
tion was in its infancy in 1870. It was only during the 
period of the Armed Peace that Russia and Germany under- 
went all the economic changes consequent upon the in- 
troduction of the factory system. Socialism as a fully 
developed creed, stated in terms expressly intended to 
appeal to the working classes, had come to its zenith in the 
middle of the century. In 1 820 the wage slaves of England 
and France, oppressed by all the miseries of the early factory 
system, made extraordinarily little effort to free themselves 
from their bondage. They saw no way of escape. No 
alternative was presented to them and they submitted. 
The proletariat of Russia and Germany, on the other hand, 
had a gospel and a prophet. Karl Marx had suggested to 
them a way of escape, and it was improbable that they 
would suffer with resignation or in silence. 

The social problems of every country differed, of course, 
in degree. But the future of the capitalist class was, in 
1 914, already in the balance. Economists had begun to 
ask themselves how long the proletariat would permit one 
section of the community to monopolize the means of pro- 
duction. Some foresaw in the near future a radical change 
to some kind of collective ownership of capital. Others 
maintained that the proletariat would be content to 


leave the existing system of production untouched ; they 
believed that the aim of the masses was rather to secure a 
larger share of the product and to obtain fairer conditions 
of work. They did not think that the working man wished 
to abolish the private ownership of capital ; they merely 
credited him with a very human desire to do less work for 
more money. But, even if this were the case, it was not 
improbable that the share demanded by labour might prove 
to be so large that the capitalists would not be able to 
afford it. The existing system might be ended in a 
deliberate revolution or it might die of inanition. In either 
case the ultimate issue was the same. The economic 
order of the future was veiled in mystery. No country had, 
as yet, made Socialist or Communist experiments upon a 
large scale, since the disastrous experiment of the French 
Communists in 1 871 was too premature, and attempted 
under too unfavourable circumstances, to serve as a pre- 
cedent, and cast little light upon the economic problems of 
the day. 

The War of 191 4-1 8 stimulated the Socialist movement 
in some countries and checked it in others, according to 
circumstances. In England the inequalities of distribution 
were, for a time, still further diminished. The rise in 
wages, which outstripped even the rise in prices, and the 
increased taxation upon capital ministered to this. Con- 
sequently, at the end of the war, a large majority of the 
middle class were considerably poorer, and an even larger 
proportion of the working class was much better off. The 
subsistence level of the whole nation went up, and the in- 
creased prosperity of the working class was manifested in 
many ways. Workhouses were empty and the demands 
upon poor relief were unprecedently small. The capitalist 
system was, however, left untouched in principle, and the 
new conditions impoverished the small investor rather than 
the large one. Nor were there many indications of an 
overwhelming demand for social revolution, though, of 
course, the claims of labour, as regards work and wages, 
were far from satisfied. This phase was, however, too 


good to last. During the years 1918-20 increased popular 
indignation against the "profiteers" and the growth of a 
demand for the nationalization of mines and railways, sup- 
ported by strikes, are an indication of a partial attack on 
the capitalist system itself, while the unemployment con- 
sequent upon the war cancelled to a certain degree the im- 
provement effected by the rise in wages, 

Russia and the Bolsheviki 

In most continental countries the danger of national 
annihilation was, during the war, so great that Socialist and 
internal problems were, for a time, thrust into the back- 
ground. But they were not forgotten, and they were 
doomed to reappear with a more urgent insistence in post- 
war politics. In Russia the social crisis outweighed any 
other event in importance ; and occurrences in Russia 
were, in their turn, to colour the development of Socialism 
in every other country. The economic problems of the 
Continent had become so interdependent that revolution in 
one country spelt upheaval in all. 

It is still uncertain how far the natural development of 
Socialism was deflected and modified by the Great War ; 
that is a question which will, in all probability, never find 
an answer. But one thing is certain. Owing to the 
peculiar conditions prevalent in Russia consequent upon 
the war, a form of Socialism known as Bolshevism, which 
may or may not be the true Slav solution of the social 
problem, acquired an importance which cannot be over- 
estimated, Russian Communism may affect the East, and 
indeed the whole of Europe, to a profound degree, or it 
may disappear within the course of a few years, but no 
estimate of the Socialist problems of 1920 would be com- 
plete without some considerable study of the rise and de- 
velopment of the Bolshevik party, and an analysis of the 
circumstances which ministered to its easy triumph. Russia 
was the spirit which troubled the waters of Europe in 1920, 
and upon Russia in consequence the chief attention of the 
historical student must be concentrated. 


Russia, 1860-1920. 

The social problems of Russia entered upon their most 
modern phase witl\ the emancipation of the serfs. 
Alexander II, after his defeat in the Crimean War, set his 
mind to putting his house in order, hoping thereby to 
remove these causes of weakness which were sapping the 
strength of his Empire. The greater part of Russia con- 
sisted of estates owned by the nobles and by the Crown. 
One half of each estate was cultivated by the owner for 
his own profit, and the other half was cultivated collectively 
by the serfs, who lived together in a village community 
called a Mir, and who paid rent for their share of the land. 
They did not own it, but they had the right to use it, and 
they were obliged to do free work upon their lord's estate. 
In the years 1858-62 all the serfs in Russia were made 
personally free. But a difficulty arose as to the question of 
landownership. To give the peasants their freedom with- 
out land was a mockery ; but to give them the land would 
ruin the aristocratic class. As a compromise, half the land 
was kept by the nobility, each peasant was to possess his 
own house, and the rest of the land belonged to the village 
collectively. Compensation for his loss was, however, to be 
paid to the landlord, and, as the peasants had not sufficient 
money for this, the State advanced a sum which was to be 
refunded in the course of the next fifty years. This was a 
disappointment to the peasants, who had come to believe 
that they were the owners of the land and hoped to obtain 
it for nothing. In many cases they were obliged to pay a 
higher rent than they had done before, and, although they 
were free in theory, in practice they were tied to the land 
more closely than ever. The difficulties of the settlement 
increased with the growing population, and the condition 
of the people grew worse instead of better. 

Alexander endeavoured also to establish a certain amount 
of local self-government. Assemblies called Zemstvos were 
to be elected in the provinces by the nobles, the towns- 
people, and the peasants, which were to help in the 


administration, to superintend education, and maintain high- 
ways and hospitals. These Zemstvos did much good work, 
and afforded a certain amount of political education to men 
who would otherwise have had none. Their decisions, how- 
ever, could at any time be quashed by the governor of the 
province, should he think fit. Thus did Alexander hope 
to guard against Liberalism. 

This era of reform came to an end in 1864. Alexander 
was disappointed at the discontent of the peasants. The 
Polish Revolution of 1863 made a great impression upon 
him ; he would no longer trust the people and fell back 
upon a policy of stern reaction and repression. The dis- 
illusionment and discontent of young Russia took the form ot 
" Nihilism " or an attack upon all existing institutions. A 
great attempt was made in the years 1870-75 to spread 
Nihilist doctrines among the peasants, but they were too 
much oppressed and too ignorant to respond to the appeal. 
The more energetic Nihilists then resorted to a policy of 
terrorism and assassination. This was only stimulated by 
the increased activity of the police, and culminated in 
repeated attempts against the life of the Tsar. In 1881, 
at the very moment when he was about to yield to the 
demand for constitutional Government, Alexander fell a 
victim to the hand of the assassin, and his reactionary son, 
Alexander III, reigned in his stead. 

The new Tsar believed that the decadence of Russia was 
due to the corruption of Western ideas. He thought that 
his Empire might be saved if her rulers moulded their 
policy upon historical Russian traditions, and he regarded 
absolutism and the Orthodox Greek Church as the two 
pillars of Tsarism. He set himself to undo the work of his 
father ; as the protector of the Greek Church he counten- 
anced a savage persecution of the Jews ; he strengthened 
the power of the police, and launched a fierce campaign 
against Nihilism. Politically his reign is barren and devoid 
of event, but certain features in it point to the approach 
of a great upheaval. Russia was on the eve of her Indus- 
trial Revolution. Under Sergius de Witte, the able Minister 


of Finance, the industry and commerce of the country were 
developed ; foreign capitalists were invited to spend their 
money in building railways and factories, and in opening 
up the huge resources of the Empire. De Witte hoped, 
by stimulating industrial progress, to lighten the pressure 
upon the land, providing new outlets for the peasants and 
thereby simplifying the agrarian problem ; but, with the 
growth of the factory system, Russia began to suffer from 
new labour troubles. An industrial proletariat grew up, 
gathered together in the towns, who were more ready than 
the peasants to listen to revolutionary doctrines. A new 
middle class came also into existence, which regarded with 
disfavour the rule of the hidebound aristocracy ; while be- 
tween capital and labour there sprang up the same grim 
dispute which poisoned the social life of other countries. 

Nicholas II, who succeeded Alexander in 1894, pursued 
the policy of reaction. The persecution of intellect was 
especially severe. All places of education were rigorously 
supervised, students were punished on the mere suspicion 
of Liberal views, and many thousands were exiled to Siberia. 
Indeed, in one year, as many as one-fifth of the students of 
Moscow are said to have disappeared. A strictly censored 
Press stifled any attempt at Liberal propaganda. Manifes- 
tations of rebellion and discontent were thus suppressed, 
but nothing was done to avert the approaching crisis by 
removing its causes.^ 

In 1904 a disastrous war with Japan precipitated the ex- 
plosion. The war was at the outset extremely unpopular, 
and the Government was openly blamed for the defeat of 
Russia. The assassination of Von Pleyve, the reactionary 
Minister of the Interior, was only a symptom of the general 
discontent. Reformers began publicly to demand constitu- 
tional government and the recognition of those liberties 
and rights which had for many years been secured to the 
individual in Western Europe. On 22 January, 1905, the 
conflict was embittered by the catastrophe of "Bloody 

'An excellent picture of certain aspects of Russian life at this time is 
given in Joseph Conrad's novel, " Under Western Eyes." 


Sunday," an event never forgotten in the annals of Russian 
revolutionaries. A procession of people, led by a priest, 
who were marching peacefully to offer a petition to the 
Tsar, were fired upon by the police and many were killed. 
This move on the part of the Government was followed by 
a fierce attack on the Zemstvos, not because they were in 
any way revolutionary, but because they were representa- 
tive and savoured of constitutional government. For the 
same reason the Nationalist aspirations of the Poles, the 
Letts, the Finns, and the Armenians were disregarded and 

Opposition to this policy was organized in all classes, 
and strikes, mutiny, and assassination gave ample evidence 
of the anarchy towards which the country was drifting. It 
was evident that a great political struggle was taking place 
simultaneously with a great economic crisis. All classes 
were united in the demand for political reform, but the dis- 
pute between the middle classes and the proletariat, upon 
industrial questions, was bitter, and the landowners were 
strenuously resisting the demand for an equal division of 
land among the peasants. 

" Strikes which began over questions of wages and hours 
became political demonstrations in favour of a Constitutional 
Assembly. On the other hand, political demonstrations be- 
came transformed, without any conscious effort on the part 
of any body, into strikes for immediate economic better- 
ment." ^ Such was the parlous condition to which Russia 
had been reduced by her reactionary Government. The 
political and economic questions which had occupied the 
attention of the rest of Europe for more than a century had 
become in this case inextricably involved. Any attempt 
at political reform would open the floodgates to economic 
reorganization ; but those who would improve the condi- 
tion of the industrial classes could not do so without com- 
mitting themselves to democratic concessions. 

In August, 1905, the Tsar issued a manifesto promising 

Spargo, " Bolshevism." 


an Advisory State Council, elected on a very limited suffrage. 
But the people desired a Parliament, and in October they 
resorted to the expedient of a general strike. At this time 
councils of workmen and soldiers, called Soviets, were first 
formed, which afterwards became famous in the history of 
Russia. A Soviet was originally a Council of Deputies, 
each elected by a group, and no innovation in Russian 
custom. During the strike of 1905, however, these coun- 
cils acquired great importance, for they represented, more 
nearly than any other body, the opinion of Labour, and the 
people were ready to obey their orders. They directed the 
strike proceedings, and their policy emphasized the dis- 
crepancy, already considerable, between the middle class 
Liberals and the working class Socialists. These two ele- 
ments in the opposition now became distinct. For instance, 
the Petrograd Soviet proclaimed an eight hour working day, 
despite the bitter opposition of the middle class, who argued 
that such a reduction of hours must be carried out in co- 
operation with other great manufacturing towns, if Petrograd 
was not to be outstripped by them in industrial production. 
The middle class capitalists began to look to the Government 
for protection, and it became increasingly improbable that 
capital and labour would co-operate to secure constitutional 

The Tsar, however, was forced at last to make concessions, 
and he promised the people a Duma or Parliament, which 
should have power to consent to the laws. With the estab- 
lishment of the Duma, absolutism was ended and the reign 
of law began. But Nicholas dreaded lest his new Parlia- 
ment should become a weapon of Liberalism, and immedi- 
ately began to take precautions. He appointed an Imperial 
Council, composed of representatives of the official class, 
which must give its consent before the Duma could pass 
laws. He also proclaimed a number of " Fundamental 
Laws " which the Duma could not touch. The first Duma, 
elected in 1906, had a short lease of life. It was divided 
among four parties, the Reactionaries, the Octobrists, 
the Constitutional Democrats, and the Socialists. The 


Octobrists were those who were satisfied with the reforms 
already achieved and wished for no others. The Consti- 
tutional Democrats, or the Cadets, represented Liberal, 
middle class, and non-socialist opinion ; they were in a 
majority, and it was their programme which was placed 
before the Duma. This included full political freedom, an 
amnesty for political prisoners, the abolition of the Imperial 
Council and of martial law, democratic elections, Home Rule 
for Poland and Finland, the division of land among the 
peasants, and a variety of social reforms. The Duma was 
speedily dissolved, and its successor met with a similar fate. 

The Third Duma, elected in 1907, showed the effect of 
some sweeping changes made by the Tsar in the electoral 
law. More power was given to the land-owning class, and 
the reactionaries were in the majority. As a weak consul- 
tative institution, this Parliament lasted till 1912 ; but by its 
very futility it discredited Parliamentary institutions in the 
eyes of Russian reformers. 

The Socialist party, meanwhile, had been weakened by a 
split in its ranks. The Menscheviks, who generally followed 
the leadership of Plechanov, believed that Russia would have 
to go through the Industrial Revolution before she could 
become a Socialist State, They based this idea upon the 
Marxian theory of historic evolution ; they thought that 
the foundations of democracy must be laid by a powerful 
capitalist middle class, as in England and France. Until 
Russia had been through this stage, the working class could 
not hope to carry out its own programme. The Mensche- 
viks therefore were inclined to concentrate upon political 
issues, as the prologue to economic and social revolution. 
They wished the Socialist party to join with the Cadets in 
overthrowing the autocracy, and they voted for participa- 
tion in the work of the Duma. 

The Bolsheviks on the other hand would brook no co- 
operation with the middle class, and preferred the immedi- 
ate seizure of political power by the proletariat in a violent 
revolution. They thought that Russia could skip the stage 
of capitalist production, and they did not believe in Parlia- 


mentary Government, since it suggests the principle of 
majority representation. The Bolsheviks wished to rule 
by a minority. The majority in Russia were the peasants, 
who formed 85 per cent, of the population ; but these were 
not included by the Bolsheviks in the industrial working 
class, since their economic existence depended upon the 
private, not the communal, ownership of land. For the 
same reason the Bolsheviks did not believe in that gradual 
education of the people which is the safest preparation for 
democracy. They did not want democracy, they looked to 
a dictatorship of the small minority of "class conscious" 
industrial workers. They refused to participate in the ac- 
tivities of the Duma or to compromise themselves with 
the Cadets. Bolshevik doctrines were eagerly spread by 
Government spies and provocative agents, who were only 
too pleased to split the Socialist party and render it im- 

The war, 1914-18, however, struck a fatal blow at Tsarism. 
Germany was the natural ally of Russian autocracy, and, in 
the face of the rising tide of Social Democracy, the Kaiser 
and the Tsar should have stood together. Their alliance 
to suppress Liberalism had been historic ; it dated from the 
Holy Alliance. The Houses of Hohenzollern and Romanov 
were closely related, and the Russian official class was 
largely Germanized. Ever since 1878, however, it had ap- 
peared that the two Empires would, sooner or later, become 
embroiled over the Eastern Question ; and in 1914 neither 
Government realized that this was to be the final struggle 
between deqiocracy and autocracy. The Imperialist party 
in Russia plunged into war and then realized their mistake. 
A small but powerful minority, which had influence at Court, 
foreseeing the probable downfall of Tsarism if the war were 
continued, began to work for a separate peace 

In their desire to end the war the Germanophil bureau- 
cracy were in accordance with their extreme opponents, 
the Bolsheviks, The latter insisted that the defeat of 
Tsarism was the best thing which could happen to Russia, 
and that one capitalist Government was no worse than 


another. The bureaucracy had therefore all the more 
reason to spread secretly the Bolshevik views. The great 
majority of Russian people, on the other hand, supported 
the war. The capitalist class feared the trade rivalry of 
Germany. She had done her best to stultify and retard 
the industrial development of Russia, keeping her a back- 
ward and agricultural country and a fruitful source of raw 
materials for German industries. Imperialists felt that the 
German' policy in the East must be checked. Most Demo- 
crats and Socialists regarded Germany as the enemy of 
Liberalism and thought that the downfall of the Kaiser 
would herald the triumph of democracy in Germany and 
Russia. Soon after the beginning of the war a Socialist 
manifesto was issued, bearing, among other signatures, the 
name of the veteran Plechanov. It ran as follows : — 

"We, the undersigned, belong to different shades of 
Russian socialistic thought. We differ in many things, 
but we firmly agree in that the defeat of Russia in her 
struggle with Germany would mean her defeat in her 
struggle for freedom, and we think that, guided by this 
conviction, our adherents in Russia must come together 
for a common service to their people in the hour of grave 
danger which their country is now facing." 

To Labour the manifesto declares : — 

"Misinformed people may tell you that, in defending 
yourselves from German invasion, you support the old 
political regime. These people want to see Russia defeated 
because of their hatred for the Tsar's Government. They 
confuse the fatherland with its temporary rulers. But 
Russia belongs, not to the Tsar, but to the Russian work- 
ing people. In defending Russia the working people 
defend themselves, defend the road to their freedom. . . . 
The inevitable consequences of German victory would be 
the strengthening of our old regime. The Russian re- 
actionaries know this very well. In a faint half-hearted 
manner they are defending Russia from Germany. They 
understand that the defeat of Germany would be a defeat 
of the principles of monarchism, so dear to all our Euro- 


pean reactionaries. . . . Our people will never forget the 
failure of the Tsar's Government to defend Russia. But, 
if the progressive and politically conscious people will not 
take part in the struggle against Germany, the Tsar's 
Government will have an excuse for saying : ' It is not our 
fault that Germany defeats us, it is the fault of the revolu- 
tionists who have betrayed their country.' ... In order 
that the struggle of the classes in Russia should be success- 
ful, certain political and social conditions must exist there. 
These conditions will not exist if Germany wins." 

As the Government became more lukewarm in its sup- 
port of the war, the whole energy of the country became 
centred upon voluntary effort. Thousands of associations 
for war work sprang up, of which the chief was the Union 
of Zemstvos, organized at Moscow by Prince Lvov. This 
society strove to do all the things which the Government 
had failed to accomplish. It clothed and fed a large part 
of the army, started munition works, developed transport, 
ran hospitals and canteens, and cared for refugees, etc. 
Moreover, all this was done in the teeth of actual obstruc- 
tion on the part of the Government. Such an object 
lesson could not be lost, even upon the conservative Fourth 
Duma, which was gradually being driven to Radicalism 
by the reactionary policy of the bureaucrats. All honest 
Conservatives were driven over to the other side, and in 
191 5 a progressive Bloc was formed in the Duma including 
persons of all political parties. Demands were made for 
a new coalition Government, responsible to the Duma, and 
composed of people enjoying the confidence of the country. 
Other items in the programme of the Bloc were equally 
radical ; the freer exercise of voluntary work, the release 
of political prisoners, the end of religious persecution, and 
concessions to Poland, Finland, the Ukraine, Galicia, and 
the Jews. 

These demands, however, met with but little response 
from the Prime Minister, Goremykin, a reactionary of the 
sternest order. Nor was his successor, Sturmer, more 
likely to be acceptable to the Duma, for his Germanophil 


tendencies were well known. His appointment was a 
direct challenge to Russian Liberalism. The loyal and 
patriotic Sazonov was removed from the Foreign Office 
and Sturmer took his place. Aided by Protopopov, the 
Minister of the Interior, and Kurlov, a well-known organ- 
izer of massacres, Sturmer inaugurated a regular campaign 
for a separate peace. Propaganda was everywhere dis- 
persed among the troops, frequently couched in the most 
violently Socialist terms and, by expatiating on the hope- 
lessness of the Russian cause, calculated to shake their 
morale. Spies and provocative agents urged the people 
on to mutinies, revolts, and strikes which would impede 
the progress of the war. Every kind of obstruction was 
put in the way of the National Union of Zemstvos in order 
to prevent voluntary war work. Food supplies were 
shortened to create a famine. In this way Sturmer hoped 
to urge the people on to a revolution, which would of 
course be suppressed by the troops, but which would give 
the Tsar a pretext for making a separate peace. 

The country meanwhile had become uneasy. Rumours 
of treachery were persistent. Generals like the Grand 
Duke Nicholas, who had scored obvious successes, were 
removed from their posts. Sinister stories were told of 
the Government, of plots for a separate peace, and of the 
activities of the •' dark forces " of Russia, the spies and 
police agents, the criminal army employed in the horrible 
pogroms, or massacres of the Jews. 

On 14 November, 191 6, the Duma met and the great 
struggle began. Rodzianko, formerly a Conservative, 
attacked Sturmer roundly. Miliukov, the leader of the 
Cadets, pointed out how delighted Germany had been at 
the minister's appointment. Sturmer was eventually forced 
to resign, but Protopopov remained, and the policy of the 
Grovemment was not altered. Even the Imperial Council, 
that pillar of Tsarism, supported the Duma in its demands 
for a change of Government. To this Protopopov replied 
by prohibiting altogether the meetings of the National 
Union of Zemstvos. 


On 30 December certain individuals struck at a prom- 
inent figure among the " dark forces." Gregory Rasputin, 
a peasant monk, was believed to have influence of the most 
sinister kind in the highest circles at court ; it was said 
that he was in German pay and was one of the chief agents 
for betraying the country. He was known to be the friend 
of Protopopov. After his murder, Protopopov felt that no 
time must be lost in bringing about a rebellion. On 3 
March, 19 17, M. Konovalov presented to the Duma irre- 
futable proof of the intention of the Government to pro- 
duce a rebellion. The only labour leaders who had escaped 
arrest had framed an appeal to the people imploring them 
not to strike. This appeal had been suppressed by Proto- 
popov. The police, moreover, were hiding food supplies 
in Petrograd, and prices rose to famine rates. On 8-10 
March a general strike ensued. 

The Government, however, had miscalculated in two 
things. It had expected the people to be disorganized 
and it had depended on the soldiers to restore order. But 
the workers of Petrograd, remembering the procedure of 
1905, elected a Soviet, or Council of Workmen and Soldiers, 
to direct their affairs. This body organized the efforts of 
the people. The soldiers, moreover, sympathized with the 
revolutionaries and would not fire upon them. On 12 
March the soldiers and the people took the arsenal and 
the great fortress of Peter and Paul. The police were shot 
down if they attempted to resist. On the same afternoon 
the Duma, which had till then been sitting inactive, ap- 
pointed a "Duma Committee of Safety," which issued a 
proclamation calling for a Constituent Assembly. By 
14 March the Revolution was over and the authority of 
the Duma was proclaimed in all the corners of Russia. 
The following day the Duma and the Council of Deputies, 
sitting together, appointed a provisional Government. It 
is said that the Duma did not contemplate the deposition 
of the Tsar, but that the Soviet flung all its influence 
against the Monarchy. The Tsar was forced to abdicate 
and retired with his family to virtual imprisonment at 


Tzarskoie Selo. They were afterwards removed to Ekaterin- 
berg, where, in July, 191 8, the whole family and several 
attendants were murdered secretly by the Bolsheviks. The 
full details of this revolting crime are as yet unrevealed, 
and the fate of the unhappy Nicholas was wrapped in 
mystery for many months after his death. 

The provisional Government was a coalition. Its chief 
minister was Prince Lvov, the organizer of the Union of 
Zemstvos. Miliukov, the leader of the Cadets, was Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. Guchkov, who had done well in war 
industries committee work, was Minister for War. Kerensky, 
a member of the Soviet, and the only Socialist in the Gov- 
ernment, was Minister for Justice. The Revolution had 
been popular and democratic. The provisional Government 
was aristocratic. It ignored the fact that the people had 
been led by the Soviet, and not by the middle class. Its 
programme included political democracy but very little 
economic innovation, and represented very fairly the views 
of the Cadets. But the Soviet, though agreeing to the 
formation of a central Government, had not given up its 
control of affairs. It declared, in a proclamation on 16 
April, that : " So far the provisional Government has faith- 
fully carried out its promises," and recognized " the 
necessity of exercising over the provisional Government 
an influence which would keep it up to a more energetic 
struggle against the anti-revolutionary forces, and . . . 
which will ensure its democratizing the whole Russian life 
and paving the way for a Peace without annexation or 

This proclamation displays the arrogant assurance of 
the Soviet and its conviction that it commanded the obedi- 
ence of the masses of the people. The Duma had little 
support. The Tsar's electoral laws had made it an aristo- 
cratic institution and not a representative Parliament. 

The Soviet at Petrograd was not at this time dominated 
by the Bolshevik party, its recognized programme was 
very moderate, and it fully intended to co-operate with 
the Constituent Assembly which was to be elected. But 


disputes soon arose concerning the peace terms and the 
obligatory force of the treaties made by the Tsar with his 
Allies. On 13-16 May Guchkov and Miliukov resigned, 
and the split between the Soviet and the provisional Grov- 
ernment became evident. The Bolshevik party had 
organized itself meanwhile. Its leaders, Lenin and 
Kamenefif, had returned from their exile in Switzerland, 
expedited through Germany with unusual speed. They 
vetoed the suggestions for a new provisional Government, 
including more Socialists, and they proposed that the Soviet 
should seize political power without further compromise. 
They wished to abandon the idea of a Constituent Assembly, 
since Democracy and Parliamentary Government were, ac- 
cording to Lenin, reactionary and middle-class ideas. They 
urged the Soviet to make an immediate peace with Ger- 
many, and to abandon all the engagements made by the 
Tsar with his Allies. 

Bolshevik ideas were enthusiastically spread by all the 
German agents and spies who had worked formerly under 
the bureaucracy. They aimed especially at the demoraliza- 
tion of the army. The discipline of the troops was already 
relaxedinconsequenceof the unfortunate Order No. I issued 
by the Soviet, which abolished the death penalty and ab- 
solved soldiers from the duty of obeying their officers unless 
their Soviet approved the orders given. 

Upon the resignation of Miliukov, the Menscheviks 
wished to appoint a new provisional Government. An appeal 
was issued, signed by every member of the Soviet exclusive 
of the Bolsheviks, urging the soldiers to be faithful to the 
cause of Russia. On 17 May the Soviet decided, 41 votes 
to 19, to support the formation of a new provisional 
Government. This measure was strongly approved by the 
all-Russian Peasant Congress, which met at this time and 
which strongly rejected Bolshevik ideas. 

The new Government included seven Cadets, two 
Octobrists, and six Socialists. M. Kerensky was made 
Minister of War, and he began an energetic campaign to 
reorganize the army. But demoralization had gone too far. 


On 19 July the Bolsheviks made an attempt to seize the 
Government, which was successfully resisted by Cossack 
troops. Prince Lvov resigned on the following day, and 
M. Kerensky, as Prime Minister, took stern measures to 
check the corruption of the Army. But the industrial 
anarchy into which the country had slipped made the task 
of provisioning and munitioning the troops an impossibility. 
In September a new German offensive coincided with a 
quarrel between Kerensky and Kornilov, the ablest of the 
Russian Generals. The troops were defeated everywhere 
and refused to fight further. Panic seized the nation, and, 
on 6 November, the Bolsheviks were able to bring off a 
successful stroke at the Government, Filling Petrograd 
with " Red Guards " they arrested the entire Ministry, and 
Lenin and Trotsky took upon themselves the direction of 
affairs. The people would seem to have acquiesced in any 
Government that would give them peace. 

The Bolsheviks, however, delayed in making terms with 
Germany, hoping to see a kindred revolution there too. In 
this, however, they were disappointed, and, on 2 March, 
191 8, they were forced to sign the Treaty of Brest- 
Litovsk, by which Russia gave over all her Baltic Provinces, 
Poland, Lithuania, and the Ukraine to German protection, 
and yielded Armenia and the Caucasus to the Turks. 

The Bolsheviks were now free to establish their own 
power at home. All over Russia the " Red Guards " 
fought the Cossacks, and the problem was complicated by 
the fact that the Entente did not look upon the Bolsheviks 
as a legal Government and supported the " Whites." The 
Allies could not afford to recognize the Treaty of Brest- 
Litovsk, and, once embroiled in the support of the anti- 
Bolshevik forces of Russia, they found their position 
difficult. They could not abandon the " Whites " without 
ensuring their security, a fact which led to the continuance 
of warfare in Russia after the Peace Treaty of 191 9 ; it was 
a civil war, made the more bitter by the intervention of 
foreign Powers. The consequences were highly disastrous, 
since the natural development of the Russian Revolution 


was retarded and perverted, and the possibilities of any real 
expression of public opinion were indefinitely postponed. 
The future will show how far Russia, as a whole, supports 
the Bolshevik Government. Terrible outrages are ascribed 
to both sides, in the course of the conflict, but these reports 
do not, on the whole, exceed in horror the long tale of 
massacre and oppression under Tsarism. In estimating the 
present condition of Russia it is always necessary to re- 
member how bad were the evils from which she has freed her- 
self. Barbarous atrocities and fanatical extremes are bound 
to occur in a country where civilization has been retarded 
and stifled. 

When the stress of warfare is over, it may be discovered 
that the Russian people really support the Bolshevik rule. 
Certain it is that Bolshevism is anti-democratic. It never 
pretended to be anything else. The first act of the Bolshe- 
viks was to countermand the Constituent Assembly, and to 
dissolve all those Soviets, throughout the country, which 
were not Bolshevik. Lenin indeed, in the New Inter- 
national for April, 1 9 1 8, says : — 

"Since March, 191 7, the word democracy is simply a 
shackle fastened upon the revolutionary nation. . . . Just 
as 150,000 lordly landowners under Tsarism dominated 
130,000,000 Russian peasants, so 200,000 of the Bolsheviki 
are now imposing their proletarian will on the mass, but 
this time in the interests of the latter." 

In claiming thus that his autocracy is justified by the fact 
that he is governing for the good of the governed, Lenin re- 
veals himself in a very familiar guise, none other than that 
of the old-fashioned " Enlightened Despot." As our period 
opens, so it closes, with the claim of a minority to dominate 
a majority in the interests of the general good. History 
has witnessed a great revolt against this claim, when it was 
made by the landowning aristocracy ; it remains to be seen 
whether similar pretensions on the part of the industrial 
proletariat will meet with similar opposition. But at 
present Article II, Chapter V, of the Constitution of Russia 
under the Bolshevik rule states that : — 


" The Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated 
Soviet Republic involves, in view of the present transition 
period, the establishment of a dictatorship of the urban 
and rural proletariat (i.e. industrial working class) and the 
poorest peasantry (i.e. the very small class of absolutely 
landless agricultural labourers) in the form of an all-power- 
ful Russian Soviet Authority. . . ." 

It may be, of course, that Lenin is right, and that demo- 
cracy is an outworn ideal. And this may be true of Russia, 
even if it does not apply to Western Europe. It is not to 
be supposed that the democratic ideals of the nineteenth 
century are the final revelation of social good, and that no 
further developments of political theory and civic practice 
lie in store for us. In Latin and Teutonic countries it 
would indeed seem that, on the whole, the movement to- 
wards democracy has not entirely lost its impetus. But, for 
the Slavonic peoples of Eastern Europe, it may not have 
the same attractions. Nothing is more fatal than the tend- 
ency, particularly strong in the Anglo-Saxon, which leads 
men to regard a specific set of institutions, which, in a 
specific country, at a specific time, have proved highly 
beneficial to a certain race, as the best possible formula for 
all nations at all times. " What is good for us will be good 
for you " is a non-sequitur which has led many worthy men 

It is possible that Russia may find in undemocratic com- 
munalism a solution to her problems. It is possible that 
her institutions may serve as a model to the other Slavonic 
races. These institutions may be highly uncongenial to 
the temper of Western Europe, to the Teutons, and to the 
Latins. It is, on the other hand, possible that Western 
Europe may be able to borrow something from Russia. 
Another hundred years may see the whole Continent re- 
organized upon the Soviet model. Many decades must 
elapse before it will be possible to decide how much there 
is of permanence and universality in Bolshevism. 

In one respect, however, Russian Socialism already re- 
flects the Socialism of Europe as a whole. It is urban, not 


rural. The largest occupation of Europe is still that of 
agricultural labour ; but Socialism has grown up in the 
towns, and has been thought out by townspeople to meet 
their own needs. The whole life of the continental peasant 
depends upon the ownership of his land, and this puts him 
beyond the pale of Socialism, which aims at the collective 
ownership of the means of production. Great difficulties 
must be overcome before a Socialism can be evolved which 
will meet the needs of agricultural labour. 

In the case of Russia, the Bolshevik theory is plain 
enough ; but it is not yet clear how far that theory has 
been put into practice. In the towns, communalism may 
have been introduced ; but Russia is very large and the 
Bolsheviks are few. Many villages which are self-support- 
ing and independent may be still quite unaffected by the 
change of Government. The peasants have always been 
used to collective self-government, and in many places 
they may have restored their old Mirs under the name of 
Soviets. A despotism is only galling when it is efficient 
and well organized, so that it interferes in every branch of 
the life of the people. If, when Russia is again at peace, 
the Bolsheviks are able to organize themselves to such an 
extent that they can apply their theories, impartially, over 
the whole country, Europe will have an opportunity of 
judging how far they are really supported by the people. 

It is unfortunate that decision was first forced on the 
other European Powers at a time when very little was 
clearly known as to the internal conditions of Russia. To 
the plenipotentiaries of the Peace Conference at Paris, 
1 91 8- 1 9, it was first given to decide upon the attitude 
which the rest of Europe should adopt towards their Com- 
munist neighbour. They had to determine whether Bol- 
shevism is really the Russian method of solving Russian 
problems, or whether it is merely a hotch-potch of German 
theory preached by a Jewish clique as a justification of their 
own despotism. 

The decisions of the peace-makers were a little incon- 
sistent In their refusal to have any dealings with the 


Bolsheviks, who were not permitted to send representatives 
to the conference, the allied Powers betrayed their conviction 
that Lenin and his followers were but the temporary rulers 
of Russia and had no legitimate mandate from the people 
to represent them. The inference was that the Bolsheviks 
would soon be overthrown. But, in the other provisions 
made with regard to Russia, a supposition is evinced that 
she will, for a considerable time at any rate, remain 
Bolshevik. She was treated like a conquered country and 
was freely partitioned. Finland, Esthonia, Livonia, Lithu- 
ania, the Ukraine and Georgia were taken from her and 
made into independent States. These measures were 
hardly calculated to dispose the anti-Bolshevik party in 
Russia to look upon the Powers assembled at Paris in the 
light of friends and rescuers. Everything was done to erect 
a "Chinese wall " between Russia and the rest of Europe, 
so great was the fear of Communism among the post-war 
Governments of the West. They feared it as men in a 
powder magazine fear fire. Imminent as the social crisis 
had been in 191 4, Russia was as yet the only country in 
which an explosion had taken place, and the dread of an 
international conflagration lay heavy upon the other mem- 
bers of the Concert of Europe. Victors and vanquished 
alike beheld in Bolshevism an outstanding menace, as can 
be seen from a short study of the conditions prevalent in 
France and Germany since 1 870. 

The Third French Republic 

In the years immediately succeeding the war of 1870-71, 
France occupied herself mainly with the problems of con- 
solidation and reconstruction. It was not until after 1906 
that the underlying friction of classes, the great economic 
struggle, became apparent. Socialism was for a time dis- 
credited by the events of 1871, when the whole country 
was brought to the brink of ruin by civil war between the 
Republicans and the Communists. Paris demanded that 
France should become a federation of independent Com- 
munes, each with the right of self-government, a suggestion 


which was abhorrent to the ardently nationalist tempera- 
ment of the majority of the people. 

Beset thus with difficulties, President Thiers undertook 
the task of reconstruction. He reorganized the army, and 
paid off the indemnity due to Germany with a rapidity 
which astonished Europe and which came as an unpleasant 
shock to Bismarck and his colleagues. It was evident that 
France had not been stricken beyond recovery. The work 
of Thiers was carried on by his successor, Jules Grevy, and 
internal reforms were broached with energy. Railways and 
harbours were built, compulsory education was established, 
the freedom of the Press secured (1881), and Trades Unions 
were legally sanctioned (1884). 

France was, however, still regarded with distrust by the 
other nations of Europe. It was thought that she would, 
never achieve stability and that her politics would always 
be corrupt. A succession of incidents in the years 1887- 
1906 ministered to this impression. From 1886-89 the 
whole of Europe was much disturbed by the agitations 
centred round the person of a certain General Boulanger, 
the French Minister of War, and leader of a Jingoist cam- 
paign of revenge against Germany. Boulanger was the 
merest man of straw, an imposing figure-head and nothing 
more, but he kept Europe in a state of tension. Many 
sensible people believed that he might become a second 
Napoleon, leading the French people on to a campaign of 
aggression. He was, however, tried for treason in 1889, 
and was discovered to be in communication with the 
Royalist party. He fled from France and committed 
suicide in 1891. 

The Panama scandal, in 1 892, revealed a shocking state 
of corruption in high places ; while the assassination of 
President Carnot, in 1894, ministered to the general im- 
pression of lawlessness and unrest in the country. It was 
the Dreyfus case, however, which most discredited France 
in the eyes of her possible allies. Dreyfus was a Jewish 
officer in the French army who was accused of having be- 
trayed military secrets to a foreign Power. He was tried by 


court-martial, condemned, and imprisoned. His cause was, 
however, championed by many eminent men who believed 
him innocent, including M. Zola, the novelist, and M. 
Clemenceau ; and it was eventually proved that the evidence 
against him had been forged. This case, and the picture it 
afforded of corruption in the army aroused a great distrust 
of France in other countries, particularly in Great Britain, 
and effectually delayed a Franco-British understanding. 

In consequence of this case also, many clear-sighted 
Frenchmen were led to the conclusion that some element 
in the condition of France was poisoning the whole life of 
the country. The majority of the progressive party blamed 
the Catholic Church, which had been very violent against 
Dreyfus, and which had excited popular animosity against 
him as a Jew. The Church had supported the army and 
was connected, in the French mind, with militarism. Many 
people, of whom Zola is a good representative, regarded 
the Church as a corrupting influence, disseminating, in its 
educational institutions, disloyalty to the French Republic. 
From 1901-6 the combined energies of the Republican and 
of the Socialist parties were directed against this evil. 
Education was taken out of the hands of the religious 
orders, many of which were suppressed by the new Laws 
of Association. In 1903 anti-clerical feeling was em- 
bittered by a quarrel with Rome. The Church was en- 
tirely separated from the State and partially disendowed. 
The return of a large Radical majority in 1 906 is significant 
of the entire approval with which the nation at large re- 
garded these measures. 

Thus it was not till after this year that the full attention 
of the Socialist party was turned to economic legislation. 
In 1905 a United Socialist party had been formed by the 
union of two dissenting branches. During the Church 
crisis, and over the Dreyfus case, this party had joined 
forces with the Republicans, who wished for political de- 
mocracy, but who did not adhere to the Socialist programme 
of economic reorganization through revolution and class 
war. The two parties now became distinct, and the 


problem became complicated by the rise of a Syndicalist 
party which vetoed all co-operation with the existing 
Government and which intended to work by direct action, 
such as strikes, etc. A Federative Union of Co-operative 
Trades Unions was established. Many Socialists, of whom 
M. Briand, who became Minister in 1909, was one, were 
driven into opposition to their party by the Syndicalist use 
of the strike weapon. The elections of 1910, however, 
marked a defeat of the United Socialists, showing that 
the country, as a whole, .preferred constitutional reform to 

The first round of the conflict was fought out in the 
same year, when the Syndicalists organized a railway strike, 
not as an economic dispute, but as a political blow, the 
initial step of a revolution. M. Briand adopted the stern 
expedient of placing the strikers under military discipline. 
This measure sufficed, thenceforth, to prevent any attempt 
at a paralysing general strike ; but its efficacy was liable to 
be impaired at any time should a conflict arise on a question 
in which the masses of the people did not support the 
Government. For a Government which does not command 
the confidence of the people, it is a dangerous weapon. 

Such were the general conditions in France when, in 19 14, 
a sudden and overwhelming peril thrust internal economics 
into the background. For four years all the energies of 
the country were devoted to one end, that of the struggle 
for national existence. But this does not imply that the 
Socialist problem could indefinitely be shelved. It was, 
rather, driven underground and rendered the more bitter ; 
with the close of the war it regained its old importance, and 
the bitterness of the proletariat towards the bourgeoisie had 
not been decreased by the evolution of a new class of war 
profiteers, a phenomenon not peculiar to France. Nor 
were general conditions favourable to a peaceful settlement. 
In addition to the ordinary tasks of reconstruction which 
confronted all belligerent nations, France was impeded in 
1919 by a considerable diminution of her natural resources, 
consequent upon the disastrous effects of the German 


occupation of the north-east area. Mines had been put out 
of order, factories destroyed, and orchards cut down. Only 
a united nation, under a strong Government, could hope to 
surmount such difficulties. 

But post-war France is not united and her Government 
is not strong. Its incapacity to tax the people proves the 
extent of its instability. The people of France show a 
distinct inclination to rely upon huge war indemnities from 
Germany as a means of restoring their credit, and they 
have, up to the year 1920, shirked the necessity, frankly 
faced by England, of paying for the war by heavily increased 
taxation. The future of all capitalist enterprise, moreover, 
is seriously compromised by the menace of International 
Socialism, a danger as real to the Latin races as to the 
Teutons and the Slavs, as was proved by the insurrections, 
in 1920, among the factory-workers of Northern Italy. 

The capacity of France to weather this crisis depends 
entirely upon the capacity of her individual citizens for 
sacrifice — for that extraordinary patriotism which, again 
and again, has saved her in her direst need, causing her to 
rise like a phoenix from the fires of peril and disaster. Of 
the marvellous recuperative powers possessed by the 
French nation our period has afforded abundant illustra- 
tion ; it has a power of maintaining its national entity in 
the face alike of foreign defeat and of internal sedition ; 
and never has so great a demand been made upon these 
powers as will be made in the years immediately succeed- 
ing the War. 

The German Empire and its Fall 

If the problems of France are involved, they are nothing 
to those confronting the people of Germany. The con- 
fusion here created by bankruptcy, internal disorder, 
diminished resources, and a bitter class war is enhanced by 
the consequences of defeat and the conditions of a severe 
Peace Treaty. A great autocracy has fallen into ruins, and 
the Germans are learning their first lessons in self-govern- 
ment at a time when government of any kind is supremely 


difficult. The social democratic opposition, which has been 
growing in Germany for the last fifty years, has come into 
power at a moment of crisis unparalleled in the history of 
any people. It has perhaps come too late. As long as 
Bismarck directed the course of German affairs, the history 
of the Empire was tranquil enough. He spent the first 
ten years after the Franco-Prussian War in a careful 
organization of the Empire and in conducting a campaign 
against the Catholic Church. The fight between Church 
and State arose mainly in consequence of the Pope's 
assumption of infallibility. The Empire contained many 
Catholic subjects and they had a large party in the 
Reichstag. The dispute turned upon the right of the Pope 
to interfere in the civil affairs of the State. That right was 
fiercely denied by Bismarck, and a series of anti-clerical 
laws ensued. The Jesuits were expelled from Germany in 
the year 1872, Bismarck believed that the Church was 
opposed to German unity and the contest was political 
rather than religious. Civil marriage was made compulsory, 
and the education of the priests was largely controlled. 
Many religious orders were suppressed and education was 
taken out of their hands. But persecution only strengthened 
the resistance of the Catholics, and the anti-clerical campaign 
embittered the life of the whole country for fifteen years. 
Compared with the similar movement in France it differs in 
this respect. It was not the work of the whole community, 
but a series of measures taken by an autocracy against an 
institution which threatened its supremacy. In 1878 
Bismarck relaxed his policy of persecution. The death of 
Pius IX and the conciliatory attitude of Leo XIII made an 
agreement easier. Moreover, the Chancellor needed the 
support of the Catholics in his new financial policy and in 
his campaign against Socialism, He had recently changed 
from a policy of free trade to one of protection, and in 
doing so he was forced to break with the national Liberals, 
who were free traders, and to rely upon the Conservative 
party, who were landowners and protectionists. This 
change in policy was largely due to his wish to protect the 


growing German home industries. He had noted the 
prosperity of those nations which had adopted a protective 
policy, and he considered that England alone could flourish 
upon the free trade system, on account of her leading 
position in industry at the beginning of the century. A 
considerable development of German industry and an 
increase of commercial prosperity certainly followed upon 
this change in policy ; but factors other than protection 
contributed to this. Germany had embarked upon her 
Industrial Revolution and was fast becoming a manufactur- 
ing country. 

The Socialist party in Germany increased in strength 
with the growth of the industrial population. A large 
number of Socialist members were sent to the Reichstag. 
Bismarck disliked this party because they had opposed the 
North German Confederation, the war with France, the 
annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and the constitution of the 
German Empire. He feared their economic principles and 
he hated their democracy. In 1878 he made a deliberate 
attempt to crush them. Making use of an outburst of 
popular sentiment aroused by the attempt of two Socialist 
extremists to murder the Emperor, he passed a ferocious 
law forbidding all Socialist societies, all Socialist publications, 
and all meetings with the object of criticizing existing 
social conditions. Large powers of espionage and inter- 
ference were given to the police, enabling the officials to 
expel from Germany anyone suspected of being a Socialist 
As in the case of religious persecution, the ardours of 
Socialism were not extinguished, though its activities were 
driven underground. 

Although he suppressed Socialist doctrine, Bismarck 
was at some pains to carry out certain legislative measures 
of social reform. He thought that the doctrines of 
Socialism would never prevail if the amelioration of the 
condition of the people were undertaken by the State. 
His experience of mankind had led him to believe that the 
masses would be content to live for ever under an en- 
lightened despotism, provided they were comfortable. He 


inaugurated, therefore, a policy of working men's insurance 
against accident, sickness, and old age, as part of a system 
of State Socialism. These measures were not supported 
by the Socialists, who regarded them as an attempt to 
tinker up a system which should be entirely done awiay 

The Emperor William died in 1888 and was succeeded 
for a few weeks only by his son, Frederick, a liberal and 
moderate man, who might, had he lived, have changed the 
course of German history. But he died almost at once, and 
his son, William, became Emperor. William II immediately 
began to quarrel with Bismarck. Both were determined 
to rule Germany, and at last, in 1890, the Emperor dis- 
missed the Chancellor and embarked upon a personal 
guidance of affairs. His policy was faithfully carried out 
by his four Chancellors, Caprivi, 1 890-94, Hohenlohe, 1 894- 
1900, Von Billow, 1 900-1 909, and Bethmann-Hollweg, 

Under William II the prosperity of Germany developed 
marvellously. In commerce and industry she became the 
rival of England and America. The policy of protection 
was not abandoned, but larger markets were gained for 
German goods by reciprocity treaties made with other 
nations. The army and navy were considerably increased, 
the latter advancing in strength with wonderful rapidity 
until it became second only in importance to the British 
fleet. The Kaiser was convinced that a great sea trade 
and a Colonial Empire must be supported, as in the case 
of Great Britain, by a dominant navy. The cession of 
Heligoland gave Germany a good base for the defence 
of her East Coast and a new command of the North Sea. 

The reign of William II was disturbed by the conflict 
between the Social Democrats and the Pan-German 
militarists. The Pan-German party preached a gospel 
of world domination and of world Teutonization. Its 
policy is illustrated by the treatment dealt out to Alsace- 
Lorraine and Poland. Everything was done to Germanize 
these countries. Not until 191 o was Alsace-Lorraine 


given a Diet, such as all the other States of the Empire 
possessed. The German language was made compulsory 
everywhere, and German officials were employed. This 
policy aroused fierce criticism among the Social Democrats. 
The programme of the militarist party also included war 
with Great Britain. It is still not clear how far the 
Emperor was in agreement with this party, and how far he 
was sincere in his attempts to avoid war. The final verdict 
of history may be that his hand was forced. In the 
Moroccan crisis of 191 1 he certainly incurred great un- 
popularity by taking the side of moderation. 

It is the militarist party which must bear the brunt of 
the blame for the War, 19 14-18. It could not, however, 
have carried out its programme had not the country as a 
whole been inclined to accept militarism. This was the 
inevitable fruit of Bismarck's policy. Germany, by the 
very essence of her being, was forced to be a militarist 
country. She had incurred the undying hatred of France, 
and as long as she kept Alsace-Lorraine she was forced to 
maintain a large defensive army. But a large army will 
never stay merely defensive. A point must come when it 
will either become aggressive or sink into inefficiency. 
The Pan-German programme of a world war grew out of 
the necessity for keeping guard against France. 

On the other hand, the peace of the Empire was 
threatened by the growing menace of social democracy. 
William II had originally relaxed the Bismarckian laws 
against Socialism ; but he soon grew to fear it. The Social 
Democratic party contained, besides Socialists proper, all 
those who desired constitutional reform, the responsibility 
of ministers, and the reduction of the heavy taxation 
necessitated by the maintenance of increased armaments. 
This was the fault of Bismarck, who had united all the 
progressive elements in Germany into a common opposition 
against the existing Government The Social Democrats 
continually gained power in the Reichstag, and used every 
means to discredit the militarists, who began to feel that a 
great war was the only remedy. Victory would stifle the 


development of Socialism, just as Liberalism had been 
stifled in 1870. In March, 191 4, the Social Democrats 
organized a great national demonstration, and the war party 
felt that they must act soon. Their prophecies were, to 
some extent, justified, when the war broke out in August 
The Social Democrats rallied to the side of the Government, 
believing, as the huge majority in Grermany did believe, 
that Russia had attacked their country and that a Cossack 
invasion was imminent. The war seemed to be one of 
self-defence and, much as they disliked Prussianism, they 
preferred it to conquest by Russia. The leader of the 
Social Democrats said, in the Reichstag, on 4 August : — 

" For our people, and for its freedom in the future, much, 
if not all, is at stake. Should victory come to Russian 
despotism, which has stained itself in the blood of the 
best of its own people ? " 

The following years witnessed the gradual disillusionment 
of the people and the breakdown of the war party. The 
victories, which should have given a fresh lease of life to 
Kaiserism, were of short duration. Four years of dogged 
struggle against an ever-increasing array of enemies, against 
famine, against that exhaustion of morale and resources 
which only a protracted life-struggle can produce, compelled 
the war party to admit its failure. On 9 November, 191 8, 
two days before the signature of the armistice which ended 
the war, the Emperor abdicated, and the people of Germany 
were forced to find for themselves new rulers. 

In a way their position resembled that of the French in 
1870. But in some respects it was less favourable. The 
opposition party, which now came into power, had even 
less political experience than the men of 1871. The Social 
Democrats had held together in opposition, but when in 
power they split into opposing factions. Middle-class 
Liberals became sharply differentiated from Socialists. A 
party grew up which aimed at government by the working 
classes, through Councils, modelled on the Russian Soviet 
system. No strong majority supported any one construc- 
tive programme, and the only class which had any experience 


of the art of government was the old bureaucracy. This 
class had not in reality been removed from office, but con- 
tinued to carry on the administration of the country. It 
was easier for Germany to draw up a Liberal Constitution 
on paper than to attain, within a few weeks, the habit of 
freedom. Much of the machinery of Kaiserism was left. 

The Socialists themselves were divided. The Majority 
Socialists, led by Scheidemann and Ebert, desired the im- 
mediate election of a Constituent Assembly and the forma- 
tion of a provisional Government. The Minority Socialists, 
or Independents, wished to introduce the Council system 
of Government. It was by the junction of the Majority 
Socialists and the Liberal Democrats that a Majority was 
formed strong enough to carry through the election of a 
Constituent Assembly. This Assembly sat at Weimar and, 
on the whole, represented middle-class democracy. It ap- 
pointed a Coalition Government containing Majority Social- 
ists and Liberal Democrats. 

The Independents, however, were making headway in 
the industrial towns, and the general strike in Berlin, March, 
1919, is indicative of the discontent of the people with the 
bourgeois programme of the Constituent Assembly. The 
people became more revolutionary as they grew hungrier, 
since, during the interval between the armistice and the 
Final Peace, the Allies kept up their blockade of Germany 
and cut off her food supplies. In May, 19 19, at the Con- 
gress of Councils held in Berlin, the trend of public opinion 
is indicated as turning towards the Independent and 
Spartacist parties. As the people became more revolution- 
ary, the Government became more reactionary. All indica- 
tions of popular discontent were suppressed with severity 
and machine-guns, after the manner of the Old R6gime. 
Disturbances in the provinces were made the excuse for 
raising troops, which could, on occasion, be used for a 
reactionary coup d'etat. In several provincial towns, such 
as Brunswick and Munich, attempts at Council Government 
were suppressed. The peace terms did not, naturally, 
render the Government more popular in the country. A 


storm of rage and disappointment shook the people. Ac- 
cording to the general view, the economic clauses of the 
treaty were calculated to annihilate the economic existence 
of Germany. Public opinion fully endorsed the comments 
made on the treaty by the German delegate at Versailles : — 

" German democracy is thus annihilated at the very 
moment when the German people was about to build it up 
after a severe struggle; annihilated by the very persons 
who, throughout the war, never tired of maintaining that 
they sought to bring democracy to us. . . . Germany is 
no longer a people and a State, but becomes a mere trade 
concern, placed by its creditors in the hands of a receiver, 
without its being granted so much as the opportunity to 
prove its willingness to meet its obligations of its own 
accord. The Commission, which is to have its permanent 
headquarters outside Germany, will possess in Germany 
incomparably greater rights than the German Emperor ever 
possessed ; the German people, under its regime, would 
remain for decades to come shorn of all rights and deprived, 
to a far greater extent than any people in the days of ab- 
solutism, of any independence of action, of any individual 
aspiration in its economic or even its ethical progress." 

The treaty, if enforced, spelt ruin to the capitalist middle 
class, the class which stood as a bulwark against Imperialism 
and Bolshevism, and upon which, as we have seen, the de- 
velopment of transitional democracy so largely depends. 
The future of Germany turns upon the issue of the struggle 
between Communists and Reactionaries ; and it is hardly 
rash to predict that the winning party will be that which 
holds out to the German people the brightest hopes of 
escape from the treaty terms. 

Europe in 19 19 

In considering the general condition of Europe in 1919 
it is necessary to distinguish between the inevitable effects 
of the recent war and the probable effects of peace. In 
both aspects of the question the economic situation is so 


grave and fraught with such disaster that it overshadows, 
to a certain extent, points of a purely political importance. 
Many new nations have sprung into existence since the 
Peace Treaty. The last thirty years have been favourable 
to the doctrine of Nationality, so scorned at the opening of 
the nineteenth century. The historic ambitions of Czecho- 
Slavs, Jugo-Slavs, Poles, Roumanians, Italians, and Alsatians 
find recognition in the treaties of igig. Ancient wrongs 
have been righted, and in the unsatisfied Nationalism of the 
Irish and the thwarted Teutonism of the German population 
of Austria are to be found the chief remaining monuments to 
the spirit of 1 8 1 5. The fundamental axioms of Nationalism 
have been recognized. It has been admitted that man 
cannot live by bread alone, and that humanity does not, 
like the beasts of the field, submit to any master who will 
provide food. But this truth is, in 191 9, overshadowed by 
the equally important fact that, without bread, man cannot 
live at alL Questions of governments, of nationalities, and 
of democracy are thrust into the background by the all- 
important problem of existence on any terms. A colossal 
economic crisis has followed upon the war, which the peace- 
makers have, as yet, failed to solve. 

I. Europe and the War 

Despite the political dissension which rent her, Europe 
has, ever since 1 870, become yearly a more united civiliza- 
tion. This is the obvious result of forty years of com- 
parative peace. The population increased very rapidly, 
and production kept pace with it. The economic life of 
the Continent depended upon a highly organized inter- 
national system based upon the supplies of coal, iron, 
transport, and raw material. This system was built up 
by the capitalist class. Before the war economists occupied 
themselves with finding remedies for the inequalities of the 
capitalist system, without disturbing the elaborate mechan- 
ism upon which modern production is founded. Mr. Keynes, 
in his " Economic Consequences of the Peace," has pointed 
out the following facts : — 


"The immense accumulations of fixed capital, which, 
to the great benefit of mankind, were built up during the 
half-century before the war, could never have come about 
in a society where wealth was divided equitably. The 
railways of the world, which that age built as a monument 
to posterity, were, not less than the pyramids of Egypt, the 
work of labour which was not free to consume in immediate 
enjoyment the full equivalent of its efforts. . . . Pre-war 
society was based on the principle of accumulation based 
on inequality, and this depended on a psychological con- 
dition which it may be impossible to recreate. ... It was 
not natural for a population of which so few enjoyed the 
comforts of life to accumulate so hugely." 

Since the war these conditions have partially disappeared. 
Labour in future will demand more, and capital will con- 
sume more. The economic beliefs of pre-war society are 
shattered. The peoples of Europe, despite their attacks 
on the capitalist, had formerly a lingering respect for the 
economic functions which he performed. He was at least 
accumulating wealth, which would, one day, become the 
heritage of the community. Their awakening was bitter. 
Much of the vast stores of wealth accumulated by the capital- 
ists was doomed to be dissipated in a burdensome and 
unproductive war, costing many millions a day, which, in 
the words of Mr. Keynes, "disclosed the possibility of con- 
sumption to all and the vanity of abstinence to many," 
The justification of the capitalist had, in the eyes of the 
masses, disappeared. To what end, enquired the proletariat, 
should capital be accumulated, if it is liable to be employed 
thus? Does it not enable wars to be waged on a larger 
scale? Is not this a capitalists' war? 

Alternative methods of production, socialist and syndical- 
ist, were, before the war, experimental and theoretical. 
They existed in the region of half-realized probabilities. 
By 1 91 8 they had acquired a new importance. One great 
State had admittedly embarked upon the adventure of 
Communism, and, to make matters worse, this State 
happened to be the least civilized and the least European 


of the Christian States of Europe. The fact that Russia 
was the first country to put Socialist principles into practice 
is so important that it cannot be over-estimated. 

The pre-war methods of production may thus be im- 
possible in the future. But, in addition to this, production 
itself has received some crushing blows. International 
credit has disappeared, and currencies which have no value 
in exchange retain their purchasing power at home. The 
economic services of Germany have, for a time, been lost 
to Europe. Russia, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Switzer- 
land, Italy, and Austria have lost their best customer. 
Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark have lost their second 
best. The pre-war investments of Germany, spent in de- 
veloping the resources of Austria, Russia, and the Balkans, 
amounted to ;^ 1, 2 5 0,000 ,000. These are gone, and her 
power of supplying capital is crippled for some time to 
come. The general productivity of the Continent has 
enormously fallen off. Much fixed capital has been de- 
stroyed. Factories have fallen into disrepair, mines have 
been flooded, and transport has broken down. In the 
shambles of Belgium and the Balkans large quantities of 
efficient labour have been lost. Especially disastrous is the 
decrease in the production of coal and iron. 

The people in many parts of Europe are, consequently, 
starving and in a condition which would tax the resources 
of an old and long-established Government Especially is 
this the case in Germany, Poland, Russia, Austria, Hungary, 
Czecho Slavia, and Jugo-Slavia, where the Government has 
recently changed hands. The effects of misery and starva- 
tion are manifested in the prevalence of internal disorder 
and in conditions which favour militarism and absolutism, 
whether in a Bolshevist or an Imperialist form. Nation- 
ality and democracy, in Central and Eastern Europe, are 
threatened with death by exhaustion in the very hour of 
victory. Europe is an house divided against itself; worse 
than all the material disasters of war is the loss of unity 
of spirit The war has left a legacy of hatreds between 
nation and nation and between class and class, of mutual 


distrust, and a yearning for vengeance in the minds of the 

2. Europe and the Peace 

The Peace Treaty of 191 9 was presented to Europe as a 
partial solution of the difficult questions raised by the war. 
Generally speaking, it represents the views current among 
the victors in the recent struggle, and a sharp distinction 
must be drawn, in any estimation of the probable effects of 
the treaty terms, between the victors and the vanquished. 

Germany will either refuse to carry out the treaty, a 
proceeding which will probably cause another war, or she 
will comply with it and embark upon an economic slavery 
unheard of in the history of any nation. The latest esti- 
mate made by the Allies of the reparation due amounts to 
a sum of iJ" 1 1,000,000,000, payable in instalments during a 
period of forty-two years. It is difficult to imagine a people 
who, for nearly half a century, will be content to toil and 
not to reap, to labour for others, to pay taxes for no 
communal object, to show enterprise and to gain no reward. 
But, supposing this unprecedented miracle is achieved, the 
consequences to German economic life will be disastrous. 
It was not easy, before the war, to induce the people to 
work, in order that the capitalists of their own country 
might become richer ; it will be still more difficult to induce 
them to labour for the profit of other nations. It is possible 
that Germany, under the circumstances, may find attractions 
in the programme of international Socialism. 

The Allies, on the other hand, are to gain large quantities 
of wealth, handed over to them by Germany for a period 
of years. This will go in direct indemnity to France and 
Belgium, and, indirectly, to England and America, in pay- 
ment of the large sums which these countries have loaned 
to their Allies. The effect of these high hopes is already 
felt. France and Italy have, as yet, made no systematic 
attempt to repair their damaged financial position. They 
seem to hope that the money taken from Germany will 
relieve them from the necessity of hard work and raised 


taxes. While the taxation of Great Britain has nearly 
trebled, that of France has hardly gone up 7 per cent., and 
the currency is dangerously inflated. In Italy, moreover, 
the State expenditure is three times that of the revenue, all 
the industrial undertakings of the Government are run at a 
loss, the exports are a fifth of the imports, and the military 
expenditure in one month is greater than it was annually 
before the war. When the indemnity is paid, the markets 
of Europe will, presumably, be flooded with German goods, 
produced and handed over to the Allies for nothing. This 
is hardly likely to stimulate production in the rest of 
Europe. The free labour in Allied countries will have to 
compete against the slave labour of Germany. Nor will 
the Allies find in Germany a market for their own goods, 
since the Germans will be able to make annual payments 
only by diminishing their imports and increasing their 

A discussion of the deserts of Germany does not lie 
within the scope of this book. To the Allies it appears 
unjust that a country which they believe to be responsible 
for the disaster of 1914 should not be forced to make re- 
paration for the colossal damage inflicted. But economic 
laws have, unfortunately, very little connexion with the 
principles of human ethics. The fate of the innocent has 
become inextricably involved with that of the guilty. The 
European nations have become, during the past half-century, 
an economic unit ; if it were ever possible for one member 
of the group to be treated as an outcast, it is so no longer. 
The future of the whole Continent depends upon the fate 
of the peoples of Central Europe. 

This fact has been disregarded by the Treaty of Paris, 
The developments of the past fifty years have been ignored. 
As the men of 1 8 1 5 would not take into account the recent 
growth of nationalism, so the men of 191 9 have disregarded 
the rise of internationalism. But they cannot eliminate 
the economic unity of European interests from the realities 
of history, any more than Metternich could quench in a 
treaty the ardours of the War of Liberation. It is not easy 


for us in England, wrapped in an insularity which even the 
greatest of all wars has not entirely pierced, to realize the 
full gravity of the position of Europe. But it is necessary 
that we should. Owing to the part which we played in 
the war, we hold a position of great importance among the 
concert of nations, and our actions will vitally affect the 
future of the whole Continent. We must not betray the 
power which has been given to us. We must not sink into 
insular indifference, nor must we permit ourselves to be 
carried away by the catchwords and the emotionalism of 
war politics. Only by concentrated and dispassionate study, 
by clear thought, and by determined self-sacrifice, on the 
part of every individual in our great democracy, can we 
justify ourselves in that path of honour to which we have 
been called. 


Adrianople, Treaty of (Sept. 24, 

1829), 68. 
Afghanistan, 143, 146. 
Africa, 139, 143-45. 
Agadir, 146. 
Aisne, 162, 165. 
Aix, 16. 

Albania, 148, 157, 158. 
Aleppo, 165. 

Alexander I, Emperor of Russia, 30, 
36-38, 60, 62, 63, 66, 67, 72. 

— II, Emperor of Russia, 104, 177, 


— Ill, Emperor of Russia, 178, 179. 
Alexandria, 143. 

Aigeciras, 146. 

Algiers, 75. 

AUenby, 165, 

Alsace, 18. 

Alsace-Lorraine, 98, 125, 128, 169, 

America (South), 65, 144. (Also see 

United States.) 
Amiens, 165. 

— Peace of, 1802, 29. 
Ancient Mariner, 84. 
Aranda, 8. 

Areola, battle of (Nov. i6, 1796), 23. 

Argentine, 168. 

Armenia, 151, 190. 

Artois, Count of. See Charles X. 

Asia, 139, 143, I44- 

— Minor, 132, 144, 150. 
Auerstadt, battle of (Oct. 14, 1806), 


Austerlitz, battle of (Dec. 2, 1805), 
29. 30. 

Australia, 144. 

Austria, 11-13, 15, 18, 20, 22-24, 29, 
31, 33-38, 40, 41. 59-65. 68, 72-74, 
77-80, 97, 105-14, 116-20, 123, 
124, 126, 142, 143, 146, 147, 149- 
58, 159, 160, 163, 166, 169, 170, 
206, 208. 

Baden, 62, 118, 119. 

Baghdad, 145, 152, 165. 

Balkan League, 147, 152, 157, 158. 

Balkans, 12, 67, 104-6, 139, 140, 142, 

143, 145, 147-52, 157-60, 163, 

164, 208. 
Balzac, 86. 
Barante, 83. 

Basle, Treaty of (April 5, 1795), 22. 
Bastille, 15, 49. 
Batavian Republic, 21. 
Bavaria, 11, 23, 29, 34, 40, 62 68, 

Bazard, 92. 

Beauharnais, Eugene de, 31. 
Beaumarchais, 53. 
Belgium, 11, 19, 20, 23, 38, 41, 57, 

73, 74, 120, 124, 161, 162, 168, 

170, 171, 208, 209. 
Belgrade, 157, 159, 160. 
Bentham, 91. 
Berlin, 30, 145, 204. 

— Congress of (1878), 142, 150. 

— Decrees (Nov. 21, 1806), 32, 

— Treaty of (1878), 146, 148, 150. 
Bernardin de St. Pierre, 53, 81. 
Bernstorff, 8. 

Berri, Duke of, 70. 

Bessarabia, 150. 

Bethmann-Hollweg, 201. 

Beyle. See Stendhal. 

Biarritz, interview of (Oct., 1865), 117. 

Bieberstein, 151-52. 

Bismarck, 96, 97, 112-14, 116-20, 122- 

26, 140, 142, 145, 157, 195, 199- 

Black Sea, 105, 124, 126, 162. 
Blanc, Louis, 91, 93, 99. 
Boer War, 145. 

Bohemia, 11, 58, 77, 78, 153-55. 
Bolivia, 168. 
Bologna, 31. 
Bolsheviks, 137, 176, 182, 183, 184, 





Bonaparte, Jerome, 31. 

— Joseph, 31, 33. 

— Louis, 30. 

Napoleon, 42, 79, 96, 100, 


Emperor of the French, 

102-4, 107-9, III, 112, 
114, 119, 120-24. 

— Napoleon, 13, 22-43, 46. 47. 53. 

61, 79. 
Boiiapartt and the Bourbons, 82. 
Bordeaux, 125. 
Bosnia, 146, 149-51, 154, 156, 159, 

Bosphorus, 152, 157. 
Boulano;er, General, 195. 
Brazil, 65, 164, 168. 
Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 165, 190. 
Briand, 197. 
Bride of Messina, 52. 
Brissot, 18. 
Brunswick, 204. 

Bucharest, Treaty of (1913), 158. 
Bulgaria, 148-50, 152, 157, 158, 163, 

166, 169, 170. 
Billow, Prince von, 151, 201. 
Bundeschaft, 62, 80. 
Burger, 50. 
Byron, 81, 82. 

Cadets (Constitutional-Democrats), 

181-83, 186, 188, 189. 
Cadiz, 63, 
Cairo, 23. 
Calas, 5. 
Camperdown, battle of (Oct. 11, 

1797). 23- 
Campo Formio, Peace of (Oct. 17, 

1797), 23, 36. 
Canning, 67. 
Caprara, 27. 
Caprivi, 201. 

Capua, battle of (Nov., i860), iii. 
Carbonari, 64, 73, 80. 
Carlsbad Decrees, 63, 73. 
Carniola, 154, 155. 
Carnot, President, 195. 
Castelfidardo, battle of (Sept. 18, 

i860), III. 
Castiglione, battle of (Aug. 15, 1796), 

Castlereagh, 61. 

Catherine, Empress of Russia, 8, 11. 
Caucasus, igo. 

Cavaignac, loi. 
Cavendish, 47. 
Cavour, 96, 106-12. 
Ceylon, 41. 
Charles III of Spain, 8. 

— IV of Spain, 12, 33, 36. 

— X, King of France, 6g, 70, 71, 75. 

— Albert, King of Savoy, 77-80. 
Chartreuse de Parme, 87. 
Chateaubriand, 81, 82, 84. 
Chile, 168. 

China, 141, 144, 164, 168, 170. 
Christian IX, King of Denmark, 115 

Cisalpine Republic, 23. 
Civil War in France, 137. 
Clemenceau, 168, 196. 
Coleridge, 84. 
Columbia, 168. 
Comedie Humaine, la, 86. 
Committee of Public Safety, 20-22, 

Communist League, 138. 
Communist Manifesto, 136. 
Como, 47. 

Concordat of 1801, 26, 6g. 
Confederation of the Rhine, 31. 
Confessions, 82. 
Congo (French), 146. 
Constant, 83. 

Constantine, King of Greece, 164. 
Constantinople, 11, 143, 163. 
Constituent Assembly(French — 1791), 
15-18; (1848), 100. 

(German), 204. 

(Russian), 187, 188. 

Constitution, of 1791, 15-17. 

— of the year VIII, 24, 25, loi. 

— of 1812, 64. 
Continental system, 32. 
Cousin, 83, 84. 

Crimean War, 104-6, 107, 177. 

Croatia, 154. 

Cuba, 164, 168. 

Custozza, battle of (July 25, 1848), 

78, 79- 

(June 24, 1866), 119. 

Cyprus, 150. 

Czecho-Slovakia, 168, 170, 208. 

Dalmatia, 154-56. 
Danton, 18, 21. 
Dantzig, 170. 
Danube, 105, 153. 



Dardanelles, 163. 

Darwin, 47, 96, 130-32. 

Davy, 47. 

Decazes, 69. 

Decline and Fall of the Roman Em- 
pire, 83. 

Denmark, 8, 12, 31, 37, 40, 41, 98, 
115, 168, i6g, 208. 

Directory, the, 22-24. 

Dobrudja, the, 150. 

Dogger Bank dispute, 141, 142. 

Dreyfus, 195, 196. 

Dual Alliance, 1879, 142, 147. 

— Entente, 145, 146. 
Ducos, 24. 

Duma, 181-83, 185-88. 
Dumas, 86. 
Dumouriez, 18. 

Ebert, 204. 

Ecuador, 168. 

Egmont, 52. 

Egypt, 23, 24, 67, 75, 143-45. 163. 165. 

Ekaterinberg, 188. 

Elba, 38, 41, 102. 

Engels, 136, 137. 

England, 2, 3, 12, 20-23, 29-34, 37. 
38, 40, 41, 43-48, 57, 61, 63-65, 
67, 68, 72, 74-76, 88, 89, 91, 97, 
104-7, lOQi iio» 114-16, 120, 121, 
123, 124, 126, 134, 137, 140, 142- 
47, 149-52, 159-69. 171. 173-76. 
182, 196, 198, 200-2, 208-11. 

Epirus, 68, 148, 150. 

Esthonia, 165, 194. 

Eylau, battle of (Feb. 8, 1807), 30, 

Fashoda, 145. 
Faust, 52. 

Ferdinand IV, King of Naples and 
Sicily, 8. 

— VII, King of Spain, 63, 64, 65. 
Ferrara, 31. 

Fi^v^e (Note), 24. 

Finland, 11, 13, 41, 165, 182, 185, 194. 

Florence, 79. 

France, 12-44, 47. 52. 60-62, 64, 65, 
67. 68-77, 79-89, 91, 97, 99-105, 
107-12, 114, 116, 117, 119-26, 133, 
134. 137. 139. 140, 142-47. 151. 
152, 159-69, 171. 174. 182, 194- 
98, 202, 209, 210. 

Francis II, Holy Roman Emperor, 18. 

-= — Emperor of Awstrja, 29, 35, 78. 

Francis II, of Naples, in. 

— Ferdinand, Archduke, 159. 

— Joseph, Emperor of Austria, 78. 
Frankfort, 38, 119. 

— Parliament of, 77-79, 97. 

— Treaty of (May 19, 1871), 125. 
Frederick II (The Great), King of 

Prussia, 7, 50. 

— William II, King of Prussia, 11, 

Ill, King of Prussia, 30, 35, 

36, 62. 
IV, King of Prussia, 78-80, 113. 

— Emperor of Germany, 201. 
Friedjung trial, 157. 

Friedland, battle of (June 14, 1807), 

Fourrier, 91. 
Fundamental Laws, 181. 

Galicia, 154-56, 185. 

Gallipoli, 163. 

Galvani, 47. 

Gambetta, 122, 124. 

Garibaldi, 79, 106, no, in. 

Gastein, Convention of (Aug. 14, 

1865), 116, 117. 
Gautier, Theophile, 84. 
Geneva, 169. 

— Conventions of, 140. 
Genius of Christianity, 81. 
Genoa, 13, 41. 

George, Lloyd, 167, 168. 

Georgia, 194. 

German Confederation, 41, 62, 115, 
116, 117, 119, 126. 

Germany, 10, 13, 29, 31.33.35-38,4°. 
41, 44, 50-52, 58, 59, 62, 63, 73, 
77-80, 95-97, 103, 112-20, 122, 
126, 128, 133, 134, 137. 139. 140- 
47. 150-52. 157-71. 174. 183- 
86, 189, 190, 195, 198-205, 208, 
209, 210. 

Gibbon, 83. 

Girondins, 18, 20. 

Goethe, 51, 52, 82, 83. 

Goldsmith, 48. 

Good Hope, Cape of, 41. 

Goremykin, 185. 

Gotz von Berlichingen, 52. 

Great Britain. See England. 

Greece, 57, 66-68, 148, 149, 151, 157, 
158, 163, 164, 168. 

Gr^vy, President, 195. 



Grey, Sir Edward, 151, 160. 

Guatemala, 168. 

Guchkov, 188, 189. 

Gueschoff, 157. 

Guizot, 75, 76, 83, 84. 

Gustavus III, King of Sweden, 8. 

Hague Conferences, 140-42. 

— Tribunal, 141, 142. 
Haiti, 168. 

Hanover, 30, 31, 79, 115, 116, 118, 

Hapsburgs, 31, 77-80, 152-54, 155. 
Hebert, 21. 
Hedjaz, 168. 
Hegel, 83. 
Heine, 85. 

Heligoland, 41, 170, 201. 
Helvetian Republic, 24. 
Herder, 51, 83. 
Hermann and Dorothea, 52. 
Hernani, 84, 85. 
Herzegovina, 146, 149-51, 154, 156, 

Hesse (Cassel), 118-20. 

— (Darmstadt), 118-20. 
Hetairia Philike, 66. 
Hindenburg, 163. 
Hohenlohe, 201. 
Hohenzollern, 11, 183. 

— Leopold of, 123. 

Holland, 12, 20, 21, 30, 38, 41, 57, 73, 

74, 137, 168, 208. 
Holstein. See Schleswig-Holstein, 
Holy Roman Empire, 9, 10, 11, 20, 29. 

— Alliance, 60-65, 7o> 183. 

— Places dispute, 104. 
Honduras, 168. 
Hugo, Victor, 84-86. 

Hungary, 11, 77.79, 149, 152-158, 169, 

170, 208. 
Huxley, 130. 
Hypsilanti, 66. 

Illyria, 31. 

Independents (Spartacists), 204, 205. 

India, 23, 143, 152, 165. 

Industrial Revolution, 43-47, 75, 87- 

89, 94, 128, 129, 144, 174, 178- 

179, 182, 200. 
Inquisition, 4, 63. 
International Socialism, 138, ig8. 
Ionian Islands, 23, 31, 41, 68, 
Iphigenia, 52. 

Ireland, 57, 159. 

Istria, 154-56. 

Italy, 12, 13, 22.24, 29, 31, 36, 40, 41. 
58, 59, 64, 65, 72, 73, 77.80, 96, 
97, 103, 105-12, 114, 117, 119, 
122-24, 126, 128, 142, 144, 151, 
152, 154, 156, 157-60, 163-69, 
171, 198, 208-10. 

Jacobins, 18. 

Japan, 141, 144, 146, 151, 163, 168, 

169, 171, 179. 
Jena, battle of (Oct. 14, 1806), 30, 35. 
Jenner, 129. 
Jerusalem, 152, 165. 
Jesuits, 8, 63, 70, 199. 
Joseph II, Holy Roman Emperor, 

8, g, II, 12. 
Josephine, wife of Napoleon, 35. 
Jugo-Slavia, 168, 208. 
July Ordinances, 71. 

— Monarchy, 75-77, 83, 89, 93. 
Jutland, battle of (May, 1916), 164. 

Kameneff, 189. 
Kant, 83. 

Kerensky, 188, 189, 190. 
Keynes, 206, 207. 
Kiel Harbour, 163, 164. 
Konovalov, 187. 
Kornilov, 190. 
Kossuth, 77. 
Kotzebue, 63. 
Kurland, 163, 165. 
Kurlov, 186. 
Kut, 165. 

Lafayette, 15. 

Laibach, Congress of (1821), 65. 
" Laissez-Faire," 90, 94. 
Lamarck, 47, 130. 

Lamartine, 76, 81, 84, 86, 96, 99-101. 
Lassalle, 135. 
Lauenberg, 116. 
Lavoisier, 47. 

' Laws of Association," 196. 
Ledru Rollin, loi. 
Lefavre, 125. 
Leipzig, battle of (Oct. 19, 1813), 38. 

— Working Men's Congress, 135. 
Lenin, 189, 191, 192, 194. 

Leo XIII, 133, 199. 
Leopold, Arch Duke of Tuscany, 8, 12. 
Holy Roman Emperor, 17-19. 



Leopold of Coburg, King of the Bel- 
gians, 74. 
Lessing, 51, 83. 
Liberia, 164, 168. 
Lichnowsky, 152. 
Ligurian Republic, 23. 
Linnaeus, 130. 
Lisbon, 33, 
Lister, 129. 

Lithuania, 163, 165, 190, 194. 
Livonia, 165, 194. 
Lombardy, 31, 47, 77, 107-9, 165. 
Lomenie de Brienne, 14. 
London, Conference of, 1832, 74. 

— Conference on the Black Sea 

Treaties, 1871, 126. 

— Treaty of (July 6, 1827), 67, 68. 

— Treaty of 1852 on Schleswig-Hol- 

stein dispute, 115, 116. 

— Working Men's Conference, 138. 
Louis XVI, King of France, 8, 12, 

14-19, 38, 81. 

— XVII, King of France, 38, 40, 

68, 69, 70, 82. 

— Philippe, King of the French, 71, 

72, 74-76, 96. 
Louisa, Queen of Prussia, 30. 
Lucca, 13. 
Luneville, Peace of (Feb. 9, 1801), 29, 

Luxemberg, 161, 170. 
Lvov, Prince, 185, 188, 190. 

Macedonia, 68, 148-50, 157, 158. 
Magenta, battle of (June 4, 1859), 

Maid of Orleans, 52. 
Main river, 119. 
Majority Socialists, 204. 
Makino, Baron, 168. 
Malta, 41. 
Malthus, 91. 
Marat, 18. 
Maria Stuart, 52. 

Marie Antoinette, Queen of France, 
15, 19-21. 

— Louise, second wife of Napoleon, 

35, 38. 
Marne, 162, 165. 
Marriage of Figaro, 53. 
Marseilles, 16. 

Marx, Karl, 96, 136-38, 174, 182. 
Mauritius, 41. 
Maximilian, Archduke, 121. 


Mazzini, 58, 59, 64, 72, 73, 77, 79, 96, 
98, 106, 138. 

Mediterranean, 23, 31, 75, 161. 

Mehemet, Ali, Pasha of Egypt, 67, 75. 

Menscheviks, 182, 189. 

Menschikoff, Prince, 104. 

Mesopotamia, 145, 152, 163, 165. 

Metternich, 34, 37, 38, 40, 55, 56, 58, 
59, 61-68, 73, 77, 80, 90, 154, 210. 

Metz, 125. 

Mexico, 63, 65, 121, 141. 

Milan Decrees (Dec. 17, 1807), 32, 46. 

Milanese, ir, 23, log. 

Miliukov, 186, 188, i8g. 

Minna von Barnhelm, 51. 

Minority Socialists. See Indepen- 

Mirabeau, 16, 17. 

Mirs, 177, 193. 

Modena, 13, 31, 72, 108, no. 

Moldavia, 66, 104, 105. 

Moltke, von, 114. 

Monroe Doctrine, 65, 121, 144. 

Montenegro, 149-51, 156, 157, 158, 

Moore, Sir John, 33. 

Moravia, 11, 154, 156. 

Morea, 66, 68. 

Morocco, 145, 146, 202. 

Morton, 139. 

Moscow, 37, 179, 185. 

Munich, 204. 

Musset, De, 84. 

Naples, 12, 20, 24, 31, 38, 64, 65, 77, 

106, 167, no, III. 
Napoleon. See Bonaparte. 
Nassau, 62, 118, 119. 
National Assembly, 9, 14-16. 

— Convention, 19, 20. 

— Society, 106. 

Navarino, battle of (Oct. 29, 1827), 67. 
Nelson, 23. 
Newfoundland, 145. 
New Lanark Experiment, 92. 
Newton, 130. 
Nicaragua, 168. 
Nice, 12, 19, 107, 109. 
Nicholas I, Emperor of Russia, 67,, 
72, 78, 104, 114, 141. 

— II, Emperor of Russia, 141, 151^ 

179 83, 187, 188. 

— Grand Duke, 186. 
Nieuport, 162. 



Nigeria, 145. 

Nihilism, 178. 

Nikolsberg, Peace of (July 26, 1866), 

119, 120. 
Nile, battle of (Aug. i, 1798), 23. 

— Upper, 145. 

North German Confederation, 119, 

122, 123, 200. 
Norway, 12, 37, 41, 168, 208. 
Novara, battle of (March 23, 1849), 79. 

OcTOBRisTS, 181, 182, 189. 

Odessa, 66. 

Old Age Pensions, 174. 

Organization 0/ Labour, the, 93. 

Origiji of Species, the, 130. 

Orlando, 167, 168. 

Orleans. See Louis Philippe. 

Ossian, Macpherson's, 50, 52, 53, 8i. 

Otto, King of Greece, 68. 

Owen, Robert, 91-93. 

Pacific Islands, 144. 

Palestine, 104, 132, 163, 165. 

Palmerston, 109. 

Panama, 164, 168, 195. 

Papal States, 13, 72, 77, 106-8, iio- 

Paraguay, 168. 

Paris, 15-17, 38, 47, 60, 71, 75, 76, loo, 
124, 125, 166, 194. 

— Treaty of May 30, 1815, 39. 

of March 30, 1856, 105. 

of 1919, 166-73, 193. 204, 205, 

209- n. 
Parma, 12, 31, 38, 41, 72, io8, no. 
Parthenopean Republic, 24. 
Pasisch, 157. 
Pasteur, 129. 

Patrimony of St. Peter, 112. 
Paul, Emperor of Russia, 26. 
Paul and Virginia, 53. 
Peninsular War, 33. 
Percy^s Reliques, 50. 
Persia, 141, 143, 145, 146, 168. 
Peru, 168. 

Peter and Paul, fortress of, 187. 
Petrograd, 181, 187, 188, 190. 
Piacenza, 38, 41. 
Piave, 165. 
Pichot, 83. 

Piedmont, 12, 24, 64, 65, 105-10. 
Pius IX, Pope, 80, 103, 107-9, III, 
121, 132, 199. 

Plechanov, 182, 184. 

Pleyve, von, 179. 

Plombieres, Conspiracy of, 107. 

Poland, 9, n-13, 20, 30, 41, 57, 58, 

62, 72. 73. 98, 114. 153. 156, 163, 

165, 166, 168, 178, 182, 185, 190, 

20I, 208. 
Polignac, 70. 
Pombal, 8. 
Portugal, 12, 20, 22, 23, 30, 40, 65, 

144, 168. 
Prague, Treaty of (Aug. 23, 1866), 120. 
Pressburg, Treaty of (Dec. 26, 1805), 

Protopopov, 186, 187. 
Proudhon, 91, 96. 
Prussia, 11, 12, 18, 20, 21, 23, 29-31, 

34-41, 61-64, 72-74, 78-80, 83, 97, 

103, 105, 106,108, II2-20, 122-26. 

Quadruple Alliance (Nov. 20, 1815), 

61, 62. 
" Quanta Cura " Encjrclical, 132. 

Racine et Shakespeare, 87. 
Rasputin, 187. 

Red Cross Society, 129, 140. 
Reform Bill (1832), 91, 92. 
Reichenbach, Convention of (June 17, 

1813). 37. 38. 
Reichstag, in North German Con- 
federation, 119, 120. 

— in German Empire, 161, 199, 200, 

202, 203. 
Remusat, 83. 
Renan, 132. 
Republic (First French), 19. 

— (Second), 99, 100. 

— (Third), 125. 
Ricardo, 134. 
Richelieu, 69. 
Riego, 63. 
Risorgimento, 106. 

Rivoli, battle of (Jan. 14, 1797), 23. 

Robespierre, 18, 20, 2i. 

Rodzianko, 186. 

Romagna, 108, no. 

Roman Republic (1798), 24; (1848), 

79, 106, no. 
Romantic Revolt, the, 6, 36, 47-54, 

Rome, 79, in, 112, 121, 123, 126, 133, 

Rouge et le Noir, le, 87. 



Roumania, 105, 148-150, 156, 158, 164, 
166, 168. 

Rousseau. 6-9, 15, 57, 81, 82. 
~Kumelia (taslern), 150: " 

Russia, 11-13, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31, 33, 
37, 38, 40, 41, 44, 61, 63, 64, 66- 
6S, 72-74, 78, 95, 104, 105, 107, 
114, 123, 124, 126, 137, 140, 142, 
143, 145-52, 159, 160, 163-69, 
170, 174, 176-94, 203, 208. 

Saar coal-fields, i6g. 

Sadowa, battle of (July 3, 1866), iig. 

St. Helena, 41. 

St. Simon (Due de), 5. 

— (the Socialist), 91-93. 

Salamanca, battle of (July 22, 1812), 


Salonika, 150, 151. 

Salvador, 168. 

San Stefano, Trfeaty of, 1878, 149, 

Santa Lucia, 41. 

Sardinia, 12, 13, 22, 41, 64, 77, 103, 
105-08, 113. 

Savoy, 12, 19, 107, log. 

Saxony, 11, 30, 79, 116, ii8. 

Sazonov, 186. 

Schamhorst, 35, 36. 

Scheidemann, 204. 

Schiller, 52, 83. 

Schleswig-Holstein, 114-16, 119; 
(Schleswig), 115, 170. 

Schwarzenberg, 78. 

Scientific Progress, 126-33. 

Scott, 49, 50, 81. 

Sebastopol, 104, 

Sedan, battle of (Sept. i, 1870), 124. 

Serajevo, murders of, 159. 

Serbia, 146, 149-52, 156-58, 159, i6o, 
163, 171. 

Serbo-Croat-Slovene State. See Jugo- 

Shakespeare, 50-52, 83. 

Siam, 141, 164, 168. 

Siberia, 179. 

Sicily, 12, 31, no, in. 

Si^y^s, 24. 

Silesia, 170. 

Simpson, 129. 

Slavonia, 154. 

Social Contract, 6. 

Socialism, 76, 87-95, 98-100, 133-38, 
■■ -f ' - f J i 'T O, 182-94, 196-98, 199-205. 

Soissons, 165. 

Solferino, battle of (June 24, 1859), 

Somme, 164. 
Sorrows of Werther, 82. 
Soviet, 181, 187-89, 192, 193, 203. 
Spain, 12, 20, 23, 31, 33, 40, 41, 63- 

65, 70, 75. 123, 168. 
Spanish Marriages, 75. 
Spartacists. See Independents. 
Stadion, 33-35. 
Staal, M. de, President of the First 

Hague Conference, 139. 
Stael, Mme de, 54, 82. 
States General, 2, 13-15. 
Stein, 30, 35-38. 
Stendhal, 86, 87. 
Strassburg, 125. 
Sturmer, 185, 186. 
Suez Canal, 143. 
Sweden, ii, 19, 31, 37, 40, 41, i68, 

Switzerland, 10, 24, 30, 41, 162, 168, 

189, 208. 
Syndicalism, 197. 
Syria, 145. 

Talleyrand, 38, 40, 160. 

Tannucci, 8. 

Tel-el-Kebir, 144. 

Tennis Court, oath of the, 14. 

" Terror, The," 20, 21. 

Thermidorians, 21, 22. 

Thessaly, 68, 150. 

Thibet, 143, 146. 

Thiers, 71, 75, 123, 125, 195. 

Third Estate, 14, 15, 17. 

Thrace, 158. 

Tillot, du, 8. 

Tilsit, Peace of (July 7, 1807), 30. 

Tobago, 41. 

Tours, 125. 

Trades Unions, 94, 134, 135, 138, 173, 

195, 197. 
Transylvania, 148, 154, 155, 156, 

Trinidad, 41. 

Triple Alliance, 1882, 142, 143. 
— Entente, 146, 147, 162-65, 190. 
Tripoli, 157. 

Troppau, Congress of (1820), 64. 
Trotsky, 190. 
Turgot, 8. 
Turin, 112. 



Turkey, 12, 66-68, 75, 98, 104-6, 107, 
143, 146, 147, 149-52, 157, 158, 
163, 166, 170. 

Tuscany, 12, 20, 24, 77, 79, 108, no. 

Tzarskoie Selo, 188. 

Ukraine, 165, 185, 190, 194. 

Ultras, 69. 

Umbria, 112. 

United States of America, 7, 63, 65, 

121, 137, 141, 164, 165, 168, 169, 

171, 201, 209. 
Uruguay, i68. 

Valmy, battle of (Sept. 20, 1792), 19. 

Varrennes, 17. 

Vendue, War of the, 20. 

Vtnetia, 13, 19, 23, 29, 30, 41, 77, 107, 

109, no, 112, 117, 119. 
Venezuela, 168. 
Venizelos, 157. 
Verdun, 164. 

Verona, Congress of, 1822, 66. 
Versailles, 14, 15, 126, 166, 205. 
Victor Emanuel II, King of Piedmont 
and Sardinia, 79, 105-12. 

— King of Italy, 112. 
Vienna, 77, 159, 160. 

— Congress of (1814-15), 39, 40, 66, 

152, 166. 

— Treaty of (Oct. 14, 1809), 34. 

(March 25, 1815), 40, 41, 61. 

(Oct. 30, 1864), 116. 

Vigny, Alfred de, 84, 86. 
Villafranca, Peace of (July 11, 1859), 

log, 122. 
Villemain, 83, 84. 
Vincent, Cape, battle of (Feb. 14, 

1797). 23. 

Vittoria, battle of (June 21, 1813), 38. 

Volga, 148. 

Volta, 47. 

Voltaire, 5, 6, 48, 49. 

Wagram, battle of (July 6, 1809), 53. 

Wallace, 130. 

Wallachia, 104, 105. 

Warsaw, Grand Duchy of, 30, 34, 36, 

Wartburg, 62. 
Waterloo, battle of (June 18, 1815), 

Watt, 44. 

Weimar, 51, 8i, 82, 85, 204. 
Wellesley, Sir Arthur, 33 ; (Duke of 

Wellington), 37, 38. 
Wells, 129. 
Westphalia, 31. 
Wilhelm Meister, 52. 
William I, King of Prussia, 113, 114, 

— Emperor of Germany, 126, 201. 
William II, Emperor of Germany, 

145-47, 151. 152. 170. 201-03. 
William Tell, 52. 

Wilson, President of U.S.A., 167, 168. 
Witte, de, 178, 179. 
Wordsworth, 49. 
Wurtemberg, 62, 118, 119. 

" Young Italy," 73. 
Ypres, 165. 

Zemstvos, 177, 178, 180 ; (Union of), 

185, 186, 188. 
Zola, Emile, 199. 
Zurich, Treaty of (Nov. 10, 1859), 







D Kennedy, Maxgaxet 

299 A century of revolution, 

K4 1789-1920